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Abstract
Recent human-induced disasters have prompted concerns that conventional risk manage-
ment (quantifying and controlling hazards) is not only reaching its limits but introducing
vulnerabilities which increase the probability of accidents. These compliance or behaviour-
based approaches can obscure risks, suppress data, and detract from major hazards —
feeding complacency and reducing resilience as the workforce becomes disfranchised and
deskilled. In response to this, emerging constructs favour non-prescriptive methods for
managing risk and look to support the human factors which underpin these. This is known
as the ‘fifth’ or ‘Adaptive’ age of safety.
Adaptive safety differs from its predecessors in two fundamental ways: Firstly, it re-
futes notions of accident causation as predictable and, consequently, it casts doubt on our
understanding of the human contribution to accidents. Both these undermine traditional
risk management models. Instead, an approach is advocated which accounts for complex
systemic interactions and interpersonal aspects of risk management. As yet there is a lack
of evidence and guidance to support Adaptive safety in industry.
The construction sector is particularly challenging with respect to safety because of
its litigation culture, affinity for traditional safety, project-based network structure, and
transient workforce. The emerging Adaptive paradigm could potentially be a valuable op-
portunity to improve construction safety: Moving towards engaging workers, drawing on
their expertise, increasing vigilance, and enabling a response to the unexpected; however,
its applicability to this unique sector is disputed.
This research uses mixed qualitative methods to examine the compatibility of Adaptive
safety with construction, theoretically and then in practice. The first part of this thesis ex-
plores leadership as a means to foster an Adaptive culture in organisations. A framework
for ‘Adaptive safety leadership’ is synthesised from literature on safety leadership, Safety
Intelligence, and Adaptive safety, and evaluated against construction practice in an inter-
view study. The findings show many safety practitioners and policy-makers in construction
recognise the need for systems thinking and relational aspects of leadership, but the struc-
ture, pressure, and culture of the industry mean the tendency to blameworkers and bureau-
cratise risk is difficult to overcome. The relationships between these systemic ‘Originating
Influences’ and the ‘Immediate Circumstances’ surrounding accidents are crystallised in an
update of Haslam, Hide, Gibb, Gyi, Pavitt, Atkinson and Duff’s (2005) contributing fac-
tors in construction accidents (ConCA) model — explaining the challenges to taking an
Adaptive approach and demonstrating the value of systems thinking in construction.
The second part of this thesis case studies Adaptive safety in practice, following two pio-
neering infrastructure megaprojects as they embrace Dekker’s (2017a) ‘Safety Differently’.
Proactivity, relationships, communication, and job-satisfaction are improving as the new
philosophy is cultivated and allowed to evolve in collaboration with the workforce. The
role of safety leaders in embedding this concept in frontline work and factors contributing
to their success are examined. Aspects of the company, project, and London’s megapro-
ject ecology have meant Laing O’Rourke has been uniquely well-equipped to make this
transition, but the sector’s pace of change and persistent culture have been challenging.
These insights contribute an improved understanding of the mechanisms of Adaptive
safety and the factors which support and hinder its success with a view to its wider im-
plementation. However, the work also warns against substituting engagement for safety;
questions the ethics of responsibilising workers; and stresses the need for a context-sensitive
balance of new and old safety paradigms. It highlights the inadequacies of this construct
which need to be resolved before it can be operationalised.
Keywords: Adaptive Safety; Construction; Ergonomics; Health and Safety; Human Fac-
tors; Resilience Engineering; Safety Differently
Acknowledgements
This work would not have been possible without the support and generosity of so many
people. I would like to thank:
Every construction professional for taking the time to speak to me. Your kindness and
honesty have made this worthwhile. I am especially thankful to Laing O’Rourke, Tideway,
and the Tideway Tracer Team for granting me to access your projects.
Patrick Waterson and Andy Dainty. It has been a privilege to work under your supervi-
sion. I am thankful for your drive, enthusiasm, and unwavering confidence that we would
get here.
Friends old and new for countless cups of tea debating the highs and lows of ‘quantum
gradnamics’ and my wonderful family for your constant encouragement.
The first Dr Harvey. You are my resilience. Thank you for supporting me emotionally,
financially, and technologically, and for loving me just as I am.

Publications
Full journal articles
1. Harvey, E.J., Waterson, P., and Dainty, A.R.J., 2016. Applying HRO and Resilience
Engineering to Construction: Barriers and Opportunities. Safety Science.
DOI:10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.019 (In press, corrected proof. Online since August 2016)
2. Harvey, E.J., Waterson, P., and Dainty, A.R.J., 2018. Beyond ConCA: Rethinking
Causality and Construction Accidents. Applied Ergonomics, 73, pp.108-121. DOI:
10.1016/j.apergo.2018.06.001
Peer-reviewed conference papers
1. Harvey, E.J., Waterson, P., and Dainty, A.R.J., 2015. Comparing safety intelligence in
air traffic management and construction: A conceptual comparison. In: Raidén, A.B.,
and Aboagye-Nimo, E. (Eds) Proceedings of the 31st Annual ARCOM Conference, 7-9
September 2015, Lincoln, UK. Association of Researchers in Construction
Management, pp. 1115-1124.
2. Harvey, E.J., Waterson, P., and Dainty, A.R.J., 2016. Towards an alternative approach
to safety in construction. In: Waterson, P., Hubbard, E.M., and Sims, R. (Eds)
Contemporary Ergonomics and Human Factors 2016. 19-21 April 2016, Daventry, UK.
Taylor and Francis, UK, pp. 20-24.
3. Harvey, E.J., Waterson, P., and Dainty, A.R.J., 2018. Impact of the Contributing Factors
in Construction Accidents (ConCA) Model, in: Bagnara, S., Tartaglia, R., Albolino, S.,
Alexander, T., Fujita, Y. (Eds) Proceedings of the 20th Congress of the International
Ergonomics Association, 26-30 August 2018, Florence, Italy. Springer, New York, NY,
pp. 310-319.
Presentations
1. Harvey, E.J., 2015. A new way to improve safety among construction workers. At:
Loughborough University Research Conference. 9 November 2015, Loughborough,
UK. Loughborough University.
2. Harvey, E.J., 2017. Oblivious, complacent, and rebellious? A systems thinking view of
construction workers’ attitude problem. At: 7th Annual DesRes Conference 2017. 14
March 2017, Loughborough, UK. Loughborough University.
3. O’Loughlin, M., and Harvey, E.J., 2017. Resilience in safety: A shift and opportunity for
the construction sector. At: 2017 Annual Conference: Transforming Health and Safety
Across the World. 20-21 November 2017, Birmingham, UK. Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health.
viii Publications
Poster presentations
1. Harvey, E.J., 2015. Building proactive safety in construction. At: 5th Annual DesRes
Conference 2015, 1 April 2015, Loughborough, UK. Loughborough University. And at:
EHF2015. 13-16 April 2015, Daventry, UK. Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and
Human Factors.
2. Harvey, E.J., 2017. Don’t blame the builder. At: Graduate School Summer Showcase.
22 June 2017, Loughborough, UK. Loughborough University. And at: Resilience
Conference 2017. 20-21 September 2017, London, UK. Loughborough University
London.
Contents
Rethinking Construction Safety iii
Acknowledgements v
List of Publications vii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xv
List of Abbreviations xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The landscape of safety 1
1.1.1 Systems safety and ergonomics 2
1.1.2 Understanding causation 3
1.2 The Adaptive age 4
1.3 The challenges of construction 5
1.3.1 Plateauing accident rates 6
1.3.2 The divorce of safety from operations 6
1.3.3 Behavioural safety programmes 7
1.4 Problem statement 8
1.5 Aims and objectives 8
1.6 Thesis overview 8
2 Emerging Concepts in Safety 11
2.1 Introduction 11
2.1.1 The organisation of this chapter 12
2.2 Comparing HRO and RE 12
2.2.1 Origins and traditions 12
2.2.2 Perspectives on core concepts 13
2.2.3 Approach to measurement and validation 13
2.3 Key principles 14
2.3.1 Risk management principles 14
2.3.2 Organisational principles 20
2.3.3 Worker-centred principles 25
2.4 Discussion 30
2.4.1 Summary 33
2.5 Research agenda 34
2.6 Conclusion 35
x Contents
3 Safety Leadership in Construction 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 Leadership and safety culture 38
3.2.1 Defining leadership 39
3.2.2 Leadership theories over time 40
3.2.3 Safety leadership 46
3.3 A framework for safety leadership 48
3.3.1 Safety Intelligence 49
3.4 Comparing safety leadership between sectors 50
3.4.1 Safety leadership competences in construction 52
3.5 Discussion 55
3.5.1 Adaptive safety leadership for construction 56
3.6 Conclusion 57
4 Methodology 59
4.1 Introduction 59
4.2 A social approach to risk research 60
4.3 Ontology of risk and safety 61
4.4 Epistemology in construction, psychology, and systems ergonomics 63
4.4.1 Organisational research in construction 63
4.4.2 Behavioural psychology and safety 65
4.4.3 Systems ergonomics 66
4.5 Research design 68
4.5.1 Qualitative methods 68
4.5.2 Interview study 69
4.5.3 Case study 73
4.6 Ethical approval 78
4.7 Conclusion 79
5 Safety Leadership for Resilience 81
5.1 Introduction 81
5.1.1 The organisation of this chapter 82
5.2 Method 82
5.2.1 Participants 82
5.2.2 Data collection 83
5.3 Data analysis 83
5.4 Findings 84
5.4.1 Safety leadership 84
5.4.2 Construction workers’ attitudes towards risk 92
5.4.3 A healthy attitude to risk 95
5.4.4 Resilience 98
5.4.5 Freedom 100
5.5 Discussion 102
5.6 Conclusion 105
6 Construction as a Complex System 107
6.1 Introduction 107
6.1.1 Systems thinking in construction 108
6.1.2 The organisation of this chapter 109
Contents xi
6.2 Method 110
6.3 Data analysis 110
6.4 Findings 110
6.4.1 Hazards in construction 110
6.4.2 The wider challenges of managing risk 117
6.5 Discussion 119
6.5.1 Worker traits and their systemic origins 119
6.5.2 Summary of findings 124
6.5.3 Systemic causes of risk in construction 125
6.5.4 Recommendations and future work 128
6.6 Conclusion 129
7 Adaptive Safety in Practice I 131
7.1 Introduction 131
7.1.1 The organisation of this chapter 132
7.2 The projects 132
7.3 The case study 133
7.3.1 Data collection 134
7.4 Data analysis 135
7.5 Findings and discussion 135
7.5.1 Why ‘Safety Differently’? 136
7.5.2 The ‘Next Gear’ vision 138
7.5.3 Impact on the business 147
7.5.4 Enabling factors 149
7.6 Conclusion 151
8 Adaptive Safety in Practice II 153
8.1 Introduction 153
8.1.1 The organisation of this chapter 154
8.2 Frontline operatives 154
8.2.1 Communication 154
8.2.2 Collaboration 156
8.2.3 Trust 157
8.3 Safety leadership 159
8.4 The client 162
8.5 Industry 165
8.5.1 Regulators 165
8.5.2 Structure 166
8.5.3 Culture 169
8.6 Conclusion 170
9 Discussion 171
9.1 Introduction 171
9.2 Challenges and facilitators of Safety Differently 171
9.3 The role of safety leadership 176
9.4 Challenges 176
9.4.1 The ethical concerns 176
9.4.2 The substitution of engagement for safety 177
9.4.3 The responsibilisation of workers 177
xii Contents
9.5 Antecedents of Adaptive safety 177
9.6 The interdependence of traditional and Adaptive safety 179
9.7 Conclusion 180
10 Conclusion 181
10.1 Introduction 181
10.2 Summary of thesis findings 181
10.2.1 Adaptive safety and construction 181
10.2.2 Safety leadership to cultivate resilience 182
10.2.3 Compatibility with construction 182
10.2.4 Implementing Safety Differently and its impact 183
10.3 Final conclusion 183
10.3.1 Original contribution 184
10.4 Limitations 184
10.5 Future work 185
Positioning the research 187
Appendices 189
A Coding structure sample 191
B Case study participants 193
References 195
Figures
1.1 The ages of safety 2
3.1 Leadership theories through history 41
3.2 Conceptual model of Safety Intelligence 50
4.1 Documents and observations 75
5.1 Traits of safety-conscious leaders 86
5.2 Behaviours of safety-conscious leaders 89
5.3 Risk-tolerance versus risk-awareness of different attitudes 95
5.4 A healthy attitude to risk in construction 96
5.5 Behaviours of a resilient workforce 99
5.6 Safety leadership and culture maturity model 103
6.1 The ConCA model 109
6.2 Tree diagram of the intrinsic hazards of construction processes 111
6.3 Tree diagram of factors which can cause workers to trade-off safety 116
6.4 Factors contributing to construction workers’ lack of engagement 120
6.5 Factors contributing to construction workers’ lack of communication 121
6.6 Factors contributing to construction workers’ low competence levels 122
6.7 Factors contributing to construction workers’ high risk-tolerance 124
6.8 ConCA+ 126
6.9 Tree diagram of the ConCA+ data 127
7.1 The cases and units of analysis in relation to the River Thames 134
7.2 The roles of case study participants 135
7.3 A conceptual framework illustrating how safety strategy influences stakeholders136
9.1 Vicious and virtuous cycles in management and worker attitudes 176
9.2 Industrial and organisational factors that support a resilient frontline response 178
9.3 A continuum between traditional and Adaptive safety 179
A.1 An example from the coding structure developed during interview analysis 191

Tables
1.1 A comparison of Safety I and Safety II 5
2.1 Barriers and opportunities of Adaptive safety’s management principles 19
2.2 Barriers and opportunities of Adaptive safety’s organisational principles 24
2.3 Barriers and opportunities of Adaptive safety’s worker-centred principles 29
2.4 Contrasts between Adaptive safety and construction 33
2.5 Opportunities for construction from Adaptive safety 35
3.1 Comparison of competences for influencing safety 51
3.2 Comparing Safety Intelligence in ATM and construction 55
4.1 Interview questions 72
4.2 Interview questions 72
4.3 Interview questions 77
5.1 Study participants and their roles 83
5.2 Construction workers’ attitudes to risk 94
6.1 Demographics of the construction workforce seen to exacerbate risk-taking 113
6.2 Originating, shaping, and immediate factors which make managing risk difficult118
9.1 The modified SWOT-TOWS pro forma 173
9.2 The strengths and challenges of Next Gear at LOR 174
B.1 LOR management participants 193
B.2 Crossrail TCR participants 193
B.3 TTT participants 193

Abbreviations
AI appreciative inquiry
ARCOM Association of Researchers in
Construction Management
ATM air traffic management
CDM construction design and
management
CEO chief executive officer
CIEHF Chartered Institute of Ergonomics
and Human Factors
ConCA contributing factors in
construction accidents
CSCS Construction Skills Certification
Scheme
CSO combined sewer overflow
EQ emotional intelligence
ETTO efficiency-thoroughness trade-off
FLO Ferrovial Agroman and Laing
O’Rourke
FSR fatal and severe risk
HF human factors
HFE human factors engineering
HRA human reliability analysis
HTA hierarchical task analysis
HRO high reliability organising
HSE health and safety executive
HSW health and safety at work act
i3P infrastructure industry innovation
platform
IEA International Ergonomics
Association
IOSH Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health
JCS joint cognitive systems
KPI key performance indicator
LMX leader-member exchange
LOR Laing O’Rourke
NAT normal accident theory
NDM naturalistic decision making
NEBOSH National Examination Board in
Occupational Health
OSH occupational safety and health
PPE personal protective equipment
PPP public-private partnership
PvA planned versus actual
RCT rational choice theory
RE resilience engineering
RI requisite imagination
SARF social amplification of risk
SMS safety management system
SSM soft systems methodology
STS sociotechnical system
SWOT strengths weaknesses
opportunities threats
TCR Tottenham Court Road station
TMO temporary multiple organisation
xviii Abbreviations
TTT Thames Tideway Tunnel
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied
Trades and Technicians
WYLFIWYF what you look for is what you
find
1Introduction
Contents
1.1 The landscape of safety 1
1.1.1 Systems safety and ergonomics 2
1.1.2 Understanding causation 3
1.2 The Adaptive age 4
1.3 The challenges of construction 5
1.3.1 Plateauing accident rates 6
1.3.2 The divorce of safety from operations 6
1.3.3 Behavioural safety programmes 7
1.4 Problem statement 8
1.5 Aims and objectives 8
1.6 Thesis overview 8
1.1 The landscape of safety
Since the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974, c. 37), the past
45 years have seen the devolution of occupational safety and health (OSH) — shifting
responsibility from the government’s factory acts, to organisational safety management
systems (SMSs), and to teams within organisations. Safety has been described as pro-
gressing through a series of ages, each distinguished by its emphasis on different aspects of
the system. There are multiple accounts of these ages: Hale and Hovden (1998) proposed
a Technical age, Human Factors age, and Management systems age; while Reason (1997),
the Person, Engineering, and Organisational safety models; and Hudson (2007), waves of
Technology, Systems, and Culture.
Contemporary safety has been described as the ‘fifth’ or ‘Adaptive’ age of safety (Borys,
Else and Leggett 2009). Vincent, Burnett and Carthey (2013, p. 21) describe six conceptual
approaches to safety which show how the Adaptive age has evolved from systems safety in
the 1970s.
• Safety as defences in depth (James Reason)
• Systems safety (James Reason and Charles Vincent)
• High reliability theory and safety (the Berkeley group)
• Safety as collective mindfulness (Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe)
• System dynamics and safety (René Amalberti)
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• Safety as resilience (Erik Hollnagel and David Woods)
(Vincent et al. 2013)
This era encompasses high reliability organising (HRO) and emerging theories of
resilience engineering (RE) and ‘Safety Differently’ (Dekker 2017a). It encourages a
holistic view of jobs, work, and systems (Hale and Hovden 1998, Wilson 2014) and a
humanistic view — seeing people as a valuable source of responsiveness and resilience
rather than a liability to be constrained, and focussing on ensuring safe operations, rather
than preventing unsafe ones (Hollnagel 2008, Hollnagel 2014).
The five ages are illustrated alongside the associated safety approaches in the timeline
in Figure 1.1.
Technical Age Engineering/Human Factors Age Systems Age Cultural Age Adaptive Age
Legislation
Safety Management Systems
Systems Safety
Ergonomics
Safety Culture
High Reliability Organising
Resilience
Engineering
1950Pre-1940 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Figure 1.1: The ages of safety based on Waterson et al. (2015)
1.1.1 Systems safety and ergonomics
Progress through the ages of safety has been driven by milestone events, the growing com-
plexity of sociotechnical systems (STSs) (Reason 1997) and scientific insights into human
performance and error. In the early 20th century the human factor was defined as “Mental,
physical and moral shortcomings that predispose a person to accident” (Dekker 2015). Acci-
dents of the Industrial Revolution were primarily blamed on accident-proneness or a lack
of attention, and factory inspectors were only interested in accidents “with technical causes,
since others could not reasonably be prevented” (Hale and Hovden 1998, p. 129).
The emergence of ergonomics in the 1940s shifted the focus away from so called “short-
comings” (Dekker 2015) and approached accidents from the point of view that by applying
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research regarding human capabilities and limitations to the design of tools, tasks, jobs
and environments human error could be mitigated (IEA 2018). Early ergonomics resem-
bled scientific management, decomposing tasks using hierarchical task analysis (HTA) and
integrating tasks and operators (human factors engineering (HFE)) to improve efficiency.
STS theory developed in the 1950s and originally focussed on the impact of technology
at work, but has since been applied to risk, health, safety, and accidents (Waterson et al.
2015). This era introduced naturalistic and contextualised approach to human error “to
provide a ‘holistic’ assessment of work–system interfaces and to capture the interaction between
these” (Waterson et al. 2015). Rather than mitigating errors, STS sees humans as assets
and technology as a tool— emphasising quality of life and respect for individual differences
(Eason 2008, Read, Salmon, Lenné and Stanton 2015).
There is growing interest in how social processes of organizing, wider socio-
cultural considerations, and the situated production of safety can contribute.
(Turner and Gray, 2009, p. 1259)
The role of social and cultural factors in accidents, as well as political, economic, leg-
islative and regulatory influences, has been recognised for 40 years (Pidgeon and O’Leary
2000, Turner 1978). Fundamental to an STS approach to risk management is the belief
that accidents “are not only caused by direct physical events, nor by human errors alone. They
have their roots in organisational settings and in the sociotechnical system companies are ac-
tive in” (Swuste 2008). A systems ergonomics approach advocates considering the role of
humans in accidents while taking account of context, interactions, complexity, emergence
and alternative perspectives (Wilson 2014). This systemic view has liberated workers from
fear of blame and punishment, and the concept of ‘accident-proneness’ is now regarded as
politically incorrect, unethical, and legally questionable (Dekker 2015).
1.1.2 Understanding causation
Each of these eras has brought with it a new understanding of accident causation. Hein-
rich’s 1931 Domino Theory (Heinrich, Peterson and Roos 1980) conveys a linear chain of
events resulting from a root cause. In the 1980s, complex or systemic accident models were
introduced: These were based on the theory that accidents were caused by the interaction
of multiple failures, some of which lie dormant in the design for many years (Reason 2000).
Both these historical perspectives suppose that accidents are caused by technical mal-
functions or human failures. Conversely, contemporary perspectives understand accidents
as an emergent consequence of performance variability which can interact in unexpected
ways with other functions (Hollnagel 2012, Hollnagel 2009). These dynamic, non-linear
interactions mean even the ‘safest’ organisations are vulnerable to highly improbably ‘black
swan’ (Taleb 2008) events.
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Below, Pariès and Amalberti (2000) describe the way in which accident causation is
perceived has changed between 1960s and 1990s. This model has been updated with most
recent two decades.
• 1960s: Accidents are the result of individual human errors due to a lack
of skill
• 1970s: Accidents are the result of individual human errors due to a lack
technical proficiency
• 1980s: Accidents are the result of crew errors e.g. ‘team synergy failures’
and poor resource management
• 1990s: Accidents are the result of multiple organisational failures that
shape frontline actions
• 2000s: Accidents are the result of complex interactions between organi-
sational factors
• 2010s: Accidents are the result of normal performance variation
(Based on Pariès and Amalberti 2000)
1.2 The Adaptive age
As traditional models of accident causality (and thus risk management) are questioned,
researchers and practitioners are turning towards methods which emphasise resilience and
empowerment over control and compliance. The past ten years have seen growing interest
in organisational resilience and how this can be developed within organisations (Hollnagel
and Woods 2006).
Safety-critical sectors are seeing important changes in the way safety is managed —
moving towards a less calculative approach that no longer depends upon identifying and
eliminating a ‘root cause’. This enlightened approach recognises rigid procedures can
prime inappropriate responses (Bieder and Bourrier 2013); unrealistic targets such as
‘zero accidents’ suppress incident reporting and breed scepticism (Long 2012, Sherratt and
Dainty 2017); and risk aversion or “striving for a utopia” can stifle creativity and learning
(Sherratt 2016b, Dekker 2017b, Dekker 2018, Price, Bryman and Dainty 2004).
The move towards Adaptive safety has seen a paradigm shift in our understanding of
the aetiology of accidents; the human contribution; and consequently the way in which risk
is managed (Pariès and Amalberti 2000, Hollnagel 2008). These changes are described in
Table 1.1 (Hollnagel 2014, p. 147).
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Table 1.1: A comparison of Safety I and Safety II (based on Hollnagel 2014, p. 147)
Safety I Safety II
Definition of safety As few things as possible go
wrong
As many things as possible go
right
Safety management
principle
Reactive, respond when
something happens, or is
categorised as an unacceptable
risk
Proactive, continuously trying to
anticipate developments and
events
Explanations of accidents Accidents are caused by failures
or malfunctions
The purpose of an investigation is
to identify causes and
contributory factors
Attitude to the human factor
Humans are predominantly seen
as a liability or a hazard
Humans are seen as a resource
necessary for system flexibility
and resilience
Role of performance
variability
Harmful, should be prevented as
far as possible
Inevitable but also useful. Should
be monitored and managed
The umbrella term ‘Adaptive safety’ is used throughout this thesis to describe this emerg-
ing school within safety science which sees safety as created by more than formal rules and
bureaucracy. There are many terms used for this age in the literature: HRO or Organisa-
tional Resilience (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007), Safety II (Hollnagel, Wears and Braithwaite
2015, Hollnagel 2018), Safety Differently (Dekker 2017a), and Resilience Engineering
(Hollnagel and Woods 2006). As well as encompassing these similar theories, Adaptive
safety avoids the connotations of engineering as a ‘hard’ approach to systems, rather than
a social one.
1.3 The challenges of construction
Construction is a unique industry: It has been characterised as an organic (Lingard and
Rowlinson 2005), heterogeneous network of subcontractors who form temporary multiple
organisations (TMOs) (Stringer, 1967) to produce unique projects. Employment is frag-
mented, plans dynamic, and finances constrained (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005, Sherratt
2016b), and as such it is difficult to develop and invest in a long-term risk management
strategy like permanent organisations are able to.
As a result, construction’s approach to risk management is one of control and compli-
ance, aligning with a traditional Safety I philosophy (Hollnagel 2014). Research in con-
struction safety has focused on technical aspects — accident statistics, causes, and costs
(Zhou, Goh and Li 2015)— rather than taking a holistic STS approach (Haslam et al. 2005,
Asilian-Mahabadi, Khosravi, Hajizadeh, Hassanzadeh-Rangi, Bastani and Behzadan 2014).
In terms of preventing fatal injuries in construction sites, a Cochrane review found most
interventions focus on workers’ knowledge, skills, or attitudes and motivation. There is
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weak evidence that any of these interventions are effective (van der Molen, Lehtola, Lap-
palainen, Hoonakker, Hsiao, Haslam, Hale, Frings-dresen and H 2012, van der Molen,
Basnet, Hoonakker, Lehtola, Lappalainen, Frings-Dresen, Haslam and Verbeek 2018).
1.3.1 Plateauing accident rates
Fatality rates in construction are three times higher than the average across all industries —
1.94 per 100,000 workers compared to 0.46 across all sectors in the UK (HSE 2016) and
10.1 compared to 3.4 in the US (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). The sector contributes
substantially to the total number of occupational fatalities worldwide: 31% in the UK (HSE
2014a), 18.9% in the US (NIOSH 2011), 20.9% in the EU-28 (Eurostat 2016), and 13.6%
in Australia (SWA 2013).
These statistics have improved significantly over the past century, yet progress has
stalled in recent years (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015, HSE 2014a). It remains the second
most dangerous industry — recording around 40 fatalities each year and costing the UK
economy £1.1 billion (HSE 2014a). Dekker and Pitzer (2016) claim traditional forms of
safety will never reduce accidents to zero because the methods themselves overcomplicate
matters and draw focus onto trivial risks, leaving organisations vulnerable to catastrophic
and unpredictable accidents.
1.3.2 The divorce of safety from operations
SMS have been a significant part of risk management since the Three Mile Island accident
in 1979 and have been growing in complexity to keep pace with developing technology
ever since (Reason 1997). So-called “safety inflation” (Brown and Krauss 2014, p. 251)
has resulted in cynicism: The UK’s liberal economic policies have fostered a strong regula-
tory culture whereby sectors are increasingly focussed on “secondary risk management” (p.
59) — avoiding responsibility, blame, and financial penalties — rather than managing the
risks of their primary activities (Power 2004). OSH has become about protecting vested
interests, shirking responsibility, enhancing company image, and reducing common sense
(Brown and Krauss 2014).
Criticism of the bureaucratisation (Bieder and Bourrier 2013, Dekker and Nyce 2014)
and professionalisation of safety is growing (Provan, Dekker and Rae 2018). SMS have
become “divorced from operations in the field … diverting attention away from what was
actually happening in the practical functioning of the plants” (Dawson and Brooks 1999 p.
200 cited in Smith 2016): They create a false sense of security (Amalberti 2013) and focus
on the expected rather than the unexpected (Bieder and Bourrier 2013).
There is a pressing need to change attitudes within construction that safety manage-
ment is a “bureaucratic burden”(p. 1333) that detracts from production and that risk is an
inherent part of work (Swuste, Frijters and Guldenmund 2012). A discourse of engagement
rather than enforcement is needed (Sherratt, Farrell and Noble 2013) to understand the
gap between procedure and practice (Dekker 2006, Hollnagel, Woods and Levenson 2006).
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1.3.3 Behavioural safety programmes
The influence of culture on safety was first recognised following the Chernobyl disaster
in 1986 (INSAG 1991). Now, the critical role of safety culture (defined as “the product of
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour
that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health
and safety management” (Health and Safety Commission 1993, p. 23)) has been widely
acknowledged in accident prevention (Feng, Teo, Ling and Low 2014). It is considered a
validated construct and a robust predictor of outcomes (Zohar 2010) — once advocated
as the “the best way to establish an intrinsically motivated workforce” (p. 1), reducing the
need for enforcement and rewards to extrinsically motivate compliance (Hudson, Parker,
Lawton, Verschuur, van der Graaf and Kalff 2000).
Although safety culture can be credited with bringing a social dimension to risk man-
agement — drawing on psychology, sociology, anthropology and management (Feng et al.
2014) — the lack of a precise definition or clear understanding of culture has led to liberal
use of the term, depriving the construct of its utility (Myers, Nyce and Dekker 2014).
It’s become an exasperation to me that culture is now used too extravagantly to
explain almost anything. It’s used as a kind of shorthand for saying, “We don’t
know what’s going on, but it’s all about the culture,” as if somehow this is a great
insight.
(Dixon-Woods in Wachter 2017)
Hudson (2007) describes an exemplary safety culture as one in which safe working
is “fully internalised” as a value and safe behaviour “fully integrated” into all work activ-
ities. Progression towards this requires increasing trust, accountability, and information
flow (Westrum 1991); however, “what remains unclear is how organisations move from one
step on the ladder to another” (Borys et al. 2009). As a result, behavioural safety pro-
grammes aim to manipulate culture, viewing people as simply a “black box” (Geller 1993
in Guldenmund 2010) and tackling only the part of the iceberg above the water — observ-
able behaviours, rather than the hidden interpretations, beliefs, assumptions and values
beneath (Hall 1976).
Behaviour modification is overtly manipulative, potentially ignores internal
needs and intrinsic rewards, and can be seen as a threat to individual dignity
and autonomy. It can be viewed as a simplistic and transparent attempt at
manipulation.
(Huczynski and Buchanan, 2007, p. 121)
Disillusionment with the once promising concept of safety culture is growing (Sileby
2009, Guldenmund 2010, Long 2012, Sherratt and Dainty 2017, Dekker 2017b, Dekker
2018). Behavioural safety programmes have been criticised for suppressing reporting,
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preventing learning, encouraging fraud, and infantilising workers — blaming and pun-
ishing them for injuries and illnesses because of their “failure to practice individual respon-
sibility” (Grey 2009 cited in Dekker 2018). Furthermore, rewarding and reinforcing be-
haviours is resource-intensive; the results vary due to individual differences (Huczynski
and Buchanan 2007); and public relations and superficial branding can overtake the real
issues of OSH (Sherratt 2016a).
1.4 Problem statement
The plateau in accident rates and doubts raised about the efficacy of Systems and Cul-
tural approaches mean construction’s safety strategy is in need of a rethink. New ap-
proaches which promise to reduce paperwork and regulation should be welcomed within
construction; however, the sector has remained untouched by Adaptive safety, and little is
known about generalising this theory outside the safety-critical sectors in which it devel-
oped (HSE 2011).
Systems safety research increasingly focusses on ultra-safe high-risk sectors which are
vulnerable to rare but catastrophic accidents (such as plane crashes and explosions) and
neglects hazardous work like construction. Hence, when translating this new philosophy
into an industry like construction — which sees frequent, individual casualties — clashes
arise. This growing disconnect between traditional OSH and the emerging ideas of Adaptive
safety mean the latest developments in risk management are unsuitable for contexts where
the need for innovation is greatest.
1.5 Aims and objectives
The aim of this thesis is to improve safety in construction by exploring how to operationalise
Adaptive safety in this sector.
In order to achieve this, the antecedents and mechanisms of organisational resilience
need to be understood. With a view to providing guidance on the best way to cultivate
resilience, the objectives of this research are as follows:
• To appraise the underlying theory of Adaptive safety through the lens of construction.
• To understand the factors which facilitate and hinder an Adaptive response by:
1. Exploring the role of safety leadership
2. Understanding the challenges of construction as a system
3. Observing Safety Differently in practice in construction
1.6 Thesis overview
Chapter 2
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Emerging Concepts in Safety
This literature review critiques the principles of the Adaptive age of safety through the
lens of the construction industry. There are many barriers which mean this fragmented net-
work of litigious stakeholders and temporary organisations is not compatible — explaining
why OSH and systems safety have diverged. A research agenda is proposed which empha-
sises understanding individual or social aspects of safety.
Chapter 3
Safety Leadership in Construction
The second literature review looks in detail at safety leadership and how this creates
resilience in high-risk sectors. Comparing the roles of ‘Safety Intelligent’ leaders from differ-
ent industries shows how construction’s approach differs and where there are opportunities
to improve. A vision of Adaptive safety leadership is proposed which will be compared with
contemporary practice in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4
Methodology
The problems of viewing risk management as an absolute science have become clear.
This chapter explains the importance of studying safety as a social process and justifies the
use of qualitative methods — a interview study and a case study — to understand the role
of leadership in creating resilience and safety.
Chapter 5
Safety Leadership for Resilience
A panel of expert interviewees contributed their views on best-practice safety leader-
ship, attitudes to risk, and the potential for resilience (Objective 1). Findings show inter-
personal aspects of safety leadership are already recognised as an important part of safety
and many of these traits and behaviours — transformational leadership, delegation, trust,
worker engagement — align with Adaptive safety.
Chapter 6
Construction as a Complex System
Although managers recognise the value of worker engagement, many aspects of con-
struction as a system discourage and obstruct this. Applying a systems thinking approach
to the interview data reveals how accidents at the frontline relate to the culture, structure,
and governance of the sector (Objective 2). The findings are used to expand Haslam et al.’s
(2005) contributing factors in construction accidents (ConCA) framework.
Chapter 7
Adaptive Safety in Practice I
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
The first part of this case study discusses how Laing O’Rourke have interpreted, adapted,
and implemented Dekker’s (2017a) Safety Differently and the rationale behind their deci-
sions. Their toolkit of collaborative, streamlined, and flexible procedures is examined; how
these have been received; and their impact on the business.
Chapter 8
Adaptive Safety in Practice II
Proactivity, relationships, communication, and job-satisfaction are improving as Safety
Differently has been cultivated and allowed to evolve. The second part of this case study dis-
cusses the role of stakeholders in diffusing or diluting this innovation (Objective 3). Aspects
of the company, project, and London’s megaproject ecology have meant Laing O’Rourke has
been uniquely well-equipped to make this transition, but the sector’s pace of change and
persistent culture have been challenging.
Chapter 9
Discussion
This chapter reflects back on the Adaptive safety movement and discusses its compati-
bility with construction. It questions whether resilience — which relies on organisational
learning— is suited to a dynamic network; if empowering workers addresses construction’s
blame culture; and the degree to which a more traditional version of safety (procedures,
competence, experience, and compliance) is better suited to this sector.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis contributes an improved understanding of the mechanisms of Adaptive
safety and the factors which support and hinder its successful operationalisation. The
concluding chapter summarises the its insights into Adaptive safety, limitations, and areas
for further research.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews two of the most influential approaches in contemporary safety sci-
ence — high reliability organising (HRO) and resilience engineering (RE). Although these
stem from different traditions; use different methods; and take different stances on risk,
both HRO and RE share a focus on social aspects of safety and coping with complexity
(Haavik, Antonsen, Rosness and Hale 2016). Their principles form the foundation of Borys
et al.’s (2009) ‘Adaptive’ safety movement, promising a move away from bureaucracy and
a means to manage safety without sacrificing performance.
Efforts to apply these ideas outside the ultra-safe sectors within which they developed
have so far been limited (HSE 2011). In this chapter the construction industry is used as
a test case to explore the applicability of HRO and RE in a less highly regulated context.
Contrasting construction with the environments in which HRO and RE have previously been
studied (organisations with permanent, stable structures, and a clear purpose) provides an
interesting lens throughwhich to explore their potential and how these theories would need
to be adapted to fit another context. This discussion highlights research gaps which have
limited the expansion of these approaches in new sectors and perpetuated the disconnect
between occupational safety and health (OSH) and systems safety.
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There are many aspects of the construction sector — project-based organisations, tran-
sient workforce, widespread outsourcing of labour, and financial pressure —which prevent
it developing capabilities advocated by HRO and RE; however, there is potential for con-
struction to incorporate their principles at an individual or worker-centred level rather than
organisational. These opportunities offer a useful perspective for reframing safety debates
in construction.
This work has been published as a journal article in Safety Science (Harvey, Water-
son and Dainty 2016a) and as a conference paper (Harvey, Waterson and Dainty 2016b)
which was presented at the conference of the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human
Factors (CIEHF) in Daventry.
2.1.1 The organisation of this chapter
Section 2.2 introduces HRO and RE, unpacking their different philosophies and metrics
alongside the current state of safety research in construction to show how these nascent
fields have diverged from traditional OSH. Section 2.3 explores implementing HRO and
RE in construction to identify opportunities where elements of these concepts — their
approach to risk management, organisational principles, and worker-centred principles —
could be applied or adapted to improve safety. Section 2.4 draws out key themes, and
Section 2.5 proposes a research agenda which highlights the need to extend and adapt
aspects of HRO and RE in order to tackle some of the unique characteristics of construction.
2.2 Comparing HRO and RE
2.2.1 Origins and traditions
HRO theory developed in response to normal accident theory (NAT) (Perrow 1984), demon-
strating that it is possible for some organisations to avoid “inevitable’ accidents”. By ob-
serving organisations which operate successfully in “unforgiving environments” (Weick and
Sutcliffe 2007, p. 164) (aircraft carriers, air traffic control, and a nuclear power plant) the
qualities of organisational mindfulness, which enable these systems to cope, were identi-
fied. Case studies have shown that high reliability organisations are characterised by their
capacity to respond, learn, and feedback quickly through accurate communications, and
their flexibility to improvise by recombining resources, skills and experience (Weick and
Sutcliffe 2007). These traits demonstrate the presence of organisational mindfulness –
“a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and a capacity for action” (Weick, Sutcliffe and
Obstfeld 2008, p. 37) — which enables HROs to notice the unexpected developing, con-
tain it, or act resiliently in the face of it. Theoretically, HROs respond to perturbations
in ways that strengthen adaptability — increasing learning, flexibility, and experience —
rather than reducing it by adding further controls (Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003).
One core principle of HRO is a commitment to “resilience”, a word which has recently
appeared with increasing frequency in a variety of contexts — ecological, individual and
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engineering (Bhamra, Dani and Burnard 2011). RE in relation to safety grew out of ‘or-
ganisational resilience’, a term which first appeared 20 years ago (Mallack 1998, Horne
and Orr 1998), and described as the ability of an organisation to respond to change con-
structively, without introducing regression. RE has been described as the natural next
step in OSH following a highly developed ‘Interdependent’ (DuPont 2015) or ‘Generative’
(Westrum 1991) safety culture, “to overcome the limitations of existing approaches” (Woods
and Hollnagel 2006, p. 11). Its new perspective — seeing human adaptability as an as-
set — has been described as a significant step change (Hollnagel 2008); however, it can
also be seen as a continuation of the work of human factors (HF) researchers to design
systems around human attributes (Wilson 2014). This emerging field has yet to develop
a clear definition of its theory and limits making it difficult to draw comparisons with the
clear framework of HRO.
2.2.2 Perspectives on core concepts
In spite of their different origins, there are similarities between HRO and RE. Both emerged
in response to the limitations of procedures and regulation to manage safety in complex
systems, and both emphasise the human attributes — adaptability, imagination, mindful-
ness — which enable people to act resiliently and perform in circumstances where failure
is expected. However, attempts to reconcile HRO with other high-risk safety approaches
under the umbrella of RE (Hollnagel et al. 2006) have had limited success because of their
different philosophical foundations.
One explanation for this disparity is their differing perspectives on what constitutes
organisational resilience. In HRO’s model of organisational mindfulness, ‘commitment to
resilience’ is categorised as a principle of containment, not anticipation. ‘Firefighting’ (re-
acting to emergencies as they arise) in high reliability organisations is seen as a positive
trait and evidence of resilience (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) — something which, in other
organisations, is seen as a symptom of poor planning and reactive management. Resilience
engineers do refer to the work of HRO-scholars (Hollnagel 2014), incorporating organisa-
tional mindfulness, whether or not this is true to Weick’s original concept, as one part of
RE’s toolset of safety measures which can “facilitate the emergence of resilience” (Hollnagel
and Sundström 2006). Within RE resilience forms part of both anticipation and response—
intrinsically linked as organisations adjust “prior to, during, or following changes” (Hollnagel
and Fujita 2013, p. 13), whilst in HRO resilience is seen as the reaction to an incident, with
a greater emphasis on ‘bouncing back’.
2.2.3 Approach to measurement and validation
In terms of auditing resilience and HRO, measurement scales for HRO have been developed
(Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007), but a literature review by the health and safety executive (HSE)
(HSE 2011) criticised the lack of quantitative evidence supporting the predictive validity
of organising in this way and safety performance. The majority of research was said to
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be observational and qualitative, providing rich descriptions of the qualities of these or-
ganisations, but lacking a theoretical framework to justify why HROs succeed where other
organisations fail.
Similarly for RE, research is needed in terms of real-world empirical methods to vali-
date its constructs (Burnard and Bhamra 2011, Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003, Hollnagel 2018).
Hollnagel and Woods (2006) state that resilience cannot be measured, only an organi-
sation’s capacity for it through variables such as buffering capacity, the flexibility of its
structure, awareness of proximity to margins, and tolerances enabling graceful degrada-
tion (Woods 2006). The characteristics of a resilient organisation are less well-defined
than high reliability organisations, but the RE community believes any organisation can
become resilient, with different industries managing stability and flexibility in different
ways (McDonald 2006). Therefore, RE could offer valuable opportunities to expand the
well-intentioned ideas of HRO to suit other contexts, but as yet further work is needed to
understand the factors that facilitate the development of both resilience and mindfulness.
The following sections will compare concepts of HRO and RE through the lens of the
construction industry, focussing on three areas: Their approach to risk management; char-
acteristics of the organisation; and individuals or workers.
2.3 Key principles
2.3.1 Risk management principles
Barriers
Construction accidents
One of the greatest barriers to adopting HRO in new sectors is the belief that HRO is only
applicable in safety critical industries. In construction, workers believe that “safety detracts
from the primary production process” (Swuste et al. 2012, p. 1333). This is true in some
sectors such as rail, where unforeseen hazards frequently lead to delays or cancellations
(Hale and Heijer 2006b); however, both RE and HRO emphasise maintaining performance
and safety simultaneously — the key to safe performance without sacrificing reliability is
resilience. Reason’s Organisational safety model deliberately blurs the line between quality
and safety, as safe operation is an integral part of performance as a whole (Reason 1997).
This is particularly true in the safety-critical industries where HRO developed. The synony-
mous use of ‘safe’ and ‘reliable’ implies high-reliability is only attainable by organisations
where safety is the primary focus— a view which underlies the conceptual barrier to apply-
ing this theory elsewhere and one which has kept HRO from integrating into construction
(olde Scholtenhuis and Dorée 2014). However, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) intend their
work as a template for “any institution that wants to better organise for high reliability”.
Neither HRO nor RE promise zero accidents, but rather a reduced probability in terms
of the number of encounters. In circumstances where the risks are high, it is possible for an
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organisation to be described as resilient even if it has accidents (Hollnagel 2014). Similarly,
if the risks are low, an organisation may be safe without needing to be resilient (Hale and
Heijer 2006a). The high number and type of accidents faced by construction compared
to ultra-safe organisations may explain one of the differences that prevent HRO and RE
being applied more widely. Although construction is high-risk, the concern here is the high
level of personal injury incidents, whereas HRO and RE have developed in safety-critical
sectors — such as nuclear and aviation — with the potential to cause harm to third parties
(Reason 1997). The prevalent causes of death in construction are falls from a height (30%),
slips, trips and falls on the level, being struck by a moving vehicle (Haslam et al. 2005) and
electrocution (HSE 2014a).
Accidents therefore become intolerable on account of their consequences rather
than their frequency … 100 isolated, singular deaths may have far less emo-
tional impact than 10 deaths in a single event.
(Amalberti 2006 p. 269)
The social amplification of risk (SARF) describes how some risks are amplified by so-
cial, psychological, and cultural factors (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble,
Kasperson and Ratick 1988). Although the majority of occupational fatalities occur due to
construction accidents, they are “isolated” events, so the risk is socially “attenuated” and
research has been diverted to focus on sectors with greater risk of harm to the public and
which generate more political and media interest. However, construction is not immune
to causing collateral deaths: 4 members of the public died in UK construction accidents
in 2014 (HSE 2014a), the collapse of the Rana Plaza textile factory in Bangladesh killed
1,134 people (The Guardian 2015), and corners cut in the renovation of Grenfell Tower
led to the deaths of 72 people (Grenfell Tower Inquiry 2018). Reason (1997) argues risks
to third parties are high across all sectors because, despite differences at the frontline, they
are equally threatened by latent problems of planning, scheduling, and budgeting which
contribute to major accidents. For HRO and RE to benefit construction, the similarities
between accidents in safety critical sectors and those in construction need to be embraced.
Opportunities
Accident causation
Before the age of systems safety, accidents were believed to have a root cause — a technical
malfunction or individual failure on which events could be blamed. This simplistic model
is emotionally satisfying and has legal and financial benefits (Reason 1997), but can fail
to appreciate the complex relationships between causes and consequences. Within con-
struction this tendency towards simplifying situations to find a root cause can be seen in
contemporary accidents (Clegg and Kreiner 2014). The prominence of the ‘Zero Accidents’
discourse also confirms this model. Using propaganda to manipulate workers’ attitude
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to safety demonstrates the belief that accidents could be prevented with more effort or
care (Dekker 2015). Swuste et al. (2012) argue a better understanding of causal chains
is needed to improve construction safety; however, given the loosely coupled structure of
construction organisations, it can be difficult to identify and learn from causal links and to
accept a lack of accidents as proof of good practice (Clegg and Kreiner 2014).
Accidents in HRO are described in causal terms, as the result of an unfortunate com-
bination of a number of errors; hence, detecting failures as they develop through sensi-
tivity to weak signals is advocated (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). However, this simplistic
understanding of accidents has been criticised for endorsing the idea that accidents can
be prevented by paying more ‘mindful’ attention to precursor events (HSE 2011). Based
on this interpretation, risk analysis depends upon the systematic identification of causal
chains and implies safety is a static commodity that can be quantified, not a dynamic pro-
cess. Projects, like those in construction, have been described as “drifting environments”
(Kreiner 1996, p. 335), where the outcome changes over time, thus RE’s notion of drifting
accidents offers a different perspective on accidents investigation (Hollnagel 2009) which
could be better suited to loosely coupled systems than exploring causal chains and looking
for pivotal failures. For RE, safety is a dynamic process, human behaviour cannot be cate-
gorised in a bimodal way and the causes of accidents are far more subtle and complex —
nothing worth reporting happens (Hollnagel 2009). Instead, accidents are caused by an
undetectable “drift into failure” (Hale and Heijer 2006b, p. 37) which is a natural part of
operations in resource-constrained environments.
RE scholars argue a causal model cannot cope with complex relationships (Hollnagel
2009) and unexpected failures (Hollnagel 2014) — only predictable cases where data can
be reliably assessed — and is hindered by a form of confirmation bias Lundberg, Rollen-
hagen and Hollnagel call what you look for is what you find (WYLFIWYF) (Lundberg,
Rollenhagen and Hollnagel 2009). The efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) princi-
ple (the tendency to sacrifice thoroughness for efficiency) is key to understanding the ‘drift’
that means failure can develop out of normal behaviour. Humans have a natural tendency
towards efficiency (Hollnagel 2009). Rational decision-making is also limited by context,
subject to social and cultural factors (Perrow 1984), and constrained by finite cognitive re-
sources so people “muddle through” making what they perceive to be “sensible adjustments
to cope with current and future situational demands” P.149 (Hollnagel 2014). In many
cases, this performance variability is a positive improvement, enabling more efficient ways
of working, but the same variability can also lead to failures (Hollnagel 2009).
RE incorporates the ETTO into its understanding of accident causation, recognising
that people instinctively make sacrificing decisions, or trade-offs, to cope with pressure;
thoroughness is sacrificed for efficiency, safety is sacrificed for production. Instead, it is
proposed that accidents are caused by functional resonance — an unexpected combination
of everyday performance variability, or “ETTOing”, the consequences of which are emergent
rather than resultant (Hollnagel 2009).
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Reanalysing construction accidents through the lens of RE’s functional resonance could
provide a different perspective. Although trading off safety for production can lead to
accidents, understanding that the workforce’s natural adaptability has the potential to
strengthen the system, as well as weaken it, highlights the opportunity to harness for the
benefit of safety. These theories of drift within performance and its effects, which can
reverberate unpredictably throughout a system, present an interesting challenge to con-
struction and HRO’s interpretation of accidents. Both these fields subscribe to the notion
that accidents can be predicted and therefore prevented by promoting greater attention —
or the vision of “zero accidents” in construction. However, according to RE, it is the efficient
decisions which prevent accidents and maintain performance every day, as well as cause
them when performance drifts outside the acceptable tolerance.
Anticipating accidents
Accidents in high reliability organisations are, by definition, extremely rare. They operate
in environments which preclude learning by experimentation because of the dangers they
face; therefore, little is said about how they learn from accidents. Instead, mindfulness
encourages a focus on the present because — although past experience can be valuable —
memory can draw attention away from current events and provoke generalised interpre-
tations based on hindsight. This reactive approach to learning from accidents (or precur-
sors of accidents), where feedback is immediately acted upon, could be beneficial in an
industry like construction where factors needed for long-term learning — leadership, pro-
cesses, infrastructure, communication, education and community (Chinowsky, Molenaar
and Realph 2007) — are hindered by the dynamic and fragmented nature of temporary
multiple organisations (TMOs).
HRO’s principle of ‘preoccupation with failure’ encourages members of the organisation
to imagine potential mistakes, elaborate on near misses, and articulate the consequences—
however distressing — so mitigations can be expanded (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Sim-
ilarly, RE advocates the use of ‘Second Stories’ — looking for other potential outcomes of
the events to avoid bias, hindsight, and oversimplification caused by knowing the real out-
come (Hollnagel 2014). It also warns of the dangers of “distancing through differencing” or
the “it would never happen to us” attitude (Cook and Woods 2006) meaning people fail to
see the similarities between accidents in other organisations and events in their own, and
therefore cannot learn from them. Both these theories have potential to enhance safety in
construction.
Recently RE has put forward an approach to safety management known as ‘Safety II’
(Hollnagel 2014). Traditionally, safety (‘Safety I’) has focussed on what went wrong fol-
lowing an accident; but under Safety II, a greater emphasis on the aspects that contribute to
normal performance is encouraged; in order to learn from events they need to be frequent
enough to make generalisations. In complete contrast with HRO, which advocates seeing
the unique nuances of every event (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007), RE accepts that accidents
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are difficult to learn from because they are rare, poorly understood, and difficult to make
generalisations about. Instead, investigating everyday successes — such as human adapt-
ability and positive performance variability — can be seen as an investment in performance
rather than safety (Hollnagel 2014).
Accident research in construction, as well as many other sectors, is hindered by a mis-
taken belief that “the potential for learning is proportional to the severity of the incident”
(Hollnagel 2014, p. 160). Hence, accident investigation is often confined to serious and fa-
tal accidents (Hinze, Devenport and Giang 2006). Although it would be difficult to justify
a shift in focus away from accidents (as advocated in Safety II) when they are a frequent
occurrence, understanding accidents as emergent consequences of adaptations required to
cope with pressure could reduce the propensity for blame, creating a just culture as advo-
cated by both HRO and RE, and open up opportunities to embrace workers’ flexibility —
seeing it as a form of resilience as opposed to disobedience.
Key differences between HRO and RE have been identified in their approach to risk
management and their applicability to other contexts. Underpinning these differences is
their understanding of the way in which accidents develop. HRO, like construction, takes a
view that accidents are the result of a causal chain of errors, thus the precursors to accidents
can be detected by paying mindful attention to cues in the present. RE is founded on the
belief that accidents emerge from adaptations made to cope with pressure and the “drift”
towards failure is unnoticeable. This disparity is reflected in the ways the two schools
advocate anticipating accidents.
Table 2.1 lists the new concepts for risk management from the Adaptive age, whether
they arose from HRO or RE, and summarises the positive and negative points from the
evaluation of their potential application in construction.
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2.3.2 Organisational principles
Barriers
Applicability to construction
As with its theories about risk management, HRO’s ideas about organisations have also
meant it has not been readily embraced by construction. The type of organisation HRO
is based upon is fundamentally different from construction work. NAT (Perrow 1984) ar-
ranges organisations onto two axes, forming 4 quadrants, according to their characteristics.
“Coupling” (originally an engineering term) describes the capacity to absorb shocks and
failures. If an organisation is tightly coupled its processes are time-dependent, sequential
and invariable — leaving little slack — so perturbations have a rapid impact. “Complexity”
describes the interactions between components. In linear systems it is easier to substitute
people and materials because roles are less specialised, information is directly monitored,
feedback is local, and control can be decentralised. In complex systems the interactions
may be invisible, unpredictable, indirectly measured, and connect multiple subsystems;
therefore, perturbations have a widespread impact.
In organisations which are both tightly coupled and complex, failures have a rapid and
widespread impact. HRO describes the characteristics needed for safe performance in this
type of organisation. According to the NAT framework, construction is low risk because raw
materials are assembled, rather than fabricated, and their processes are visible and can be
understood; thus there are opportunities to learn from construction accidents. However,
the growing popularity of megaprojects as a delivery model for public services (Flyvbjerg
2014) means managers must coordinate numerous subcontractor organisations, work to a
tight schedule, and keep agreements with local stakeholders to minimise disruption. For
example, details such as the sequence in which deliveries have been loaded onto a lorry
can mean a delay of a few hours but have widespread repercussions over several months
for multiple other contractors who cannot begin their work until prerequisite stages have
been built (Walsh 2015). Although the industry as a whole is loosely coupled, projects and
their supply chains have become increasingly tightly coupled and complex — a structure
which Dubois and Gadde (2002) describe as a two-layered pattern of coupling. In light
of the recent changes to the industry, the applicability of HRO’s principles in construction
needs further consideration.
Structure
Under normal conditions high reliability organisations have an extremely hierarchical struc-
ture with clear roles and responsibilities; redundancy; high levels of accountability, and
expectations for following procedures and performance (Roberts and Rousseau 1989).
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The paradox of achieving high reliability is creating a strong hierarchy which can be dis-
solved rapidly in the face of adversity, allowing its empowered employees to manage lo-
cal events. This transformation from centralised to decentralised control is only possi-
ble if organisations initially have a centralised control hierarchy (Glendon, Clarke and
McKenna 2006). The importance of management has been well established in safety as
a whole (Zohar 2010). Particularly within RE, the management’s ability to diagnose po-
tential problems, make-decisions, and act assertively, underpinned by their commitment
(Flin 2006) and individual resilience (Hollnagel 2009) are all believed to contribute to
resilient leadership among managers. In construction projects however, lines of authority
and accountability become unclear due to the dynamic, transient nature of TMOs.
Culture
Developing adaptability through cultural change is an idea which has appeared in both
HRO (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) and RE (Reason 2000, Wrethall 2006). A just or report-
ing culture (Reason 1997) is required for ‘sensitivity to operations’ or understanding work
as performed, not as imagined (Hollnagel and Woods 2006, Wrethall 2006). Construction,
like many organisations, can be seen to take front line operations for granted. A recent in-
quiry exposed the practice of blacklisting construction workers for being vocal about OSH
issues (House of Commons 2015). It is an industry highly vulnerable to economic pressure,
employment fluctuates with recession and growth, hence the use of contracting to provide
flexibility of labour and meet changing market demands (Manu, Ankrah, Proverbs and
Suresh 2013). It has been suggested that, because HRO developed in non-profit organisa-
tions where safety is a primary objective, its constructs would be difficult to implement in
sectors, like construction, with conflicting goals and pressures (Tamuz and Harrison 2006).
A resilient response relies on contingency resources and experience within the workforce—
a challenge in “stretched systems” (Hollnagel and Woods 2006) when workers are viewed
as a disposable commodity.
Procedures
Although HRO classifies resilience as a principle of containment, it is recognised that a
resilient response depends upon the “structures that have been developed before crisis arrives”
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Similarly in RE, maintaining control in the face of unexpected
events depends upon both anticipation and response (Hollnagel and Fujita 2013). In spite
of this, both HRO and RE are sceptical of formal planning: The limitations of foresight
mean planning can never anticipate all the ways a system could fail. Planning can reduce
the capacity for a resilient response because it imposes expectations on situations, promotes
confirmation bias, and reduces improvisation (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). RE also warns
that an overemphasis on procedures could lead to “work-to-rule” where workers follow
regulations so strictly it negatively impacts upon productivity and safety (Hollnagel 2009).
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Despite its limitations, RE recognises that in some cases proceduralisation may be the
most appropriate safety mechanism (Amalberti 2006). Perrow (1967) argues the degree
to which organisational activity can be “pre-programmed” depends upon the activity itself.
According to his framework, construction is classified as an industry well suited to pro-
cedures because its tasks are well structured and routine, exceptional cases are rare, and
solutions to problems are easy to find. Thus, reducing proceduralisation is a concept from
the Adaptive age that should be applied with caution in construction. Avoiding planning
may encourage resilience to develop in some organisations, but in others it could reduce
anticipation and lead to reactive management (McDonald 2006).
HRO recommends preparing for failure by building in contingency in the form of un-
committed resources or “pockets of resilience” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, p. 80). Rather
than procedures or protocols, high reliability organisations plan by investing in systems
that gracefully degrade and developing a broad range of employee experience; shared
knowledge within the system; and training and drills to support ‘deference to expertise’.
In an industry like construction which is loosely regulated (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005)
and averse to rules (Swuste et al. 2012), formal contingency plans are difficult to establish.
The notion of uncommitted resources to help manage unexpected events is attractive, but
unlikely in such a resource constrained environment.
Opportunities
Cultivating resilience
HRO’s model of organisational mindfulness presents a ‘one-size-fits-all’ template which
does not suit a fragmented, organic, transient organisation. However, RE recognises that
“spontaneous resilience” (Amalberti 2006, p. 271) can be found in unsafe systems; hence,
its stance is a more inclusive and holistic one. Resilience is seen as an emergent property
so a top-down approach — forcing systems to adopt structures seen in successful organi-
sations — shows an idealised understanding. A specific strategy for developing resilience
is not prescribed; instead, RE methods should depend on the context and stage of devel-
opment (McDonald 2006).
RE relies on organisations learning from experience how best to facilitate resilience in
their own operations. Resilience is expressed differently in each system and at each stage,
so to develop it requires an ongoing commitment to identify and invest in the factors that
contribute. In other words, resilience is a proactive process a system does, rather than —
as HRO suggests — a reactive mechanism a system has (Woods and Hollnagel 2006). This
offers a more hopeful perspective, opening up the possibility of developing resilience in any
organisation, providing the approach is suitable. The existing resilience within construction
workers can be expanded to apply to safety, as well as production, without needing to
adopt the structures of HROs; However, developing a strategy for cultivating resilience in a
TMO—where feedback loops are not well defined and learning from experience difficult—
is an area in need of further research.
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At an organisational level, the services within which HRO and RE have so far been stud-
ied shed little light on how Adaptive safety might apply in a temporary project. Hierarchy,
commitment to the workforce, reduced proceduralisation, and an unchallenged commit-
ment of resources to safety are all concepts which do not transfer well into construction.
However, it may be possible for construction to draw upon RE as its methods for ‘engineer-
ing’ resilience are not confined to a prescribed template and there is scope to develop a
strand of RE specific to construction. Table 2.2 lists the organisational concepts for from
the Adaptive age, whether they arose from HRO or RE, and summarises the positive and
negative points from the evaluation of their potential application in construction.
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2.3.3 Worker-centred principles
Barriers
Empowerment
At an individual level there are opportunities for workers to develop a resilient mind set
which could allow construction to adopt Adaptive safety in spite of the barriers at the or-
ganisational and risk management strategy levels. However, a significant discrepancy still
exists with respect to their stance on empowerment. The challenge for tightly coupled and
complexly interactive systems is the need for control to be simultaneously centralised —
to see the interactions between different parts of the system — and decentralised — so
operators can act quickly and independently (Perrow 1984, Reason 1997). Both HRO and
RE advocate empowering individuals to respond to unexpected events, but decentralised
decision-making applied in a context like construction — where safety is not prioritised,
regulation loose, and lines of authority unclear — leads to workarounds, and unsafe acts.
Herzberg (1987) found that performance could be improved if employees had greater
autonomy, direct feedback, and an understanding of the significance and identity of their
task — unlike the fragmented tasks of scientific management (Taylor 1911). To some ex-
tent this is similar to the principle of ‘deference to expertise’ in HRO (Weick and Sutcliffe
2007) — allowing leadership to migrate to the people with the most expertise, regardless
of their rank or experience and RE which describes resilient organisations as “empowered to
be independent, involved, informed, and informative” (Hollnagel and Woods 2006, p. 324).
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) say empowerment can be achieved by encouraging constant
interaction between teams. Multi-disciplinary teams increase trust, prevent power strug-
gles, and are better at coping because existing skills and knowledge can be recombined
to deal with unique situations. They have greater diversity in their experiences — which
can also be achieved through selection, job rotation, retraining — to increase awareness of
the operational picture and prevent complacency. However, this is difficult in construction
because the majority of work is subcontracted, allowing firms to engage specialists on a
flexible basis. As a result, the organisation becomes fragmented into units with conflicting
interests, ambiguous responsibilities, inadequate communication, and reduced teamwork
(Manu et al. 2013).
An empowered workforce relies on communication, knowledge management, and op-
portunities for long-term investment and training, all of which are compromised in con-
struction. To achieve the multi-skilled, self-managed teams seen in HROs, construction
workers would need to be better educated and have higher expectations for job enrichment
(Price et al. 2004). The existing literature on empowerment focuses on internal teams, and
there is a lack of guidance as to how these could apply to outsource providers, highlighting
a barrier to applying HRO to construction. For a TMO to empower workers in this way
may not be possible, given that workers are employed for their specific skills, but it stresses
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the need to foster relationships between contractor organisations to create a community of
practice with a better understanding of the ‘big picture’.
Opportunities
Sensitive to the unexpected
Under the principle of ‘reluctance to simplify’, HROs encourage an understanding of error
which sees the unique nuances of suspicious events to learn more rather than generalise
about them. Their tendency towards efficiency means people are quick to name, categorise
and stereotype phenomena; this helps to organise information and make it more sharable,
but the use of rigid categories can mean its thorough exploration is brought to a premature
end. Avoiding simple diagnoses based on superficial similarities affords HROs a clearer and
more complete picture of situations (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
In intractable, high-risk environments it is impractical to be this thorough. Another
concept proposed by Weick is that of “sensemaking”, describing how people cope with am-
biguity by making sense of a situation through action and communication, and settle for a
plausible explanation (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2012). This is similar to RE’s ETTO:
Rather than counteracting the natural tendency to simplify, the ETTO accepts that it is
impossible for people find thorough, rational explanations for every event. To cope in dy-
namic situations people have learned to trade off thoroughness for efficiency and identify
all the relevant information without being overwhelmed, rather than “find the perfect re-
sponse when it is too late.” (Hollnagel 2009, p. 55). HRO’s sensemaking and RE’s ETTO
both describe the reality of coping with pressure in high-risk, ambiguous environments.
Efficient or plausible explanations, rather than a complete understanding, can result in
presumptuous decisions and lead to errors. Although it is impossible to avoid some simpli-
fication and routine, HRO’s warning that this should be done “slowly, reluctantly, mindfully”
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2007, p. 12) is nonetheless a valuable message and one that has not
gone unrecognised in construction: Clegg and Kreiner (2014) suggest that one way to im-
prove learning from construction accidents is to “make learning harder, not to facilitate it”.
Where situations are complex and ambiguous, doubt and scepticism should be welcomed
as they prevent complacency.
Imagination to anticipate
To avoid accidents, employees of high reliability organisations consciously maintain failure
at the forefront of their mindset — the principle of ‘preoccupation with failure’. HRO
warns of the dangers of falling into automatic processing, and instead these organisations
“persuade all their members to be chronically concerned about the unexpected” (Weick and
Sutcliffe 2007, p. 62). Reporting is rewarded and a questioning attitude encouraged so
employees remain sensitive to weak signals — acting on hunches that something might be
going wrong. The same concept can be seen in RE, as Hollnagel and Woods (2006) also
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advocate a “constant sense of unease” (p. 355) and Dekker “keeping the discussion on safety
alive even when everything looks safe” (2006).
A similar concept has also been called requisite imagination (RI) (Adamski andWestrum
2003), “safety imagination” (Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000), and “chronic unease” (Reason
1997). RI— “the fine art of anticipating what might go wrong” (Adamski andWestrum 2003,
p. 193) — is essential for resilience (Hollnagel and Woods 2006); It fuels a questioning
attitude and enables designers to anticipate all the possible scenarios. Similarly, safety
imagination (Pidgeon andO’Leary 2000) encourages a less rigid approach to anticipation in
order to capture the failures outside expectations (Pidgeon 2010). Finally, chronic unease
was first described by Reason (1997) as “the assumption that every day will be a bad day”
and has more recently been broken down into five attributes — vigilance, pessimism, RI,
flexible thinking, and the propensity to worry (Fruhen, Flin and McLeod 2013).
Developing a culture of chronic concern about safety issues is a fundamental part of re-
silience and organisational mindfulness, and its potential to improve safety in construction
has been recognised — “we need more theorising and imagination than facts and evidence”
(Kreiner 2009, p. 143). Mentally simulating the potential ways the operations could fail
expands the “complex tree of causalities” (Kreiner 2009, p. 142) therefore increasing the
number of precautions to be taken. Imagination also extends the potential of learning
from accidents using imagination to avoid what Cook and Woods (2006) called “distancing
through differencing”, and prevents “overlearning” from single-events by mediating experi-
ences with an awareness of their complexity, randomness and ambiguity. In a masculine
industry (Aulich 2013, Lindebaum and Fielden 2010) where risk as an integral part of work
(Swuste et al. 2012), encouraging vigilance and lowering risk tolerance in this way presents
an interesting opportunity. However, other than raising awareness that bringing attention
back onto task when distracted requires conscious effort (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007), nei-
ther RE or HRO offer any empirical insights into how this ‘preoccupation with failure’ can
be established or measured.
Initiative to respond
Their ability to transform between centralised and decentralised control means HROs could
be described as both ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ (Burns and Stalker 1961). Organic indus-
tries respond rapidly to changing market conditions, whereas mechanistic organisations,
such as process industries, have a stable hierarchy. Construction is organic which provides
one explanation for its poor safety record. OSH is far more difficult to implement in organic
organisations than mechanistic because autonomy, responsibility, and the use of initiative
to overcome problems are encouraged (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005).
In accordance with its philosophy that accidents can be detected as they develop, HRO
encourages organisations to react to unexpected events with a contingency of uncommitted
resources and diverse skills (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Ironically, construction workers are
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adaptable — using initiative to work independently — but without clear lines of author-
ity, regulation, and prioritisation of safety, the natural human tendency towards efficiency
leads to unsafe workarounds and violations rather than resilient performance adaptations.
This suggests high-reliability results from the combination of individual empowerment and
hierarchical control. Therefore, for construction to be highly-reliable would require struc-
tural changes to improve regulation and management — an impossible challenge to im-
plement given that construction projects are formed of multiple, temporary subcontractors
(Stringer 1967). Imposing control and structure in this way is a major barrier to expand-
ing HRO to other sectors, but cultivating workers’ “spontaneous resilience” and channelling
this capability towards safety, rather than productivity, could provide a useful opportunity.
In contexts like construction, with complex organisational networks and high pressure,
worker-innovated practices have been shown to be more influential than regulation; to im-
prove safety the ways in which this knowledge exists and flows within the system need to
be understood (Pink, Morgan and Dainty 2014).
The value of avoiding assumption, imagination, and initiative are all traits of Adaptive
safety which could be adopted within construction. It could be possible for construction
workers to develop resilience even in an industry where the structure and financial con-
straints do not support resilience at an organisational level. A research agenda is presented
in Section 2.5 to outline how this could be achieved. Table 2.3 lists the worker-centred as-
pects of the Adaptive age, whether they arose fromHRO or RE, and summarises the positive
and negative points from the evaluation of their potential application in construction.
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2.4 Discussion
The findings will be discussed with reference to five characteristics of organisations which
are managing safety in accordance with HRO and RE — continuously learning, well-
resourced, flexible, chronically uneasy, and humanising — each of which poses specific
problems for the construction industry.
Continuously learning
Learning from experience and feedback allows a resilient organisation to anticipate and
prepare for unexpected events; however, construction is an industry particularly vulnera-
ble to economic pressure: Employment fluctuates with recession and growth, hence the
sector operates as a dynamic network of projects subcontracted to multiple organisations,
allowing firms to engage specialists on a flexible per-task basis and cope with changing
market demands. As a result, construction projects become fragmented into units with
a silo mentality — conflicting interests, ambiguous authority, inadequate communication,
and reduced teamwork (Manu et al. 2013). This is a very different picture to the em-
powered, multi-disciplinary, and constantly interacting teams which enable high reliability
organisations to build up a complete risk picture (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
This transient structure impacts both workers’ loyalty to the client and management’s
commitment to workers’ professional development. While resilient organisations see the
value of investing in training and drills to develop a wide range of employee experience and
shared knowledge within the system, this long-term outlook is not prioritised for temporary
workers on construction projects. Furthermore, the unique design of projects prevents
knowledge transfer between projects and the specialised nature of the construction trades
prevents multi-skilling, therefore limiting workers’ awareness of risks outside their own
role.
Well-resourced
Another feature of safety-critical environments which contributes to their resilience is that
safety is prioritised and therefore invested in. The ability to respond to unexpected events
without sacrificing performance relies on building up resources, both in terms of knowledge
and physical assets. These can take the form of preparations, procedures, and competence
to manage known threats, or a contingency of uncommitted resources —“pockets of re-
silience” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) — to tackle unknown threats.
Unfortunately, the structure and economic constraints of the construction sector make
it difficult to prioritise safety by investing in resources in this way. Although the notion of
uncommitted resources is attractive, in a temporary and financially pressured environment
it is unlikely. It is known that for safety management to be most effective it needs to be
incorporated into the project at the design phase; however, projects are often awarded to
the lowest bidder and clients focus on the end service or infrastructure without considering
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the implications of how this will be achieved. Production is prioritised over safety; efficient
decisions (as opposed to mindful) are encouraged; and in order to cope in this dynamic
industry workers are forced to take shortcuts and workaround issues to meet production
targets.
Flexible
Ironically, construction workers and projects are adaptable, but their inability to cope with
change without it resulting in incidents means they cannot be described as “resilient”. OSH
is far more difficult to implement in organic organisations— those which respond rapidly to
changing market conditions (Burns and Stalker 1961) — than mechanistic because auton-
omy, independence, and the use of initiative to overcome problems are encouraged (Lingard
and Rowlinson 2005). Instead, it is the inflexible timescales and regulations which put
pressure on workers to take risks.
Proceduralisation and compliance-based risk management are widespread in construc-
tion. Tasks are seen as routine and therefore they can be proceduralised, however each
project is unique and so procedures, particularly if they are rigidly adhered to, can have
a negative impact on workers’ awareness and flexibility: Procedures can create a form of
‘tunnel vision’ known as Inattentional or Perceptual Blindness and can prime the wrong
responses — reducing sensitivity to cues outside their expectations.
The difficulties of managing a dynamic project also means site-wide regulations, such
as “no hard hat no work”, are implemented in situations where hard hats and other personal
protective equipment (PPE) are unnecessary or even a hindrance. Rather than empowering
workers to deal with risk, this inflexible approach to work practices shows a lack of sensi-
tivity to operations and breeds cynicism among the workforce. Although this risk averse
strategy protects against litigation, conventional approaches to OSH, including highly pre-
scriptive procedures and legislation, limit innovation and professional judgment, hinder-
ing people’s ability to assess and manage risk appropriately and the development of “en-
trepreneurialism … resilience and self-reliance” (Gill 2007, p. 18) — the types of thinking
needed to adapt in response to unexpected events.
Chronically uneasy
Fruhen et al. (2013) categorised the sensitivity and suspicion within managers of HROs as
comprising of “pessimism, propensity to worry, vigilance, requisite imagination and flexible
thinking” (p. 969). Developing a culture of chronic concern about safety issues is a fun-
damental part of resilience: Maintaining the potential for failure at the forefront of their
mind-set fights the complacency and automatic processing which allow errors surface. In
contrast, construction is known for its ‘macho culture’: Physically demanding tasks under-
taken in all weather conditions attract a workforce stereotypically seen as young, agile,
males with low academic attainment, who therefore lack the vulnerability that motivates
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a vigilant and proactive attitude to risk. Their inability to resolve “distancing through dif-
ferencing” (Cook and Woods 2006) — also described as the ‘it would never happen to us’
attitude — makes it particularly difficult for these workers to learn from the mistakes of
colleagues and other organisations.
Imagination is another trait which seems incongruous with construction work. RI
(Adamski and Westrum 2003) has been identified as a component of chronic unease:
Imagination can support an adaptive approach to safety by enabling those involved to
anticipate more potential scenarios and capture the failures that fall outside the expected.
It also encourages a questioning attitude and helps to prevent distancing through differ-
encing by allowing workers to imagine themselves in an accident scenario and digest its
consequences (Kreiner 2009).
Humanising
Managing risk in a humanising (as opposed to ‘dehumanising’) way can be subdivided into
two aspects: Firstly, an approach to risk management which engages with workers and
empowers them, and secondly an approach to investigating accidents which appreciates
their complex causes and avoids hasty judgements of workers’ incompetence or negligence.
As discussed in 2.4, organisational resilience relies on feedback, enabling the work-
force to collectively learn from experience; this requires a just culture to support reporting
of accidents. On the other hand, in construction there is a strong tendency towards ex-
plaining accidents with a root cause model. Pragmatic behavioural safety programmes
have become increasingly popular in spite of their superficial understanding of psychology
which promotes a simple ‘reward-punishment’ paradigm as a means to control unsafe be-
haviour. Rather than promoting a culture of trust and motivating learning, the unachiev-
able goal of zero accidents breeds scepticism of OSH and reduces reporting for fear of
punishment. Innovation and flexibility have also been shown to decrease, and rewarding
successes (such as the number of hours since the last accident) worryingly promotes com-
placency (Long 2012). Similar rigid and centrally-determined targets — which are often
skewed towards those which are easier to measure such as behaviour instead of culture,
accidents instead of resilience — lack the sensitivity to operations needed to allow workers’
the autonomy and responsibility to manage their own risks.
Behavioural safety programmes also demonstrate a superficial understanding of ac-
cident aetiology which causes blame to be placed on worker behaviour rather than sys-
temic issues. In contrast, a view of accidents has been proposed from the Adaptive age
which opposes a causal pathways altogether and instead sees accidents as an unfortunate
and unpredictable combination of trade-off decisions, the consequences of which resonate
throughout the system in a way that far exceeds the sum of the errors (Hollnagel 2009).
Instead of seeing humans as inherently dangerous, and therefore firing those ‘responsible’
for accidents, this view challenges this approach and opens up opportunities to discuss and
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learn from accidents by avoiding blaming individuals. A humanising approach, which sees
people as part of the solution, is critical to managing safety adaptively.
2.4.1 Summary
This review presents a challenge for both construction OSH and the HRO and RE commu-
nities. Exploring the two side-by-side, has underlined the disconnect between OSH and
systems safety, and the differences between HRO and RE. Further research is needed to
understand how construction can reprioritise in order to adopt Adaptive safety approaches,
and how HRO and RE can be extended and adapted to suit a network of subcontractors
and temporary projects.
Adaptive safety requires management commitment, sensitivity to the frontline, priori-
tisation of safety, empowerment of workers, and a just culture; thus, it seems impossible
to apply in an industry where contracting is ubiquitous, and investment in people is lim-
ited by the constrained budget and uniqueness of projects. Moreover, HRO and RE use
multi-disciplinary teams to diversify skills and experience, while construction workers are
engaged for their highly-specialised skill sets and work in ‘silos’. RE relies on experience to
inform how an organisation invests in developing resilience— a long-term strategy difficult
to implement in a network of TMOs. These contrasts are summarised in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Contrasts between Adaptive safety and construction
Characteristics of the Adaptive age Characteristics of Construction
Structure Tightly coupled and complex Loosely coupled
Empowered, multi-disciplinary teams Sub-contractors paid per task
Permanent organisations Transient projects
Strong hierarchy of control (HRO only) Independent, local decision making
Organisation Able to build in contingency resources Vulnerable to economic pressure
Safety is prioritised Production targets prioritised over safety
Open to change Rejects innovation
A just culture Low levels of reporting
Accidents Accidents affect 3rd and 4th party victims Personal injury accidents
Media attention Accidents rarely reported in the news
Individuals Sensitive to failure Low risk perception
Employees understand the ‘big picture’ Workers work independently in silos
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2.5 Research agenda
For construction to embrace Adaptive safety, in light of this evaluation the following areas
of research show the most promise and should be made the focus of further research in
both construction safety and the Adaptive age of safety.
This review has brought to light new ways accidents in the construction industry could
be reframed to change the way they are approached. Hollnagel’s (2009) theory of accidents
as a result of drifting performance and functional resonance offers an alternative to the ‘root
cause’ model which contributes to the culture of blame surrounding accidents. Models of
drift could be well suited to temporary and dynamic construction organisations (Kreiner
1996) and need further investigation in this context.
Many of the challenges discussed have their roots in the fragmented and financially-
constrained nature of construction, rather than its workers. In reality, construction work-
ers are adaptable, demonstrated by their ability to work around problems, but at present
the pressures on this sector channel workers’ “spontaneous resilience” towards productivity
rather than safety. A worker-centred, bottom-up approach to cultivating resilience by de-
veloping RI and chronic unease could help to increase vigilance and promote proactivity
in the face of risk. Understanding these mechanisms — which have been proposed as an-
tecedents to a resilient response to risk— presents a valuable opportunity to improve safety
in construction. Chapter 5 investigates the role of leadership as part of this mechanism.
Finally, understanding the ‘big picture’; focussing on responding to the present; and
investing inmaintaining everyday performance also provide areas where construction could
incorporate Adaptive safety, but are hindered by the nature of the industry. However, there
are examples of high-profile construction megaprojects where systems integration has been
successful (Davies 2017, Bolt, Haslam, Gibb and Waterson 2012): These temporary yet
well integrated megaproject organisations could provide a starting point for implementing
Adaptive safety. This is the subject of Chapters 7 and 8.
Table 2.5 summarises the principles of the Adaptive age which offer the greatest oppor-
tunities for improving safety in construction, providing the barriers can be overcome. The
novel approach to risk management and the worker-centred aspects of resilience show the
most potential.
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Table 2.5: Opportunities for construction from Adaptive safety
Approach Origin Opportunity for construction
Risk management RE
Understand that failures emerge from performance
adaptations to cope under pressure to reduce the
propensity for blame
RE Focus on everyday performance to strengthen the system
against accidents and reduce the propensity for blame
HRO
Focus on the present when responding to the unexpected
to reduce the requirement for long-term plans and
learning from experience
Worker-centred HRO
Enhance workers’ understanding of the ‘big picture’ to
build relationships between subcontractors and prevent
silo working
HRO and RE Encourage adaptability among the workforce to support a
resilient response
HRO and RE
Develop a culture of chronic unease among workers to
lower their tolerance to risk
HRO and RE
Avoid simplifying unexpected events to maintain a vigilant
and sceptical attitude
Organisational RE Cultivate resilience in a way that is appropriate to the
unique context of each organisation
2.6 Conclusion
The disparities between construction OSH and the and Adaptive safety have been explored:
The unique design of projects prevents the development of transferable experience; the
project-based nature and transient workforce prevent continuous learning; temporary em-
ployment limits investment in diversifying workers’ skills and experience; financial con-
straints do not allow for contingencies; rigid procedures hinder initiative and flexibility;
the macho culture fights feelings of vulnerability; and a pragmatic approach to finding the
‘root cause’ of accidents has created a culture of blame and intolerance.
Applying principles advocated by the Adaptive age such as management commitment,
sensitivity to the frontline, prioritisation of safety, empowerment of workers, and a just
culture presents a significant challenge. Instead, it is proposed that construction could
become more resilient by incorporating worker-level — as opposed organisation-level —
aspects of the Adaptive age of safety. For this, further research is needed to understand
how the social factors believed to underpin a resilient response to risk (chronic unease and
imagination) can be developed. In response to this, leadership and how it is changing along
with the changing landscape of safety is considered in Chapter 3.
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3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 highlighted the potential opportunity to apply Adaptive safety in construction
through its individual or worker-centred aspects. Resilience is an emergent property of
relationships and interactions between people and technology, not something which can
be imposed from outside. Therefore, the role these actors play in constructing a resilient
organisation is key to understanding how it can be adopted in a new context. As such,
a focus on leadership was pursued because it is believed to have a significant effect on
shaping the safety culture of an organisation (Zohar 2010, Clarke 2013, Lekka, Healey and
Hill 2012) — although the ability to measure both culture and leadership are disputed.
Leadership paradigms have evolved over the past century from focussing on the draw of
powerful characters towards leaders as facilitators; empathising, inspiring, and supporting
followers to achieve organisational goals (Rowe and Guerrero 2018) — in this case the
ability to withstand and respond to adverse events. This trend has also seen a movement
towards leadership as plural, rather than limited to those in positions of authority, and
hence an interest in how leaders can empower their followers to lead themselves (Huczynski
and Buchanan 2007). Adaptive leadership (Northouse 2017) and Adaptive safety have
emerged concurrently in their respective fields: Both are based on a contingency (rather
than scientific) approach tomanagement, and both aim to empower the workforce— either
to manage risk or for a general purpose. Researching how the influence of leaders can foster
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organisational resilience has the potential to further our understanding of this concept; how
it can be translated to other contexts; and how it could benefit construction safety.
This chapter reviews the literature on leadership and safety, exploring how Adap-
tive leadership and safety leadership have evolved. In particular, the review focusses on
‘Safety Intelligence’ — a recently proposed framework for senior management in air traffic
management (ATM) — and compares this with construction. A model of Adaptive safety
leadership is proposed which is then evaluated against construction managers’ experience
of safety leadership in Chapte 5.
This work has been published as a conference paper (Harvey, Waterson and Dainty
2015) which was presented at the conference of the Association of Researchers in Con-
struction Management (ARCOM) in Lincoln.
3.2 Leadership and safety culture
Supervisory practices have been shown to predict safety initiative and compliance (Simard
and Marchand 1997 cited in Lingard and Rowlinson 2005) and high quality working re-
lationships influence construction workers’ performance: Encouraging positive emotions,
job-embeddedness, voicing concerns, and participation (Chih, Kiazad, Cheng, Lajom and
Restubog 2017). Leadership has also been well-established as a defining influence in or-
ganisational culture (Zohar 2010). A systematic review of 62 articles found a “consistently
positive association held between culture and outcomes across multiple studies, settings and
countries’’ (Braithwaite, Herkes, Ludlow, Testa and Lamprell 2017). Unfortunately, leaders’
influence is not always a positive one: Lack of commitment to safety has been implicated
as a cause in the investigation of several major accidents including the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill, the Texas City Refinery explosion, and the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise
(Fruhen, Mearns, Flin and Kirwan 2014b).
Workers’ engagement with leaders shapes safety culture (Kines, Andersen, Spangen-
berg, Mikkelsen, Dyreborg and Zohar 2010, Conchie, Moon and Duncan 2013); their au-
thority reinforces the social-learning process that takes place within exchanges, allowing
members to recognise the values and behaviours that form the culture endorsed by the
organisation. Cultivating workers’ intrinsic motivation for safe behaviour is an appealing
prospect, and the concept of safety culture has been utilised by many safety programmes
such as ‘Hearts and Minds’ (Hudson et al. 2000), DuPont’s ‘STOP’, ProAct Safety’s ‘Lean
Behaviour-Based Safety’, and Geller’s ‘Total Safety Culture’ (Guldenmund 2010). Specif-
ically in construction there has been a proliferation of behaviour-based ‘Zero Accident
Vision’ (Zwetsloot, Leka and Kines 2017) programmes such as Crossrail’s ‘Target Zero’
(Crossrail 2018) BAM1’s ‘Beyond Zero’ and Laing O’Rourke’s ‘Mission Zero’ (see Chapter
7).
1Royal BAM Group
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Programmes like these have deprived safety culture of its intangible and implicit nature
and instead attempt to engineer a culture through behavioural and visible characteristics—
tackling the outer “layers” of Rituals (such as processes, dress-codes, and slogans), Symbols
and Heroes, rather than the beliefs which underpin them (Guldenmund 2010). Disillusion-
ment with safety culture is growing (Guldenmund 2010). Rather than adopt ethnographic
approaches traditionally used in anthropology, the majority of research into safety culture
takes a functionalist approach, where culture is seen as a causal attitude and a variable
subject to manipulation (Sileby 2009).
Given this backdrop, safety culture has been criticised for taking a Tayloristic view of
safety. Attempts to change safety culture through propaganda to capture the ‘Hearts and
Minds’ of the workers implies some form of moral deficiency or a lack of effort and is
incompatible with the Adaptive age view that humans are an asset to systems because their
abilities create resilience (Borys et al. 2009). Safety culture is a relative concept (Zhang,
Pirzadeh, Lingard and Nevin 2018): Research has shown it is perceived in different ways
at senior, middle and team levels (O’Dea and Flin 2001); young and older workers (Idrees,
Hafeez and Kim 2017); and influenced by the norms of social groups over organisational
identities (Choi, Ahn, Asce, Lee and Asce 2017).
There is a lack of research on how to worker engagement with leaders can support
safety in construction (Bell, Powell and Sykes 2015). The following review explores how
leadership theory has developed over time and existingmodels which could underpin Adap-
tive safety leadership in construction.
3.2.1 Defining leadership
The definition of leadership has changed significantly over the last century: Early research
focused on characteristics that attract and influence followers — charisma, masculinity, in-
telligence, wisdom. Leadership was seen as an inherited trait possessed by individuals and
fixed at birth. Contrary to this, today’s definitions see leadership as a socially constructed
process within relationships.
The process of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts
toward goal-setting and goal achievement.
(Huczynski and Buchanan, 2007, p. 695)
Lekka et al. (2012) andHuczynski and Buchanan (2007) stress three components which
characterise this contemporary understanding of leadership: Firstly, leadership is an inter-
personal process involving influence; it is set within a social context (for instance, between
leaders and followers); and lastly, it must be orientated towards a shared goal.
Leadership as a process
Consequently, contemporary leadership theories view leadership as a holistic process:
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Leadership is a two-way, interactive event between leaders and followers rather
than a linear, one-way event in which the leader affects the followers.
(Rowe and Guerrero, 2018, p. 1)
Traditional ‘trait-based’ leadership theories were challenged by this view: Rather than a
characteristic a few ‘Great Men’ were gifted at birth, newer theories advocate studying not
only the leader as an individual, but their behaviour and that of their followers, transactions
between leader and follower, the leader-follower relationship, and its context and purpose
(Rowe and Guerrero 2018, Ladkin 2010).
As an emergent characteristic, leadership is therefore available to everyone — not just
those born with particular traits — and not just a formally appointed leader (Rowe and
Guerrero 2018). Similarly, good leadership is not automatically realised by those assigned
a leadership position.
In spite of this, many studies focus only on the traits and characteristics of leaders
and not the collective process of leadership as a whole (Pilbeam, Doherty and Denyer
2017). Furthermore, in terms of safety-specific leadership, most research has looked at
team leaders and supervisors, yet the health and safety executive (HSE) provides most
guidance for senior managers (Pilbeam et al. 2017). To counter these gaps in the literature,
this thesis takes a social approach to studying leadership as a contextual phenomenon. This
is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Leadership as shared
This view of leadership as emergent and accessible to all has been reflected in develop-
ing theories. Bennis-Nanus’s (1985) model of ‘21st century leadership’ (cited in Huczynski
and Buchanan 2007) proposed a move from a few top leaders and many managers to many
leaders at every level and fewer managers. This non-hierarchical model saw reduced power
distances and increased sharing of information. It also distinguished between leaders and
managers: Leaders, as opposed to managers, would be visionary and creative; inspiring,
empowering, and anticipating rather than goal-setting, directing and reacting. The em-
phasis of leadership was as a coach, enabling change rather than managing conflict.
Pilbeam et al. (2017, p. 132) identifies three types of shared leadership: ‘Plural’ leader-
ship is a collective responsibility; ‘co-leaders’ have different specialisms; and in ‘distributed’
leadership followers defer to expertise. Since 2008 there has been an emphasis on every-
one’s responsibility as a ‘safety leader’ (BSI in Pilbeam et al. 2017, p. 121), although this
term is not well defined. Plural leadership is particularly relevant in networks temporary
multiple organisations (TMOs) like construction, especially where the aim is to engage and
empower rather than enforce rules and policies.
3.2.2 Leadership theories over time
Over time, the popular theory of leadership has developed from a trait to an ability, skill,
pattern of behaviour, relationship, and influence process (Northouse 2017). Northouse’s
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(2017, p. 5) timeline (Figure 3.1) shows of how leadership research has moved through
ages, some of which occurred concurrently. Lighter grey shading shows where interest in
these approaches has waned.
Trait
Behavioural 
Situational
Relational
New Leadership
Emerging
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Figure 3.1: Leadership theories through history (Northouse 2017, p. 5)
Traits-based leadership
Prior to leadership research, ‘Great Man Theory’ provided an explanation as to why some
individuals gathered followers more easily than others. This historical perspective argued
leadership was innate, hence these leaders would become powerful regardless of social,
historical, or organisational context (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). In the early 20th
century many attempts were made to define the characteristics of a leader or ‘Great Man’;
for example, Stogdill’s (1948) survey of the literature on personal factors associated with
leadership identified intelligence, alertness, insight, responsibility, initiative, persistence,
self-confidence, and sociability.
Although typically regarded as an historical approach, a trait theory of leadership is
still significant today. In the 1980s interest in psychometrics caused a resurgence of trait-
based approaches: Of the ‘big five’ personality factors, extroversion, conscientiousness,
openness are associated with effective leadership, agreeableness is weakly correlated, and
neuroticism has a negative association (Judge, Bono, Ilies and Gerhardt 2002). A definitive
list of traits has never been developed (Lekka et al. 2012) but themajority of models include
intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability (Rowe and Guerrero
2018).
Interestingly, some of the traits identified by early studies align with emergingmodels of
Adaptive and Authentic leadership: Stogdill (1948, p. 81) identified ‘venturesomeness and
originality in problem solving’, ‘strong drive’, and ‘initiative in social settings’. This proac-
tiveness and anticipation are also supported by Steward (1963, cited in Huczynski and
Buchanan 2007) alongside a more caring side of leadership — fairness, integrity, dedica-
tion, dependability, and co-operation.
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The inability to develop a consistent list of leadership characteristics has been a major
criticism of trait-based leadership, along with their vague description which limits general-
isability. Its models are too reductionist, simplistic, and isolate leadership from its context
(Glendon et al. 2006) — hence the move towards context-specific models in later years.
Behavioural leadership
The shift in leadership theory from traits to behaviours in the 1950s aligns with interest in,
and the growing popularity of, behaviourism in psychology. Behavioural leadership focused
on leaders’ actions rather than their characteristics and showed leadership to be a cause-
and-effect process (Lekka et al. 2012) but many of these relationships were inconclusive
(Northouse 2017) and oversimplified (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). The importance of
consideration, participation, and democracy over an impersonal, autocratic, directive style
for effective leadership was recognised.
Early research showed good or ‘considerate’ leaders focussed on building relationships,
communication, and are attentive to followers, rather than task-orientated (Glendon et al.
2006). One example is the work of Rensis Likert (1961, cited in Huczynski and Buchanan
2007) who found supervisors in highly productive sections of an insurance organisation
took a less prescriptive approach to supervision, enjoyed responsibility, spent more time fo-
cussing on employees not production. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s several continuum
were developed from social-sensitivity to production-focussed; autocratic to democratic;
and task-orientated to relationship-orientated (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). One of
these was Tannenbaum and Schmidt’s ‘Continuum of Leadership Behaviour’ (1958, cited
in Tannenbaum and Schmidt 2008) which places “Boss-centred” leadership at one end of
the spectrum and “subordinate-centred” leadership at the other; between these there is a
range of behaviour styles — tells, sells, consults, shares, and delegates.
Later research showed both task and relationship-orientation are important for effective
leadership (Northouse 2017). Leaders need both employee-centred behaviours — support-
ive, trusting, approachable, encouraging participation — and job-centred behaviours —
which deal with the practicalities — to balance productivity and workers’ satisfaction
(Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). Tannenbaum and Schmidt (2008) recognised leader-
ship style depended on factors within the manager themself (their personality, values, and
trust in workers); the workforce (their expectations, independence, tolerance of ambigu-
ity); and the situation (the nature of task and team). This inspired the following era of
Situational leadership research.
Situational leadership
A ‘context-fitting’ or ‘contingency’ theory of leadership was proposed to account for the
way leaders adapt their style to suit different situations (Fieldler and Chemers 1974). This
theory draws on Vroom’s expectancy theory (1964, cited in Huczynski and Buchanan 2007)
of motivation — the factors which determine how much effort someone will exert in a task.
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Success depends not on particular traits or a behavioural style but on the ability to vary the
approach depending on many contextual factors such as the structure of tasks; the leaders’
position of power; and the relationships between leaders and followers. For instance, task-
orientated leaders (as discussed in the previous section) were shown to be more effective in
situations where tasks are highly structured but employee-centred leaders drive innovation
and autonomy (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007).
House and Mitchell (1974, cited in Lekka et al. 2012) identified four types of leadership
styles which leaders switch between: Supportive, Directive, Participative, Achievement-
Orientated. Similarly, Goleman (2000, cited in Rowe and Guerrero 2018) identified six
styles of leadership:
• Commanding. Driven and self-control. Goal is compliance.
• Pacesetting. Initiative and drive to achieve. Goal is high-standards.
• Affiliative. Empathy and communication. Goal is harmony.
• Democratic. Collaboration and team building. Goal is consensus.
• Coaching. Empathy and self-awareness. Goal is to develop people.
• Visionary. Self-confidence and change catalyst. Goal is mobilisation.
(Goleman 2000)
Commanding and pacesetting styles have been said to have a negative effect on com-
mitment and flexibility in an organisation. In general, research suggests a considerate,
empathetic, collaborative style is more successful: These styles draw on workers’ exper-
tise, bring them on-board with decisions, promote acceptance of change, build trust, and
inspire creativity (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). However, leadership style also depends
contextual factors such as the nature of the task and the followers’ preference; for instance,
an authoritative style is needed when time is short, when the leader is most knowledgeable,
and when those who participate will never agree — this may explain why such a style is
preferred in construction.
Situational leadership has criticised for being too complex to provide a general, practical
guideline for managers — it would be impossible to optimise these factors for every situa-
tion (Rowe and Guerrero 2018). The theory has not been tested in safety-critical contexts
(Glendon et al. 2006), does not include leaders’ technical competences; does not account
for the impact of changeable style on trust in leader-follower relationships; and does not
account for followers’ needs — or “psychological readiness” (Hersey and Blanchard 1988,
cited in Huczynski and Buchanan 2007), only leaders’ goals. In spite of this, the situa-
tional model showed the importance of leaders’ Adaptive Capacity, which enables them to
perform in different contexts.
44 Chapter 3. Safety Leadership in Construction
Relational leadership
A relational approach, also known as the ‘power’ or ‘influence’ approach, was introduced
in the 1990s (Lekka et al. 2012). This type of leadership research aligned with the in-
creasing popularity of modelling human behaviour in cognitive psychology and sociology.
Rational choice theory (RCT) studied how humans optimise decisions by weighing the
risks and benefits of relevant factors — a model which was also applied to the relationship
between leaders and followers. One of the most notable theories from this period is the
leader-member exchange (LMX) theory (Graen and Uhl-Biel 1995, cited in Huczynski and
Buchanan 2007): According to this model, effective leadership is based on high quality
social exchanges between leaders and followers (Rowe and Guerrero 2018).
LMX was the first theory to focus on the leader-follower relationships rather than seeing
the leaders, followers, and situations as separate entities (Northouse 2017). Trust, respect,
sense of obligation are key aspects of an effective LMX relationships, but the theory has been
criticised as it lacked practical guidance on how to create such a relationship and down-
played the importance of situational aspects (Lekka et al. 2012). However, this approach
is still relevant and used today (Northouse 2017).
New leadership
New leadership developed from Behavioural and Relational approaches (Lekka et al. 2012).
This school focusses on visionary or charismatic leaders, the most well-known theory being
‘Transformational Leadership’. Transactional leadership models (like LMX) study the ex-
changes between leaders and followers and how these motivate employees to perform in
exchange for rewards. In contrast, Transformational leaders act as role models— inspiring,
challenging, and mentoring employees (Bass 1985, cited in Northouse 2017).
[Transformational leadership] is concerned with emotions, values, ethics, stan-
dards, and long-term goals. It includes assessing followers’ motives, satisfying
their needs, and treating them as full human beings.
(Northouse, 2017, p. 171)
As well as a commitment to their followers, these leaders are committed to improv-
ing the organisation, motivating followers and inspiring them to go beyond contractual
obligations and compliance (Burns 1978, cited in Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). This
‘Inspirational Motivation’ is one of Bass and Avolio’s ‘4I’ model of Transformational leader-
ship — the others being “Idealised influence, individualised consideration … and intellectual
stimulation’’ (Rowe and Guerrero 2018, p. 260) — describing how leaders act as role mod-
els, mentor followers, and stimulate innovation (Bass and Aviolo 1990, cited in Huczynski
and Buchanan 2007).
A similar model the New school is Sims and Lorenzi’s (1992, quoted in Huczynski and
Buchanan 2007, p. 295) ‘Superleaders’ who “lead others to lead themselves’’: These leaders
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empower workers; stimulate motivation, creativity, and commitment; and develop informal
leadership, reducing dependence on formal leaders.
Although this and other contemporary approaches to leadership research have moved
away from a trait-based model, traits and behaviours are a convenient way to communicate
aspects of leadership — providing practical guidance for managers. Alimo-Metcalfe and
Alban-Metcalfe’s model (2002, cited in Huczynski and Buchanan 2007), identifying 14
traits and behaviours which Transformational leaders exhibit:
• Leading and developing others: Genuine concern, empowering, accessi-
ble, encouraging change.
• Personal qualities: Transparency, integrity, decisiveness, inspiring, resolv-
ing complex problems.
• Leading the organisation: Networking, achieving, focussing team effort,
building shared vision, supporting developmental culture, facilitating
change sensitively.
(Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 2002)
Transformational leadership has also been described as a sequence of stages; for ex-
ample, first empower subordinates and encourage innovation; then provide a strong ex-
ample of morals which promotes trust; create an identity and goals for the organisa-
tion; shape the shared values and culture of the organisation; and finally reinforce success
(Northouse 2017). Similarly, Kouzes and Posner (2002, cited in Rowe and Guerrero 2018)
describe modelling the way, inspiring a shared vision, challenging current process, enabling
others to act, and encouraging the hearts of followers.
Transformational leadership has been found by studies to correlate with increased satis-
faction, decreased stress (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007), and increased proactivity among
workers (Den Hartog and Belschak 2017); however, Lingard and Rowlinson conclude that
“the construction industry presents difficulties for transformational leadership because the
prevalence of subcontracting means that value-based individualised relationships are difficult
to foster’’(p. 382). Transformational leaderships has also been criticised because its fo-
cus on visionary leadership neglects the mundane side of management: Transformational
leadership can intrinsically motivate employees but in some contexts workers need to be
extrinsically motivated by transactional rewards (Clarke 2013). Visionary leaders can also
have a negative influence, disrupting an organisation and confusing its goals (Huczynski
and Buchanan 2007). Thus, situational aspects of leadership and leaders technical skills
(as well as interpersonal) still need to be considered.
Emerging leadership
In recent years, Emerging theories of leadership have included ‘Adaptive’ and ‘Authentic’
leadership. Authentic leadership emphasises the importance of authenticity in leaders
(Rowe and Guerrero 2018). The factors which influence trust, and subsequently influence,
46 Chapter 3. Safety Leadership in Construction
in leader-follower relationships have become increasingly significant (Lekka et al. 2012).
Workers value transparency, ethics, self-awareness, and ‘walking the walk’ in leaders. Trust
is built by leaders who value followers input and deliver on their promises (Northouse
2017).
Adaptive leaders “don’t solve the problems, but rather encourage others to do the problem
solving and adapt to change’’ (Northouse 2017, p. 4). This approach shares similarities
with Transformational leadership, Goleman’s Visionary and Coaching leadership styles, and
even earlier behavioural concepts of social-sensitivity and subordinate-centred leadership.
However, Adaptive leadership extends this to incorporate a plural concept of leadership —
maximising empowerment. This model aligns with resilience engineering (RE) and Safety
II in risk management; however, both these concepts lack research to verify the influence
such a leadership styles could have on safety behaviour or organisational resilience.
3.2.3 Safety leadership
Over the past century, both safety and leadership research fields have moved from a techni-
cal or trait-based paradigm — in which these concepts are seen as properties — towards a
view that these are emergent or socially-constructed dynamic capabilities (Simmons, Cle-
gorne and Woods-Wells 2017). In the same way that Hollnagel described safety as “some-
thing a system does, not something a system has’’ (Hollnagel et al. 2006, Hollnagel 2009),
contemporary leadership theory suggests leadership is not something leaders have, but
something an organisation does. Both fields also now take a holistic approach with greater
consideration for context.
Pre-2000, ‘leadership’ and ‘safety management’ were considered separate entities; how-
ever, since then the term ‘Safety Leadership’ has been introduced (Pilbeam et al. 2017),
recognising their integral relationship and reflecting the growing emphasis on context and
social construction in both fields.
There is widespread agreement between industry, regulators, academics and
the press that leadership is a key component of a safe organisation.
(Lekka et al., 2012)
According to Pilbeam et al. (2017), safety leadership is integral to policy change, trans-
lation of knowledge from research to operations, and the implementation of informed prac-
tice. Safety management system (SMS), policies, and procedures will fail in the absence of
leadership or if not embedded in a culture that supports and values safety (Kath, Magley
and Marmet 2010); yet in spite of this recognition, the relationship between leadership
and safety is not well-understood.
A recent review of the literature (Lekka et al. 2012) found the impact of Transforma-
tional leadership for safety has received the most attention, but aside from this the re-
search field has been dominated by leader-centric trait and competence work. There is a
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lack literature taking a situational or relational approach— both in construction (Simmons
et al. 2017) and elsewhere (Pilbeam et al. 2017).
In terms of a trait-based or behavioural approach to safety leadership, studies have
shown the importance of actively and visibly demonstrating a commitment to safety on
safety culture (Luria, Zohar and Erev 2008) and consequently safe behaviour (Lekka
et al. 2012). Behaviours associated with this are prioritising resources; involvement
in occupational safety and health (OSH) activities; encouraging input from workers on
safety matters; enforcing safety policies and safety behaviour (Lekka et al. 2012, Luria
et al. 2008); and levels safety communication (Flin and Yule 2004). In particular, a partic-
ipative approach — where supervisors encourage safety discussions and provide positive
feedback — has been shown to have a positive effect on safety compliance (Flin and
Yule 2004, O’Dea and Flin 2001).
Transformational safety leadership improves safety participation, compliance, and per-
ception of safety climate, safetyrelated events, and injuries (Mullen and Kelloway 2009).
Specifically in construction this has also been shown to be true: Conchie and Donald (2009)
found safety-specific Transformational leadership was positively associated with safety cit-
izenship behaviours; however, others have stressed the need to combine both Transforma-
tional and Transactional aspects of leadership (Lekka et al. 2012, Clarke and Ward 2006).
Increasing the frequency of Transactional safety-related interactions between leaders and
followers also improved perceptions of safety climate and reduced injury rates (Zohar and
Luria 2003). On the other hand, organisations which take an overly controlling approach
to management but lack strong leadership “will stifle creativity and innovation and be very
bureaucratic” (Rowe and Guerrero 2018, p. 5). Balancing a Transformational approach —
inspirational vision, modelling the way, and engaging and motivating employees — with
more practical aspects of leadership — rational persuasion, goal-setting, and monitoring
and rewarding performance — is key (Clarke and Ward 2006, Lekka et al. 2012).
One key finding of Lekka et al.’s (2012) review is the importance of trust as a mediating
factor in leader-follower relationships.
Mutual trust, respect and obligation between leaders and subordinates, is asso-
ciated with positive safety outcomes, including higher levels of upward safety
communication.
(Kath et al., 2010)
The effectiveness of Transformational leadership is affected by trust and quality in rela-
tionships (Lekka et al. 2012, Conchie and Donald 2009). Being knowledgeable and likable
affects power in relationships — the ability to influence others, which is integral to leader-
ship (Rowe and Guerrero 2018). Interestingly, the openness and quality of these relation-
ships relies on the more Transactional aspects of leadership — consistent behaviour, mutual
respect, delegating responsibility (Lekka et al. 2012), two-way communication, prioritising
safety (Kath et al. 2010), and valuing input from the frontline (Flin and Yule 2004, O’Dea
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and Flin 2001). These basic management behaviours build trust which underpins a suc-
cess of worker engagement and coaching-orientated approaches of Transformational safety
leadership.
Much of the literature on safety leadership focusses on its leadership rather than safety
component. Leadership has been extensively researched but there is a lack of work on un-
derstanding safety-specific leadership for high-hazard environments. Lekka et al. (2012)
argues safety leadership requires not only interpersonal aspects of leadership that allow
leaders to motivate and inspire workers, but also technical aspects of identifying and re-
solving risks.
One reason for this is that while the view of leadership as a fixed trait has been discred-
ited, the notion of safety-consciousness or risk-perception as a trait remains popular (Wang,
Zhao, Zhang and Wang 2015). Wang et al. (2015) recognised there are innate, learnt, and
situational aspects to construction project managers’ risk-propensity, but the relationship
between this personal attitude to safety and their effectiveness as safety leaders is not yet
known.
As yet, safety leadership lacks an agreed definition and direction (Pilbeam et al. 2017).
Its research paradigm is also not clear — straddling safety science and organisational be-
haviour, both of which use mixed-methods. However, in light of the Adaptive safety move-
ment, increasingly safety (like leadership) is seen as a cultural construct and thus should be
studied as an emergent property of organising. This shift has also been seen other organi-
sational sciences such as job and team design (Parker, Van den Broeck and Holman 2017).
Like RE, which promises a means to ‘engineer’ organisational resilience, safety leadership
faces similar challenges; how to develop effective safety leadership, both in a traditional
sense of motivating compliance or to support organisational resilience, needs further re-
search.
One seeks not to create the perfect leader, but rather to develop a culture of
better teammates and role players who pass off leadership and followership as
needed when context shifts, thus creating a team more resilient to adversity of
contextual shifts.
(Simmons et al., 2017)
3.3 A framework for safety leadership
Leadership is an important aspect of organisational culture, therefore safety leaders are
a powerful tool in influencing safety culture — especially if this can also engineer or-
ganisational resilience. Although studies have shown effective leadership can improve
safety, safety leadership remains under-theorised. There is a significant body of existing
research devoted to understanding interpersonal aspects of influencing, but little on the
role of safety-specific traits and behaviours — like chronic unease, problem solving, and
risk-perception — or the more managerial, Transactional aspects of leadership.
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As well as interpersonal aspects, several models of leadership show leaders need vision-
ary and technical skill. Katz’s (1974, cited in Rowe and Guerrero 2018) Three-Skills ap-
proach to leadership includes Technical skills (subject matter proficiency), Human (or inter-
personal) skills, and conceptual skills (developing and communicating a vision); Mintzburg
(1975, cited in Huczynski and Buchanan 2007) saw the role of leaders as Interpersonal
(leader, figurehead, liaison), Informational (monitor, disseminator, spokesperson), and
Decisional (entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, negotiator); and Shaw
(1976, cited in Huczynski and Buchanan 2007) found effective leaders had high levels of
ability (intelligence, technical knowledge, and verbal facility), sociability (participation,
cooperation, and popularity), and motivation (initiative and persistence). With a view to
understanding leadership for Adaptive safety, there is a need for a combinedmodel of safety
leadership which accounts for this mutlifaceted phenomenon — balancing leadership and
management, interpersonal and technical aspects.
Fruhen, Mearns, Flin and Kirwan’s (2014a) Safety Intelligence model brings these el-
ements together into a combined model of safety leadership based on ATM — an industry
which has embraced Adaptive safety. The following part of this chapter compares leader-
ship in one industry which has embraced Adaptive safety (ATM) with construction which
manages safety in a traditional way.
Existing studies of safety-related leadership competences in the US, UK, Australian,
and Danish construction industries are reviewed in light of the Safety Intelligence model.
These studies have explored specific competences including knowledge; communication;
leadership style; emotional intelligence; and emotional expression. By comparing these
competences with those of Safety Intelligent leaders within the ultra-safe, highly reliable
environment of ATM, the differences between the leadership styles required to cope with
the differing priorities of the two sectors are highlighted. Understanding how and why
leadership differs between these sectors provides an insight into how Adaptive safety can
be adapted and incorporated in construction.
3.3.1 Safety Intelligence
Safety Intelligence was first proposed by Kirwan in (2008) as a response to growing disillu-
sionment with safety culture. It provides a “way of helping top level management understand
safety and react appropriately, rather than just giving ‘lip service”’ (Kirwan 2008) — focus-
ing on recruiting and equipping leaders with the personal attributes, skills, and knowledge
required to positively influence safety in their organizations. It recognises the importance
of chief executive officers (CEOs) and directors in shaping culture by influencing members’
attitudes to safety and defines the combination of personal attributes, skills, and knowl-
edge required for leaders have a positive influence. Just as leaders with higher intellec-
tual, emotional and managerial intelligence are believed to be more effective (Müller and
Turner 2010), Fruhen et al. (2014a) propose CEOs with these characteristics are more
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Safety Intelligent and therefore better equipped to influence to safety culture in their or-
ganisations. Safety Intelligence offers a methodology to equip the top executive level of an
organisation with a means to understand and drive safety as part of their business agenda
(Eurocontrol 2013b).
The proposed Safety Intelligence model has remained undeveloped with the exception
of a series of studies of senior managers in ATM (Fruhen et al. 2014a): Senior air traffic
managers were surveyed through questionnaires and interviews about the ideal character-
istics and behaviors of a CEO in relation to safety. The study focused on five characteristics:
personality, problem-solving, motivation, safety knowledge and social competence, the lat-
ter two of which were found to be most significant and are shown closer to the ‘core’ in
Figure 3.2.
Interpersonal 
leadership
Personality
Problem-solving
Regulatory focus
Safety 
knowledge
Social 
competence
SAFETY 
INTELLIGENCE
Figure 3.2: Conceptual model of Safety Intelligence (Fruhen et al. 2014a)
3.4 Comparing safety leadership between sectors
So far, Safety Intelligence has only been studied in ATM. This sector has very different
characteristics to construction: Accidents are tightly-coupled, work is highly-regulated,
and its approach to safety is progressive — being one of the first sectors to adopt RE
(Eurocontrol 2009, Eurocontrol 2013a). The extent to which Safety Intelligence might
have purchase within construction’s project-based environments, and to which it can ac-
count for the multiple temporalities and fragmented delivery structure of this industry,
remains unexplored. Opening up the construct and exploring its relevance to managing
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complex and hazardous construction projects offers new theoretical directions for occupa-
tional safety and health research in the sector. It provides the most pragmatic method to
introduce resilience and proactivity to construction.
Construction’s pragmatic approach to safety leadership has focused on individual char-
acteristics, indicating that the competency-based model of Safety Intelligence could gain
greater acceptance and purchase than “fuzzy” cultural methods. Trait-based approaches
have declined in popularity but ‘person-centred’ models which explain individual charac-
teristics or conditions are still valuable (de Winter 2013). While there is not a universal
model of a ‘Great Man’ there are characteristics and behaviours which help people lead
more effectively — provided these takes account of the followers’ needs, task, and context.
Traits and behaviours are also easier to communicate, generalise, and have the potential to
provide practical guidance for managers.
A competency-based approach to safety management in construction is not a novel con-
cept. Accordingly, the author’s search identified 18 studies from the construction industry
which take a similar competency-based approach to influencing safety, although each fo-
cusing on a specific safety-related managerial competence — including knowledge; com-
munication; leadership style; emotional intelligence; and emotional expression. However,
a study by (Zou and Sunindijo 2013) used questionnaires and interviews to identify and
rank safety-related competences and build a framework for construction similar to Safety
Intelligence. Using this as a starting point, this paper discusses these studies in light of the
Safety Intelligence model in order to open up the opportunities it offers and uncover the
differences between these sectors. Zou and Sunindijo’s (2013) and Fruhen et al.’s (2014a)
models are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison of competences for influencing safety based on Zou and Sunindijo
(2013) and Fruhen et al. (2014a)
Competences for positively influencing
safety in construction
Safety Intelligence for ATM
Highest priority
Lowest priority
Self-awareness, Visioning, Sincerity
Scoping and Integration,
Self-management
Relationship management, Social
awareness, Social astuteness
Safety management tasks
Social competence
Safety knowledge
Regulatory focus
Problem-solving
Personality
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3.4.1 Safety leadership competences in construction
Zou and Sunindijo (2013) describe four tiers of skills for construction supervisors: Their
most significant priority or first tier competences are self-awareness, visioning, and sin-
cerity, followed by scoping and integration and self-management; then relationship man-
agement, social awareness, and social astuteness; and finally safety management tasks.
Parallels can be drawn between this model and that of Safety Intelligence; both list social,
problem-solving and technical skills as important, although the definition and prioritisa-
tion of these skills differ. The differences between safety-management in construction and
safety-critical sectors can be explained by exploring these in greater depth.
Safety knowledge
Behavioral competences without technical skill or knowledge are futile. Many studies
have shown knowledge to be integral to authentic and committed leadership (Zou and
Sunindijo 2013, Fruhen et al. 2014a). Hardison, Behm, Hallowell and Fonooni (2014) ex-
plored knowledge-based competences for construction supervisors with respect to safety,
and found that “knowledge of pre-job planning, organising work flow, establishing effective
communication, and of routine and non-routine work tasks are highly important” (p. 45).
This suggests that safety knowledge, from the perspective of construction, is the technical
understanding of business processes relating to safety.
In contrast, the Safety Intelligence model puts a greater emphasis on safety knowl-
edge than Zou and Sunindijo, perhaps because its scope is considered to be broader than
technical knowledge. Eurocontrol (2013b) advocates Safety Intelligent managers having a
clear “risk picture” of the threats to their organisation and an understanding of how safety
works. In accordance with Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) concept of ‘Organisational Mind-
fulness’, Safety Intelligent managers are encouraged to respond to weak signals of failure,
develop a ‘Just Culture’ (Reason 1997, Dekker 2007) where reporting is encouraged, and
be sensitive to the human factors that are affecting operations. However, high reliability
organising (HRO) has not yet been integrated into construction health and safety (Olde
Scholtenhuis and Doree 2013).
A specific understanding of both safety processes within the organisation itself and
“how safety works” (Eurocontrol 2013b, p. 8) in general is necessary for Safety Intelligence;
thus, construction is hindered by its focus on technical aspects of safety which prevents new
paradigms about how safety works, such as HRO and RE, taking hold.
Problem solving
Problem solving was ranked as the fourth priority (Fruhen et al. 2014a) by ATM CEOs —
after interpersonal skill, technical knowledge, andmotivation— and is vital for understand-
ing problems and generating solutions (Eurocontrol 2013b). In construction, conceptual
or problem solving skill is seen as a higher priority: The project-based, dynamic nature
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of the construction industry, with its temporary workforce and extensive variety, presents
challenges for safety management particularly in terms of coordinating subcontractors and
keeping up with the pace of change (Biggs and Biggs 2013).
Construction is formed of TMOs “where parts of several organisations — each with its
own affiliations, its own goals and its own values — are all involved in the achievement of a
plan or of an end-result” (Stringer 1967, p. 106). Learning is limited by the uniqueness
of outputs and the transient nature, so managing these projects requires conceptual skill
to view these complex projects from a “big picture perspective” (Zou and Sunindijo 2013,
p. 9). Visioning, Scoping and Integration were seen as fundamental to understand the
dynamic relationships between stakeholders and components; ensure these are integrated
as a whole; and influence safety (Zou and Sunindijo 2013).
In their study entitled “Preparing project managers to deal with complexity” Thomas and
Mengel (2008) suggest training for this context requires a greater emphasis on continuous
change; creative and critical reflection; self-organised networking; and coping with un-
certainty. Similarly, Müller and Turner (2010) showed that construction project managers
need greater propensity for Strategic Perspective and Developing.
In both ATM and construction, problem solving as a generic competence is important.
However, in construction problem solving is considered more important than social skills as
its dynamic, fragmented nature is a major barrier to implementing and influencing safety.
The characteristics and pressures of the two sectors are very different, so the problem-
solving approaches of the two types of managers are likely to be very different in reality.
Social competence
Social competence is key in influencing workers’ behaviour, as leaders’ commitment to
safety is demonstrated by their interactions with others. Almost every study reviewed
agreed that interpersonal skills are essential for successful leadership — both in construc-
tion and other sectors, and in safety or general management. The necessary competencies
can be divided into Communication, Emotional Intelligence, and Leadership Style.
Communication
‘Soft’ skills of communication and consultation are often seen as incongruous with the
uncompromising, methodical people needed to undertake complex construction projects
(Aulich 2013). However, the need to strengthen health and safety coordinators’ compe-
tence in communication and negotiation was highlighted by Antonio, Isabel, Gabriel and
Angel (2013) and an intervention to train foremen in communication-based competences
(such as mentoring and “toolbox talks”) increased safety behaviours on residential con-
struction sites (Kaskutas, Dale, Lipscomb and Evanoff 2013). Similarly, Kines et al. (2010)
found a significant, positive and lasting effect on safety levels though providing feedback
and coaching to site foremen in daily verbal safety communication.
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Communication needs to be systematic, understood by all stakeholders, and intelli-
gently applied: A communication strategy must be designed with a thorough understand-
ing of the principles of social dynamics in joint undertakings and cognitive learning theory
(Aulich 2013). Sharing tacit knowledge within an integrated project team also builds con-
nections between team members, leading to improved dynamic capabilities and ultimately,
greater team flexibility (Zhang, He and Zhou 2013).
While some research demonstrates that initiatives directed at managers can be more
effective (Zohar and Luria 2003), in construction the role of frontline supervisors has
been shown to be more influential than that of senior managers (Lingard, Cooke and
Blismas 2012) and safety competence at all levels of the hierarchy — workers, foremen,
and managers — is equally important, because communication between these levels is crit-
ical (Hardison et al. 2014). As Safety Intelligence focusses only on senior management,
this suggests its methods may not be as influential in construction.
Leadership style
Interviews with 41 construction safety leaders identified leadership as a key factor for pos-
itive safety culture in the organisation, with an emphasis on leaders’ visibility and their
demonstration of a commitment to safety (Biggs, Banks, Davey and Freeman 2013). This
is supported by the findings of a study into the relationship between project managers’ lead-
ership style, teamwork, and project success (Yang, Huang and Wu 2011). The results show
increased leadership communication and involvement can enhance relationships, fostering
teamwork, which is significantly correlated with performance.
Emotional intelligence (EQ) is associated with many characteristics thought to under-
pin effective leadership: Improved self-awareness helps to develop effective relationships
and understand others’ emotions, thus enabling interpersonal skills such as communication,
motivating others, resolving conflicts, and building teamwork (Sunindijo 2013). Specifi-
cally, Zhang and Fan (2013) found a strong positive correlation between six EQ factors
(emotional self-awareness, emotional self-control, empathy, organisational awareness, cul-
tural understanding and communication) and construction project performance.
Although EQ and a Transformational leadership style (Ramchunder and Martins 2014)
were found to be significant in leaders from all sectors, the traits of managers in construc-
tion do not match those found in other industries. Power, urgency, proximity, competitive
threat, opposing position and neutral attitude are shown by the most influential construc-
tion stakeholders (Yang, Wang and Jin 2014). Lindebaum and Fielden (2010) show how
construction project managers quickly resort to anger in order to resolve issues, and felt
this was necessary to raise their visibility, achieve the desired outcomes, and maintain their
image and reputation because the trait is seen as “role-defining” for managers in the indus-
try.
The need to assert authority reflects the other pressures on construction managers in-
cluding organisational culture, turnover, job pressures, working relationships, budget and
3.5. Discussion 55
safety communication which dictate safety performance (Kaskutas et al. 2013). Conchie
et al. (2013) found that managers’ engagement in safety leadership was hindered by work-
force characteristics; role overload; production demands; and formal procedures.
Although managers in both sectors need to communicate strong messages, Safety Intel-
ligent managers do this through engaging with others and listening (Fruhen et al. 2014a).
The way in which social competence is enacted in these two sectors is very different, and
Zou and Sunindijo (2013) rate this as a lower of a priority in construction.
Table 3.2: Comparing Safety Intelligence in ATM and construction
Air Traffic Management
Leadership priorities Interpretation
1. Social competence
Communication from management
Just Culture
Empower and collaborate
Engage with employees and and listen
2. Safety knowledge
An understanding of contemporary and emerging safety
constructs as well as technical processes
3. Problem-solving To understand problems and generate solutions
Construction
Leadership priorities Interpretation
1. Problem-solving
Essential to cope with the fragmented and dynamic
industry
Emphasis is on a strategic perspective
2. Social competence
Communication at all levels to build integrated and
flexible teams
Power, Urgency and Anger are traits of good leaders
Self-awareness and Sincerity
Emotional intelligence supports effective management
3. Safety knowledge
A technical understanding of business processes relating
to safety
3.5 Discussion
This literature review has highlighted the differences between these industries which limit
the transferability of Safety Intelligence. As a TMO, it is more difficult for managers of
complex construction projects to understand these fragmented and transient organisations.
Problem-solving must take place between multiple contractors and stakeholders and reach-
ing solutions is prioritised over their tactful delivery through developed interpersonal skills.
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The dynamic nature of construction and production pressures also means leaders are re-
quired to deal with conflict in an assertive way, rather than collaborate as seen in Safety
Intelligent leaders.
Despite the superficial similarities observed between the generic behavioural compe-
tences in ATM and construction, the “job-task” competences are highly industry specific
(Cheng, Dainty and Moore 2005). To influence safety, the papers reviewed show con-
struction supervisors need to be more assertive and astute in their relationships, cope with
constant change, and grasp a more complex operational picture than air traffic managers.
In light of the differences between these two sectors, it is apparent that the ATM Safety
Intelligence model would need to be adapted to construction before informing the selection
and training of construction supervisors. However, whether the differences in leadership
style are due to weaknesses in managers’ competency-development, or the challenging
environment in which they work, would need to be determined. Although the Safety Intel-
ligence model provides an overview of management competences in an ultra-safe industry,
a causal link between these competences and safe operations has not been explored. Vali-
dation is needed; in particular, testing a causal link between Safety Intelligence and safety
in a more complex environment such as construction.
Risk is often accepted as an inherent part of construction work (Swuste et al. 2012)
but the safe build of the Olympic Park challenged this, demonstrating that it is possible for
construction to be a “highly-reliable” organisation. This unique success was underpinned by
a culture of “respect, trust, clarity, pre-emption, challenge, consistency, collaboration, motiva-
tion, empowerment, communication, openness, fairness and assurance” (Bolt et al. 2012) —
characteristics which are more consistent with Adaptive industries like ATM than construc-
tion.
3.5.1 Adaptive safety leadership for construction
Safety Intelligent leaders promote a just culture, empowerment and collaboration with
members, proactivity, and communication; however, the challenges of implementing these
in construction highlight where this model needs to be adapted. Taking account of this
review, a model of Adaptive safety leadership for construction must account for leadership
as distributed throughout an organisation, and its existence as a social construct within
leader-follower relationships rather than the personality of leaders. It is also a multifaceted
phenomenon—with visionary, technical and social components— and needs to be adapted
to contexts and followers’ needs. With this in mind, six components of Adaptive safety
leadership are proposed:
• Vision and commitment. Prioritising safety, remaining vigilant, and being prepared
to respond to the unexpected.
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• Safety knowledge. As well as construction-specific processes, leaders should also have
an awareness of events and aspects of the wider organisation which could impact on
safety.
• Social competence. Empathy and mutual respect help to build high quality leader-
follower relationships. Leaders should be open and approachable, and encourage
change through coaching — explaining, supporting, and rewarding positive actions.
• Authority. Although studies suggest urgency and anger and key to influence in con-
struction, knowledge and respect are important for effective leadership.
• Trusting and empowering others. This is an important difference between resilient
organisations, where leadership is plural, and traditional management hierarchies.
Trust mediates relationships and encourages proactivity and innovation.
• Collaborative problem solving. Engaging with workers, deferring to their expertise,
and involving them in solutions which they own.
3.6 Conclusion
Safety Intelligent leadership poses a challenge for construction: Although the leadership
style necessary to influence safetymay be enacted differently in different sectors, the under-
lying principles of Safety Intelligent leadership — promoting a just culture, empowerment
and collaboration with members, proactivity, and communication — have all been shown
to contribute to the success of megaprojects. In spite of this, similar studies in construction
have found site (or offshore installation) managers take a directive leadership style despite
recognising the importance of participatory leadership practices — developing openness
and trust, proactivity, and encouraging workforce involvement in decision-making (O’Dea
and Flin 2001). This mismatch between perceived best practice and actual behaviour is
not well understood.
Chapter 5 builds on the framework proposed in this chapter, exploring safety leadership
and how it is enacted in construction. Chapter 6 then applies systems thinking to under-
stand the mismatch in styles — why construction leaders prioritise problem-solving and
authority over Adaptive safety leadership characteristics. Resolving this disparity could
help to overcome the challenges to implementing Adaptive safety more widely.
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4.1 Introduction
The mechanisms of Adaptive safety are not well understood; however, Chapter 2 high-
lighted the value of researching how an organisation’s potential to anticipate, monitor,
respond, and learn is cultivated from the workforce upwards. If these resilience potentials
are theorised as social constructs, they are best researched through social methods.
This chapter justifies the choice of qualitative methods in this research. Explaining
how interpersonal skills, leadership, and culture contribute to Adaptive safety is key to
unpacking this concept. An improved understanding the of role these constructs play is
needed to guide other organisations wanting to grow their adaptive capacity — including
construction.
To fulfil the research aim stated in Section 1.5 — “To understand the factors which
facilitate and hinder an Adaptive response”—data collection was divided into two phases —
an interview study followed by a case study. The interview study of safety leadership in
construction explored which aspects could, or already do, align with Adaptive safety, and
the barriers that prevent its adoption. Interview data were analysed by thematic, content,
and soft systems methods to address the following research objectives:
1. Explore the role of safety leadership (Chapter 5)
2. Understand the challenges of construction as a system (Chapter 6)
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The case study then used multiple methods (interviews, focus groups, document analy-
sis, and observations) to evaluate Adaptive safety in practice within infrastructuremegapro-
jects. This addressed the objective to:
3. Observe Safety Differently in practice in construction (Chapter 7 and 8)
In this chapter the research paradigm is discussed as well as the chosen methods of
data collection and analysis; measures to ensure validity; and ethical considerations. The
suitability of these methods to meet the stated aims is justified with reference to the the-
oretical perspectives and methodologies of the many disciplines this research intersects —
risk management, culture, organisational sciences, human behaviour.
The following sections describe the differing research philosophies in the study of safety
and risk through the lens of construction (as the context of this work) and Sociology, Psy-
chology, and Ergonomics. The research design and qualitative methods are then proposed.
4.2 A social approach to risk research
In the age of enlightenment, scientific practice aimed to find the “real nature of things”(Bilton,
Bonnett, Jones, Lawson, Skinner, Stanworth and Webster 2002, p. 414) by making abstract
concepts visible and measurable (operationalisation). This rationalist approach is the foun-
dation of positivism and natural science. Positivism says society and culture exist external
to its members, and therefore the best means of study is as an objective observer.
With a positivist view of reality— “that reality is external to self and can be observed using
tools that produce information that can be understood and interpreted by others” (Given 2008,
p. 519) — society is seen as a system of interconnected parts that influence one another
in functional and dysfunctional ways. This view emphasises how social problems are af-
fected at an institutional level (Mooney, Knox and Schacht 2017). Positivism in sociology
is now considered a classical tradition; however, there are many similarities between its
holistic approach and that of systems ergonomics. For example the influence of ecological
processes; describing society inmechanistic terms— inputs, outputs, and feedback loops—
much like the systems theory. Similarly, sociologist Robert Merton described the functions
of society as manifest (intended) or latent (unintentional) (Merton 1968) like Reason’s
Latent and Active Errors in complex systems.
Many social phenomena — such as aspiration, comfort, belonging, or morality — could
not be operationalised or understood through rationalism or positivism (Bilton et al. 2002).
After the 1970s, opposing the rationalism of Modernity, the Postmodern era disputed the
existence of concrete concepts and instead promoted relativism (Rosenau 1992). Rela-
tivism says there is no neutral standpoint from which to view the world: All knowledge is
constructed and mediated by language and culture (Rorty in Knight and Turnbull 2008).
With a relativist world view the guiding paradigm of research is interpretivism; the
assumption “that social phenomena are constructed or co-constructed by self and can be dis-
covered by collecting and analysing conversations and texts” (Given 2008, p. 519). Social
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phenomena only exist as a result of social interaction and are best understood through em-
pathy with actors and the gathering of qualitative data. According to this perspective social
constructs can only be understood by studying definitions and meanings of communication
or symbols (Given 2008).
The following sections discuss construction as a research domain and context for this
work, and compares this with the fields within safety science that have contributed to the
Adaptive safety movement: Psychology as the foundation of both ‘traditional’ safety and
high reliability organising (HRO), and Systems Thinking and Ergonomics as the basis of
resilience engineering (RE).
4.3 Ontology of risk and safety
Many phenomena, including risk, have both a rational and an relative component — ex-
perienced individually and in common with other people (Creswell 2007) — so a pluralist
approach to methodology is key. Drawing on both these philosophies provides depth in
the study of systems and safety culture. Safety science includes research from a breadth of
fields including “organisational sociology, semiotics and cultural studies, applied psychology,
engineering, safety and risk studies” (Pidgeon 1998, p. 97). This variety of approaches can
be attributed to the disputed ontology of risk.
Pathogens and injuries have a reality beyond individuals’ beliefs, hopes and
perceptions.
(Williams 2003 in Clark, MacIntyre and Cruickshank, 2007, p. 519)
Risk is often used synonymously with other terms for unwanted events such as threat,
hazard, loss, or damage (Zinn 2008). The health and safety executive (HSE) defines risk
as “a measure of the probability for an incident to happen and of the potential severity of the
consequences” (BSI 2018). This definition underlines the dominant objective, rationalist
paradigm adopted by the majority of research in safety.
In contemporary risk management practice there is both a qualitative and quantitative
dimension — probabilistic models of human reliability analysis (HRA) such as fault trees,
HEART 1, and THERP2(Kirwan 1994) — and deterministic models such as HAZOP3 and
HAZAN4(Kletz 2001). Recognition of the social component of safety has grown in recent
years as concepts of the social amplification of risk (SARF)(Kasperson et al. 1988), Safety
Culture (Reason 1997), and safety leadership (Pilbeam et al. 2017) have been introduced,
but these are often studied with a positivist lens (Guldenmund 2010). Zinn (2008) and
1Human error assessment and reduction technique
2Technique for human error rate prediction
3Hazard and operability study
4Hazard Analysis
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Turner and Gray (2009) criticise current approaches to risk research which neglect socio-
cultural and socio-structural aspects of risk, instead focussing overly on perception and
propensity.
Social scientific perspectives on occupational safety largely characterize it as a
disembodied, tangible, and easily quantifiable phenomenon. Recent research
efforts have focused on exploring organizational conditions that predict occu-
pational safety outcomes, resulting in top-down, often de-contextualized pre-
scriptions about how to control safety in the workplace.
(Turner and Gray, 2009, p. 1259)
As a scientific discipline, much of Safety Science takes a positivist approach. Contrary
to this, Haavik (2014) argues normal accident theory (NAT), HRO, and RE are all based
on a constructivist ontology but the way these theories have been operationalised ignores
this relational aspect and its philosophical underpinnings: He warns of the danger “when
key concepts of the approaches are decontextualised, black-boxed and adopted uncritically in
a new context” (Haavik 2014, p. 37). Beck (1992) on the other hand argues risks can be
both real and socially constructed. They can be calculated formally, as a probability, or as
part of everyday life in an “intuitive” or “pre-rational” way (Zinn 2008). This means, epis-
temologically, risk can be studied from the perspective of both realism and constructivism
(Zinn 2008).
The resultant dichotomy is best defined by Hale and Borys (2013) who proposed two
models of rules in occupational safety and health (OSH): A classical view of rules as rigid
externally imposed limits to be complied with (rational), and another as flexible social con-
structions which draw on workers’ expertise and allow them to respond to reality (relative).
These two models work to different extents in different tasks (Gibb, Finneran, Cheyne,
Dainty, Glover, Morgan, Fray, Waterson, Bust, Haslam, Hartley and Pink 2016) and differ-
ent sectors depending on their degree of uncertainty (Grote 2012). This view of safety
as simultaneously relative and rational means it must be studied accordingly. Further re-
search is needed to understand rules in context — through the interpretations and values
of those who enact them (Walliman 2011).
While in much social research there has been a shift towards postmodernism, Dekker
(2018) describes the current state of safety as “Authoritarian High Modernity” — char-
acterised by unfaltering confidence in scientific methods to better the human condition
(Scott 1999).
Rationalism is, according to Weber (quoted in Zinn 2008), the belief that “One can, in
principle, master all things by calculation”. In line with this, in pursuit of risk reduction many
people are drawn to the power and prestige of numbers: The expectation in many high-risk
domains is that interventions will be proven by a measurable reduction in injury rates. A
calculative approach has invaded many sectors (social work, crime prevention, healthcare)
transforming the social world into measurable factors with averages and probabilities (Zinn
2008).
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This pseudo-scientific application of numbers in a subjective way (Porter 1995), or
“pseudo-positivism” (Zinn 2008), has been criticised. A positivist paradigm can only be
used to study repeatable, predictable aspects of nature (Walliman 2011). Risk is not one
of these. Nascent research in safety is moving away from statistics, realism, and mech-
anistic models of behaviour and systems to understand risk (Dekker 2018): A scientific
approach may work if accidents are linear, predictable, and not complex (Dekker 2018)
but contemporary thinking says they are not.
Traditional models of accident causation are being challenged, proposing instead no-
tions of emergence and resonance. Barry Turner described the study of accidents as “shak-
ing a kaleidoscope” — unconnected components, but capable of combining in infinite pos-
sibilities of diverse outcomes (Pidgeon 1998). Risk cannot be completely understood as a
product of nature and culture, but as an unpredictable and emergent property of both. Its
intractability and subjectivity mean it needs to be studied as a social phenomena as well
as a physical hazard. Similarly, Organisational Resilience (though not well understood)
seems to emerge from systems in an irrational way, so does not suit a positivist research
paradigm.
Whether risk is real or socially constructed, many phenomena which contribute to
safety — culture, leadership, mindfulness, communication — are best studied from a con-
structivist perspective. Furthermore, a view of the world as discontinuous, emergent, and
holistic underpins both Resilience Engineering and Social Science (Walliman 2011) — jus-
tifying the study of safety using social research methods.
4.4 Epistemology in construction, psychology, and systems er-
gonomics
4.4.1 Organisational research in construction
In construction management the majority of studies use quantitative methods, followed by
mixed methods (11.2%) and qualitative (8.4%) (Dainty 2008). Similarly, an analysis of
the methods used by papers published on construction safety and found that 24% of papers
were qualitative (and 9% mixed methods) (Zou, Sunindijo and Dainty 2011).
In the mid-1990s, the ‘paradigm wars’ divided opinions around the dominance of ra-
tionalism in many organisational sciences, including safety and construction management.
Since then research has become polarised: The majority taking an “engineering” approach
to studying phenomena as factual, generalisable and causative, while research into under-
standing their constructed reality is lacking (Dainty 2008). Zou et al. (2011) explains the
drive for construction research to take a realist approach — in order to be fundable and
generalisable — has meant quantitative methods have dominated past research – focussing
on what, rather than why, construction accidents occurred. Relativism means there is no
objective measure of research quality; so instead it is measured on its ability to achieve the
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desired goal (Knight and Turnbull 2008). This has meant built environment research often
takes a pragmatic approach (du Toit and Mouton 2012).
This rationalism has hindered our understanding of risk as data on accidents and in-
juries which fails to provide a “detailed analysis of causes beyond the identification of the
mechanism and agency of injury” (Cooke and Lingard 2011, p. 279). Work by Oswald,
Sherratt, Smith and Dainty into socially acceptable behaviour on construction sites raised
questions about research “approaches, which have traditionally focused in positivist roots, and
have been unable to holistically capture social aspects that influence safety” (Oswald, Sherratt,
Smith and Dainty 2018, p. 294). Reductionism distances the findings from their social con-
text; studies lack critical reflection and fail to provide a deep and nuanced understanding
of practice (Dainty 2008).
No matter the research subject — whether it is a new construction method,
scheduling advances, lean construction, project delivery, information technol-
ogy changes, or contracting techniques — the same inherent technical and
social-technical issues abound.
(Phelps and Horman, 2010, p. 58)
There are also practical reasons for the lack of qualitative research in construction:
Difficulty sampling workers because of the temporary nature of their role (Fellows and
Liu 2015); restricted access to sites; and unwillingness of participants to take part when
they are paid per task (Eaves 2016).
There are several academics in this field who champion a qualitative approach to re-
search:
If the safety knowledge and practice are to be understood as enmeshed together
… it may be prudent for [construction management] researchers to adopt more
constructivist ontological and interpretivist epistemological positions.
(Zou et al., 2011, p. 957)
Qualitative inquiry has been strongly advocated for construction management
… and with specific reference to construction H&S5 studies.
(Manu et al., 2013)
Like Hale and Borys (2013), Baarts (2009) argues construction workers’ knowledge
and skills are transferred through culture and practices on site. However, safety research
in construction often assumes, like the mechanistic models of behaviour discussed in the
next section (Section 4.4.2), knowledge and learning are resources that can be stored and
transferred by an individual, rather than a social and cultural construct (Gherardi and
Nicolini 2002).
5Health and Safety
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Constructionmanagement research is dominated by pseudo-positivism and pragmatism
(Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar and Newton 2002); drawing on a vast range of approaches
and subjects rather than developing its own philosophy and methodology (Knight and
Turnbull 2008). This lack of clarity around epistemology can be attributed to the contested
ontology of risk, but also to the fact construction management is a field of application rather
than enquiry. The same situation is seen in Safety (Shannon, Robson and Guastello 1999)
and Ergonomics (Dekker, Hancock and Wilkin 2012, Waterson et al. 2015) — discussed in
the following sections.
4.4.2 Behavioural psychology and safety
Behaviourism, or Behavioural Psychology, was a research field established by Watson
in 1913 as a scientific alternative to introspection in understanding human thought
(Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). It is based upon the principle that all behaviours are
acquired through ‘conditioning’ from the external environment. Rather than studying
thought processes (which are not directly observable), behavioural psychology treats the
human brain as a ‘blackbox’ — only the stimulus and response can be studied. Behaviour
Modification or Behavioural Safety Programmes in construction are based on these princi-
ples.
Behavioural psychology was superseded in the 1950s when cognitive psychology be-
came the dominant paradigm. Cognitive psychology was influenced by technology: Mental
processes such as learning, memory, and attention could be studied based on the premise
that these could be modelled as systems with filters, biases, and feedback loops. This ratio-
nal view of human behaviour has been endorsed in behavioural economics: Rational choice
theory (RCT) provides a framework for understanding and modelling behaviour including
risk taking; decisions are optimised based on preferences but ‘bounded’ by constraints like
time and cognitive capacity (Kahneman 2012). RCT in cognitive psychology is used syn-
onymously with Utilitarianism in sociology — the belief that all social constructs can be
described by the individual actions that cause them.
Cognitive experiments have been criticised for their ideological stance and poor validity,
yet their power, convenience, and flexibility mean their popularity has persisted to the
present day. In the late 1980s these mechanistic models of behaviour were challenged by
the introduction of naturalistic decision making (NDM): The work of LaPorte, Rochlin,
Roberts, and subsequently Weick and Sutcliffe aimed to understand high-stakes decision-
making through field research rather than laboratory experiments. This tradition spawned
sensemaking, situational awareness and HRO.
Cognitive psychology has been fundamental in shaping many of the concepts of Adap-
tive safety — for example, NDM in HRO, and joint cognitive systems (JCS) in RE. How-
ever, behavioural psychology and older cognitive models still influence risk management
in construction. These empirical branches of psychology assume knowledge, learning, and
decision-making are individual processes whereas Adaptive safety sees them as emergent
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social phenomena. In line with this shift, this thesis studies safety as a social phenomenon,
rather than an individual trait.
4.4.3 Systems ergonomics
With the rise of automation, the value of humans in systems was identified in the 1980s —
people provide “thinking, decision-making, responsibility-accepting, behaviour-adapting,
problem-identifying, innovating, information-processing, equifinality-capable6 andmultifinality-
capable7, complexity-absorbing, goal-seeking, learning, and ethical entities” (Siemieniuch and
Sinclair 2015, p. 862). The corollary to this was that it was no longer considered appropri-
ate to consider the person and technical system as separate, but rather as a ‘Joint Cognitive
System’ (Woods and Hollnagel 2005). This movement was a precursor to Cognitive Systems
Engineering, and subsequently RE.
We now acknowledge that work takes place in complex socio-technical systems,
and that our models and methods necessarily must reflect that. Since work
systems have changed, the descriptions we use must also be extended.
(Hollnagel, 2012, p. 21)
Sociotechnical system (STS) thinking takes a holistic view of the system as a whole,
evaluating behaviours as part of the system and explaining them as part of the whole
(Walliman 2011).
Systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes. It is a framework for seeing
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than
static ‘snapshots’.
(Senge, 1990)
Systems thinking is a rebellion against the objectionable habit of reductionist
sciences to suppose that there is always some order hiding behind the disorder
of the visible world
(Vandenbroeck, 2015)
Within systems thinking there are two main schools: One taking a ‘hard’ (Scholz and
Tietje 2002, p. 120) mathematical approach to simulation and modelling — systems dy-
namics, agent-based, social networks — and the other a softer approach, similar to the
way conceptual frameworks are developed in sociology. The soft and hard schools of sys-
tems thinking are divided by ontological position — whether an objective representations
of these systems exists is disputed (Vandenbroeck 2015).
6Creating the same output from different inputs (Convergence)
7Creating different outcomes from the same outputs (Divergence)
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Usually this word [system] does not refer to existing things in the real world but,
rather, to a way of organizing our thoughts about the same. The constructivist
view of reality states that systems do not exist in the real world independent of
the human mind.
(Skyttner, 1996)
While hard systems thinking creates a model of reality, in soft systems thinking reality
is socially constructed and therefore varies between individuals — much like relativism
in Postmodern sociology. The social (human) and technical complexity are linked and
embedded instead the aim of this discipline is to understand organisational learning and
emergent phenomena. How system properties can emerge proved impossible for the more
reductionist methods of hard systems thinking to explain, giving rise to Complexity Sci-
ence which emphasises the complex, dynamic, emergent, and adaptive nature of systems
as a whole (Braithwaite, Churruca, Ellis, Long, Clay-Williams, Damen, Herkes, Pomare and
Ludlow 2017). From this developed the study of Complex Adaptive Systems— another pre-
cursor of Organisational Resilience (Braithwaite, Clay-Williams, Nugus and Plumb 2013).
Both hard and soft approaches use a mixture of methods to understand quantifiable
(injury rates, absence, salaries) and unquantifiable (culture, communication, power, trust)
aspects of systems. Ergonomics and STS have both been said to take an overly pragmatic
stance on research methods (Dekker et al. 2012, Waterson et al. 2015) focusing on ap-
plications (Wilson and Sharples 2015). Thus, a pluralist approach to research design is
advocated, giving researchers freedom to use any method justifiably appropriate for the
context (Stanton, Young and Harvey 2014).
As an applied science, philosophical debates have not been a priority. Regardless of
questions around the validity of systems research (Waterson et al. 2015) its methods
are considered a truthful description of reality and powerful tools for improving safety
(Salmon, Stanton, Lenné, Jenkins, Rafferty and Walker 2017). The key instead is to look
holistically at systems, rather than take a reductionist stance (Wilson 2014), and to use
multiple methods or models to validate constructs (Siemieniuch and Sinclair 2015).
Summary
Thatcher, Waterson, Todd and Moray (2018) criticise the preoccupation with “micro-
ergonomics” in this field when a systems or macro- approach is has the potential to tackle
global issues.
Ergonomics already takes a transdisciplinary approach that combines theory
from a number of other interrelated disciplines (notably combining theory from
physiology, anatomy, biomechanics, psychology, sociotechnical systems, and de-
sign theory), more work is needed to engage with the other social sciences (e.g.
sociology, political science, anthropology and philosophy).
(Thatcher et al., 2018)
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There is a tendency in applied sciences (including construction management, safety
science and ergonomics) to focus on applications — pushing their theories to become “too
useful too quickly” (Singleton 1994, p. 31). Concepts like safety culture and workload have
been forced into oversimplifiedmeasurable constructs (Guldenmund 2010, Sharples 2018).
To avoid reductionism, this work takes an interpretivist approach, allowing the depth and
nuances of resilience to be fully understood before moving towards frameworks or models
for its application.
4.5 Research design
4.5.1 Qualitative methods
Traditionally, qualitative methods were defined as text-based or, more broadly, any data
other than numerical (quantitative) (Flick 2007, Robson 2011, Neuman 2014). However,
many sociologists are sceptical of such a simplistic divide; Creswell (2007) describes a
continuum between subjective (qualitative) and objective (quantitative) methods, and in
practice most research uses a mix of methods guided by the phenomena in question, exist-
ing research, and the tendencies of their field (Bryman 2012, Bilton et al. 2002).
The difference between qualitative and quantitative research has also been described as
taking a flexible, rather than fixed, approach to research design (Robson 2011): In quan-
titative research the theory or hypothesis leads the experimental design, but in qualitative
studies the theory develops through reflection and iteration (Neuman 2014). What is key is
that the choice of method should be driven by the aim of the study (Green and Thorogood
2010). Qualitative methods are useful for answering the and “why” and “how” questions
quantitative research cannot (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey 2011). Its exploratory approach
is best applied to tackling new problems and topics with little previous research, and at-
tempting to understand how far the generalisations are valid (Walliman 2011, Bryman
2012).
Qualitative methods are best suited to studying the world “out there” rather than in a
laboratory: Its methods are naturalistic — avoiding the use of artificial instruments (Bilton
et al. 2002) — and both researcher and participant are involved as part of interpreting the
findings (Flick 2007). This approach is therefore advocated where the aim is to provide an
in depth understanding of social phenomena — in this case decision-making, risk-taking,
and organisational change.
As discussed previously, risk, safety, leadership, and culture are socially constructed so
lend themselves to an interpretivist research philosophy and qualitative methods. Not only
are the social aspects of safety poorly understood, but this is approach is also justified by
the lack of research in Adaptive safety and the lack of qualitative research in construction
management.
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Validity
One criticism often levelled at qualitative research is its questionable validity. Knowledge
is developed via a researcher’s reflection so always has their viewpoint imposed (Neuman
2014). Thus, the applicability of the terms often used in quantitative work — ‘reliability’,
‘validity’, and ‘rigour’ — is contested (Flick 2007, Noble and Smith 2015). In qualitative
work, “credibility” and “dependability” instead become the measures of quality.
‘Dependability’ is the equivalent of reliability — the consistency or stability of a mea-
sure (Stanton et al. 2014). The dependability of qualitative work is demonstrated by a
strong link between the data collected and the conclusions. To achieve this, consistent
research housekeeping is required: Designing a case study protocol; maintaining records
of audio recordings, notes, transcripts in a database; and ensuing transparency of anal-
ysis by applying a structured framework (Robson 2011, Noble and Smith 2015, Stanton
et al. 2014). Pattern matching and explanation building are often used to link data to a
study’s proposition (Yin 2009). Stanton et al. (2014) recommends data collection is carried
out by a single investigator for consistency whereas Noble and Smith (2015) recommends
co-investigators should discuss the findings to challenge bias. These features would allow
a study to be repeated just as reliability does for quantitative measures.
The ‘credibility’ of qualitative work is the equivalent of internal validity — the degree to
which the findings reflect participants’ experience of truth (Robson 2011). Good practice
guidance recommends unbiased sampling of, and prolonged engagement to establish a re-
lationship with, participants; achieving data saturation; and ensuring interpretation is free
from bias by triangulating methods, considering alternative theories, giving equal weight
to disconfirming cases, reflexivity on the part of the researcher, and validating findings with
participants (Robson 2011, Noble and Smith 2015, Stanton et al. 2014).
Although mostly relevant for explanatory or causal studies, not exploratory or descrip-
tive work, external validity or “transferability” should also be considered. The transfer-
ability of qualitative research can be improved by comparing the findings to theory; using
multiple cases; and providing ‘thick description’ of the findings — for example, details of
the organisation and supporting evidence (Robson 2011, Noble and Smith 2015, Stanton
et al. 2014).
4.5.2 Interview study
Interview research aims to understand the “universal essence” (Creswell 2007) or a phe-
nomenon or “object” of human experience — in this case the experience of safety leader-
ship among construction professionals. Data is collected from a heterogeneous group, all
of whom have experience of this phenomenon, usually in the form of interviews (Creswell
2007).
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Interviews
According to an Interpretivist epistemological position, language is a fundamental part of
how reality is created.
Language does not mirror reality; rather, it constitutes it.
(Fairhurst, 2011)
Interview research is based on the assumption that the social actors themselves define
social phenomena best, providing the most genuine perspective (Bilton et al. 2002, Lewis-
Beck, Bryman and Futing Liao 2004). Interviews provide an insight into how people
consciously construct their own reality (Flick 2007) and are useful in gaining in-depth
information about personal views and experiences, particularly around sensitive topics
(Bryman 2012, Hennink et al. 2011). They are also well suited to exploratory research,
when concepts are not well-defined (Walliman 2011).
In comparison to survey research, interviewing allows investigators to probe into partic-
ipants’ answers; offer reassurance and encouragement; gauge participants’ understanding
of new concepts; see logic or contradiction in their ideas; and ascertain a level of certainty
or enthusiasm in participants’ responses with cues such as tone of voice, speed, or body lan-
guage (Haigh 2008). Interviewing in situ also allows the context to be observed, adding
depth to the data — important in occupational research.
Interviews are the most popular method for qualitative research in the built environ-
ment (Dainty 2008, Haigh 2008). Where the population may struggle with a questionnaire
due to low literacy or language barriers (Haigh 2008) interviewing is a preferable option.
One criticism of interviewing is that data is consciously constructed by the participants,
rather than a reflection of objective truth. Participants’ responses may be influenced by
design of the study, or the interviewer’s characteristics, opinions, or reactions (Hennink
et al. 2011, Bryman 2012). Mitigating this potential for bias is largely dependent on
the interviewer’s skill and personality — “casual and friendly, yet decisive and impersonal”
(Haigh 2008, p. 112). Researchers need establish a rapport with interviewees and be able to
adapt the schedule to follow interesting leads. From a practical perspective, the time taken
for transcription and analysis of data (Bryman 2012) is also a drawback to this method.
Audio recording is recommended as it provides the best record of data. Where participants
did not consent to being recorded, field notes were taken and written up the same day to
ensure completeness and accuracy.
Design
Interviews can take a structured or unstructured format. Structured interviews use closed
questions and gather standardised answers which can be quantified or generalised; how-
ever, they can be restrictive, cannot investigate issues in depth, and are not suited to com-
plex issues. At the other end of the spectrum, unstructured interviews use open questions as
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a general guide for exploring a topic. This style of interview is more sensitive to the partici-
pants’ answers, allowing the interviewer to omit some questions, accommodate themes not
included in the design, and discuss unanticipated topics. However, they are more time con-
suming and dependent on the researcher’s skill to spontaneously question without leading
(Bryman 2012, Haigh 2008). Unstructured interviews are said to provide “genuine access”
(Bryman 2012) to what participants believe.
A semi-structured design provides the best of both of these designs: A level of stan-
dardisation while still supporting the follow-up of responses to understand their meaning
(Given 2008) — important given the exploratory research question. Limiting the ques-
tions to a loose schedule also helps to achieve a ‘rich’ (dense and meaningful), saturated
dataset focussed on these areas of interest (Guest, Bunce and Johnson 2006), which in turn
maximises the potential to find meaning (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2005). Semi-structured
interviews were used as it allows a balance between gathering rich and focussed data and
keeping the feel open and conversational; this builds rapport between the participant and
investigator, encouraging them to share stories and examples from their own experience
(Rabionet 2011).
In the design of interview questions it is important to carefully consider their potential
for ambiguity, misinterpretation, and avoid introducing bias with loaded phrases (Haigh
2008). The interview study question protocol was informed by the emerging concepts in
safety described in Chapter 2 and supported by a focus group with 14 participants who
discussed the key issues facing safety and health in construction. A final semi-structured
interview protocol was designed comprising of 11 questions. The first eight questions (in-
cluded in Table 4.1) provide an in depth exploration of safety leadership, freedom, and
resilience. The draft protocol was piloted with one participant to confirm the questions
and probes were thought-provoking and the responses relevant and valuable. The findings
from these eight questions are discussed in Chapter 5.
The latter three out of 11 questions (included in Table 4.2) explore the hazards of
construction and worker attitudes. The questions were then chosen to gain an in-depth
understanding the role of those managing risk in construction with each question focussing
on a different facet of soft systemsmethodology (SSM)— issues, conflicts, and people. This
ensured the scope of the questions would cover a sufficient breadth of human and technical
factors at all levels of the system, in accordance with STS theory. The findings of from these
questions are discussed in Chapter 6.
Phone interviews
Some evidence suggests phone interviews are shorter; gather inferior quality data; and
have a lower response rate, engagement, and participant satisfaction compared to their
face-to-face counterparts (Bryman 2012). Visual cues such as body language and context
are lost, although this can be mitigated by the use of video conferencing tools. They are
72 Chapter 4. Methodology
Table 4.1: Interview questions
Background
1) Tell me about your role and previous experience.
a. Current position
b. Previous experience
Safety leaders’ traits and behaviours
2) What traits would a safety-conscious leader have?
3) What behaviours would you see from a safety-conscious leader?
4) How do construction workers view risk?
a. Describe their attitude
b. What has given you this impression?
5) What does a ‘healthy attitude to risk’ mean to you?
6) What would a ‘resilient workforce’ look like?
a. What would you see them doing on site?
The future of construction safety
7) Is there room to give workers more freedom?
8) What needs to be done next to ensure safety in construction continues to improve?
Table 4.2: Interview questions
Risk Management in Construction
9) What makes construction so hazardous?
10) What makes managing risk difficult?
Safe and unsafe workers
11) Why do some workers behave unsafely?
also less well suited to sensitive topics as participants may be conscious of their opinions
being overheard in public.
Regardless of these concerns, phone interviews provide a convenient and cost-effective
way to reach a busy and transient population of construction professionals. They enable a
sample to be drawn from a wider geographic area and, because participants cannot see the
Dictaphone, they quickly forget they are being recorded. Bryman (2012) also notes phone
interviews are safer for the investigator and participants are less likely to be influenced by
their appearance. Where is was not feasible within the cost and time constraints for this
project to collect interviews in person, phone and Skype™ were used.
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Sampling
Probability sampling uses randomisation to reduce bias by selecting a representative sam-
ple of participants from a wider population. This is common in quantitative research and
is essential for its external validity — allowing the findings to be generalised to the wider
population. Qualitative research on the other hand often uses non-probability sampling
because its aim is to understand a particular phenomenon, event, or group (Bryman 2012)
or provide in-depth insights into a selection of ‘information-rich’ cases (Patton 2002). There
are many potential criteria for non-probability sampling such as pursing typical or critical
cases; emergent phenomena (theoretical sampling); or homogenous characteristics (inten-
sity sampling) (Robson 2011); However, practical constraints mean the majority of quali-
tative research uses convenience sampling (Hancock, Windridge and Ockleford 2007).
To recruit participants the interview data was collected by purposive and snowball sam-
pling — encouraging participants to pass the invitation on to relevant colleagues. Within
the inclusion criteria, maximum variation (Hancock et al. 2007) — also known as ‘dimen-
sional sampling’ (Robson 2011) — was sought to to draw on the views of a breadth of
participants with differing roles and experience levels.
Data saturation
Rather than sampling a representative proportion of the population, a non-probabilistic
sample is complete when data reaches ‘theoretical saturation’. Unfortunately, there “are
no publicised guidelines or tests of adequacy for estimating the sample size required to reach
saturation” (Guest et al. 2006). Polkinghorne (1989, cited in Creswell 2007) recommends
interviewing between five and 25 participants in interview studies. Instead, the guidance is
that transcripts should be thematically analysed, iterating a coding structure until no novel
codes, material, or insight are emerging (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Bryman 2012). Details
of how the transcripts were analysed is included in Section 7.4.
The specific inclusion criteria increased the likelihood of reaching data saturation, but
its internal diversity also ensured as many present themes as possible were captured (Guest
et al. 2006). Furthermore, the use of a preliminary focus group helped to scope potential
themes to be explored in depth through interviews.
4.5.3 Case study
The interview study investigated safety leadership as a general construct — exploring and
the generating hypotheses about Adaptive safety and how it could be operationalised in
construction. Following this with a case study provided an opportunity to study Adaptive
safety in practice.
In the study of multifactorial organisational phenomena, experimental designs are of-
ten not possible because of the many factors involved and the inability to control them.
Instead, a case study is a preferable method (Yin 2009). Yin (2009) advocates case study
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research to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; in situations where the researcher cannot
control behavioural events; and when the focus on the research is contemporary rather
than historical.
The central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a
decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented,
and with what result.
(Schramm 1971 in Yin, 2009, p. 17)
Case study research is used when the case itself is of interest (ideographic) rather than
the generalisability of findings (Bryman 2012). Hence, the cases themselves are chosen for
their importance as extreme, revelatory, exemplifying or critical examples of phenomena
(Yin 2009). Laing O’Rourke (LOR) and its projects represent a critical case — an unex-
plored niche.
Like all qualitative research (as discussed in Section 4.5.1 case studies are often criti-
cised for lacking rigour. Thus, it is important to analyse and report all evidence fairly to
avoid bias. Although they can be used to generalise theories, they cannot prove a causal
link as an experimental design can, so need to be used alongside other methods (Yin 2009).
Unlike ethnographic and grounded theory research, a case study has clearly defined
boundaries. These are described in the following section.
Design
Case studies are typically exploratory or descriptive, but can be explanatory if they are suf-
ficiently rigorous and repeatable. As Safety Differently is somewhat undertheorised and
lacks an empirical evidence base (including other case studies), this case study took a de-
scriptive approach, rather than exploratory or explanatory (Yin 2009). Descriptive cases
are detailed and focused, scrutinising phenomena to inform theory development (Mills,
Durepos and Wiebe 2010) — in this case the theoretical propositions about Adaptive safety
in construction put forward in Chapter 2. The literature review and interview study pro-
vided a basis for the descriptive theory of this case study and ensured the investigator has
a strong grasp of the concepts.
Case studies can be cross-sectional, where data is collected at a single time period, or
longitudinal, where data is collected over an extended period (Mills et al. 2010). An ex-
tended data collection period is particularly useful in understanding organisational change.
Longitudinal case studies draw on multiple sources to provide rich, contextualised data,
improving the interpretation and validity of findings; however, the complexity, cost, and
logistics of such studies mean they are rare. On the other hand, cross-sectional studies are
easier to implement but can lack context and the validity of interpretation is limited (Fuller,
Gibb, Jones, Dainty, Haslam, Bust and Pinder 2017). Due to time and access constraints it
was not feasible to conduct a longitudinal case study; however, some questions included a
longitudinal element — asking participants to reflect on change over time.
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The final case study design compared Safety Differently in practice at two infrastruc-
ture megaprojects (Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) and Crossrail) at different stages of its
implementation (first and third year respectively). These two projects represented em-
bedded units of analysis within the contractor organisation (LOR). A vertical cross-section
of the parent organisation and both projects was sought to understand its adoption from
organisational — why and how the change has been implemented — and operational per-
spectives — how it affected the roles of safety managers and frontline workers. Figure 4.1
illustrates this cross-section, showing where documents and observations were collected
from in order to understand the translation of Next Gear from an external risk consultancy
to the frontline.
Safety Differently 
Masterclass 
(observation)
Leadership training 
(observation)
Compelling case for 
change
(observation)
Inclusive engagement 
programme 
(document)
Project onboarding 
(observation)
Supervisor’s daily 
activity briefing 
(observation)
Butty breifings 
(observation)
Collective insights 
(observation)
Appreciative Inquiry 
(document)
Planned vs. actual 
review 
(document)
Health and safety 
strategy
(document)
Site induction 
(observation)
External Management FrontlineSenior leadership
Figure 4.1: Documents and observations
Observations of these events totalled eight days and included any associated documents
such as presentation slides, teaching materials, and joining instructions. This was in ad-
dition to two key policy documents regarding health and safety strategy and examples of
paperwork as a ‘naturally occurring’ by-product of the risk management processes. Further
information about these methods is included in the following section.
Methods
One key aspect of case study research is triangulation (Haigh 2008). This case study uses
multiple data collection methods to create “methodological triangulation” (Denzin in Mills
et al. 2010, p. 945). In addition to interviews (as described in Section 4.5.2), data were
collected primarily by document analysis and observations for an organisational perspec-
tive, and interviews, focus groups, and observations for an operational perspective. These
methods are detailed in the following sections.
Observation
The degree to which the researcher is embedded in the context of the research can
vary: Bryman (2012) describes a continuum of “complete observer, observer-as-participant,
participant-as-observer, and complete participant” based on Gold (1958). An increased level
of involvement allows investigators to build relationships with participants and understand
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meaning, but risks compromising the neutrality a detached observer would have. To un-
derstand how the concepts of Safety Differently were conveyed to the workforce through
training courses, the induction process, and on site safety activities the investigator’s role
was as participant-as-observer.
One of the challenges of collecting observational data is that participants may change
their behaviour as a result of being observed. Therefore, it is important for researchers to
be discrete, allowing participants to be relaxed and behave naturally. Being a participant-
as-observer also helped to mitigate this effect.
Document analysis
Documents are a useful source of data because they are a “by-product of human activity”
(Mills et al. 2010, p. 318). These can be any written, visual, or physical materials — such
as artefacts — that add depth to a case. In this case, safety reports, policy documents, and
training materials contributed to the dataset.
Interviews
Most interviews conducted as part of the case study followed this semi-structured format,
except those with frontline workers which were almost completely unstructured — based
on a couple of open-ended questions. This less formal approachmaintained an informal and
trusting dynamic and allowed participants to lead with their experience and interpretation
of the new safety measures. These questions are included in Table 4.3. Critical incident
technique is a style of questioning which encourages participants to describe a specific
incident rather than general opinions (Bryman 2012). The interviews for the case study
included questions based on this method.
Focus groups
Focus groups — like group interviews — are a useful method to elicit large volumes of
information over a short time and capture a range of viewpoints. The familiarity of this
method (replicating social interaction) allows participants to speak freely about their views
(Bryman 2012, Walliman 2011).
(Hennink et al. 2011) describes focus groups as either ‘interactive groups’ or ‘moderator
dominated’. An interactive group format allows participants to debate and challenge oth-
ers, coming to a consensus, and highlighting unique perspectives. Moderator dominated
focus groups require a skilful investigator to manage group dynamics and keep discussion
flowing; this prevents minority views or quieter people being suppressed but can be less re-
laxed. The design of focus groups is important: Up to 8 participants is recommended, with
similar status and experience; and acquainted with one another (Bryman 2012, Walliman
2011).
The focus groups in the case study were interactive groups or nine or less, all of whom
were colleagues of the same status (supervisors, or workers from a particular trade). To
4.5. Research design 77
Table 4.3: Interview questions
Background
1) What is your role?
2) What responsibilities for health and safety do you have?
3) Who do you work for?
How long have you been employed by them?
4) How long have you worked in construction?
What is your background?
Awareness and understanding
5) Have you heard of ‘Next Gear’?
6) Next Gear sees “people as the solution”. Is this true here?
7) Next Gear is about “positives not negatives”. Is this true here?
8) Next Gear sees safety as about “ethics not bureaucracy”. Is this true here?
Have you seen a reduction in paperwork?
Evaluation
9) What do you like about safety here?
10) What has been the biggest change from previous projects?
11) Have you seen a change in people’s attitudes?
Or in your own attitude?
12) Can you give an example of a situation when Next Gear made a big difference?
Implementation
13) Has your role changed since introducing Next Gear?
Do you feel supported in this?
14) What have been the most challenging aspects to change?
Future projects
15) Could you have got to this point without previous safety programmes?
16) Would you find it difficult to move to a non-Next Geat site or company?
17) What would you like to see happen next?
counteract the logistical challenge of organising a focus group, they were arranged around
times when groups were already meeting for briefings. Like interviews, transcription and
analysis of focus group data is time consuming and complex (Bryman 2012, Walliman
2011).
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Sampling
According to Yin (2009) use of the term ‘sampling’ in case study research is incorrect as it
implies the participants are representative of a wider population.
Sampling while collecting data for qualitative research is not the same as sam-
pling in quantitative research because researchers are not interested in being
able to generalise at a statistical level — instead the key is purposive or strategic
sampling.
(Hancock et al., 2007, p. 21)
The aim of case study research is to seek information from specific groups and sub-
groups within a population, or describe a particular case — such as an event or organi-
sation — in detail (Yin 2009, Hancock et al. 2007). Therefore, unlike quantitative work,
where external validity is paramount, it is the intensity of analysis in case studies that is of
interest (Bryman 2012). Case study units of analysis are typically too small or unique to
be representative of similar cases of used for statistical generalisation; however, they can
be useful to corroborate, modify, reject, or advance the findings of other research as part
of informing policy (Hancock et al. 2007, Yin 2009) — in this case the rhetoric of Adaptive
safety which lacks a strong evidential or theoretical basis.
For the case study in this thesis, a stratified framework was designed to capture a cross-
section of participants from all levels of the projects and parent company — from senior
management to frontline operatives. Within this convenience sampling was used.
4.6 Ethical approval
The design of both studies was approved by Loughborough University’s ‘Ethical Approval
(Human Participants) subcommittee’. This ensured they complied with the university’s
‘Code of Practice on Investigations Involving Human Participants’ and ‘Data Protection Pol-
icy’.
In line with these policies, participants gave their informed consent; were made aware
they could withdraw at any point during or after the study; and provided a point of contact
for ‘Research Misconduct and Whistle Blowing’. Data about interviewees has been kept
confidential and information included in reports or publications used anonymously.
Audio recordings and interview transcripts from the interview study will be archived
at Loughborough University for ten years after creation and then destroyed. Those for
the case study will be combined with the dataset for the ‘Tideway Tracer’ longitudinal case
study of TTT and managed within this.
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4.7 Conclusion
Ergonomist Donald Taylor criticised mechanistic models of human behaviour and their
application of accidents and safety, instead advocating a hermeneutic approach to inter-
preting and understanding accidents through their meanings for the humans involved
(Taylor 1981). This view has become increasingly important in safety science as language
shapes culture, including safety culture (Pidgeon 1998). The importance of organisational
culture in safety has been recognised since the 1990s, yet the majority of research in this
field takes a functionalist approach rather than, as seen in the anthropological study of
culture, an ethnographic one (Sileby 2009).
Organisational culture is often wrongly thought of as an external phenomenon acting
upon the workforce (Bryman 2012). Studying ‘organising’ as a social process rather than
the organisation as an entity (Tsoukas and Chia 2002) aligns with Hollnagel’s notions of
safety as a system process rather than a property and Weick’s push for High Reliability
Organising, rather than Organisations. These shifting views towards understanding of risk
and safety as emergent social phenomena means there is a need for research which takes a
qualitative approach. Amethodology has been proposed that aligns with, or addresses gaps
in, the current research landscape of the disciplines that intersect this multi-disciplinary
work.
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5.1 Introduction
Adaptive safety has emerged in response to a changing understanding of the ontology of
risk and how risks result in accidents. Alongside this, safety is shifting from being seen
as an externally imposed control to a dynamic social process. In the preceding chapters,
the role of leaders has been theorised to be a significant factor in this; thus, the following
work focusses on leadership as a means to foster a more Adaptive culture in organisations
with a view to creating a framework to guide the implementation of Adaptive safety in
construction and other sectors (Objective 1 — “Explore the role of safety leadership”).
Chapter 3 compared a model of Safety Intelligence from air traffic management (ATM)
(a sector which has embraced Adaptive safety) with research into safety leadership in con-
struction. There are many similarities between these two sectors: The importance of a just
culture, communication, empowerment, collaboration, and proactivity has been demon-
strated, but leadership styles need to be adapted to suit different tasks, industries, and
relationships — accounting for the needs of followers. The six components of Adaptive
safety leadership proposed are therefore all necessary in both ATM and construction, but
to differing degrees and are manifest in different ways to suit the work of the sector.
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In light of this, it is not possible to create a universal model of safety leadership that
could apply in all sectors; instead, the aim of this study is to unpack the relationship be-
tween leadership and resilience — understanding the social factors that underlie organi-
sational resilience. Replicating Fruhen et al.’s (2013) method used with ATM leaders, this
study uses interviews to create an exhaustive taxonomy of safety leadership traits and be-
haviours that constitute effective safety leadership in construction. It sheds light on the
extent to which safety leadership in construction does, or could, align with an Adaptive ap-
proach. Attitudes to risk, and the potential for freedom and resilience are also discussed.
A panel of expert interviewees contributed their views on best-practice in safety lead-
ership. The findings show range of opinions, from those who were convinced a traditional
control and compliance approach is best, to those who were open to interpersonal risk
management, softer leadership styles, collaboration, and empowerment. Many partici-
pants discussed the importance of learning, trust, vigilance, and proactivity in construction
safety. However, even those who saw the benefits of the latter approach had reservations;
the pressures and trade-offs of the industry mean this best-practice is not always possible
in reality. The reasons for this mismatch are explored in Chapter 6.
5.1.1 The organisation of this chapter
This chapter presents the findings of interviews conducted with safety managers, consul-
tants and experts as part of a study of safety leadership. Participants’ responses are explored
in light of theories from the era of Adaptive safety to identify existing elements of, and the
potential for, Adaptive safety in construction.
The findings are presented as four sections based on the themes of the interviews: Best-
practice in safety leadership, attitudes to risk, understanding resilience, and the potential
to give workers more freedom.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
The sample included predominantly safety managers working for (or having previously
worked for) construction, infrastructure, architecture, and civil engineering companies.
These were global or multinational tier-1 contractors (in direct contact with the client)
headquartered in the UK, US or EU, and employing between 4,000 and 48,500 employees.
All the participants had at least five years’ experience working on or researching large
projects with a strong commitment to safety. The mean experience of participants was
22.5 years with a standard deviation of 13.2. This did not include previous experience
working in health and safety in sectors other than construction which they drew on for
comparison. Participants’ roles are included in Table 5.1.
Participants were recruited through the researchers’ contacts and snowballing the invi-
tation to participants’ colleagues. Judgement sampling was applied (based on occupation
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Table 5.1: Study participants and their roles
Role
Pilot Focus
Group
Pilot
Interview
Recorded
Interview
Health and safety manager or director 9 10
Health and safety training coordinator 1 1
Construction manager 1 1
Self-employed risk consultant 2 3
Academic with previous employment in construction 1 6
Academic researching construction safety 1 4
Total 14 1 25
and experience) to create a sample of construction safety experts with maximum variation
within this inclusion criterion; this included those involved in different roles within the risk
management process — such as research, policy-making, training, and consultancy, as well
as frontline managers — from a range of organisations.
53 potential participants were contacted yielding 25 recorded interviews (Response rate
47%). Eight participants from the pilot focus group went on to participate in a recorded
interview; they were not counted twice, leaving six plus 25 and one pilot interviewee,
giving a total of 32 individuals contributing to the dataset.
5.2.2 Data collection
Interviews were conducted between October 2015 and January 2016 by telephone (n =
15), Skype™ (n = 1), and in person (n = 9) depending on the most convenient method for
the participant. All the interviews were conducted by a single investigator. The duration
of the recordings ranged from 20 min to 60 min, with an average of 37 min. The recorded
interviews were transcribed verbatim and the complete dataset contained 140,000 words.
All coding was completed by the same investigator to ensure consistency. The process of
thematic analysis used to analyse this dataset is detailed in Chapter 4.
5.3 Data analysis
There are three main types of analysis used in social research: Grounded theory, the-
matic analysis, and content analysis (Bryman 2012). Grounded theory takes an induc-
tive (bottom-up) approach to building theory so is best suited to unresearched territories
(Bryman 2012, Walliman 2011). Content analysis, on the other hand, is deductive (top-
down) so suits research where a hypothesis to be tested exists (Bryman 2012, Walliman
2011). Thematic analysis sits between these two approaches (Braun and Clarke 2011).
As the concepts of Adaptive safety are not well-defined, neither an entirely deductive or
inductive approach was suitable. Retroductive (Bryman 2012) or Abductive (Dubois and
Gadde 2002) reasoning describes a process whereby empirical data are used to refine a
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proposed framework, thus resulting in the coproduction of knowledge (Green, Kao and
Larsen 2010). This approach was used in the thematic analysis of interview transcripts.
Following Bryman’s (2012) guidance on thematic analysis, a theme (or more) was as-
signed to each sentence — coding examples of concepts, local terminology, similarities and
differences, and theory-related material. The identified codes were then reduced by group-
ing similar and redundant themes into an axial or tree structure (Braun and Clarke 2011).
Interpretive coding (Miles and Huberman 1994) was also used to break down codes in
further detail. The coding process can be either deductive, if a coding structure has been
predetermined, or inductive, if based on the data itself. In an abductive approach, the
coding structure remains fluid and is constantly compared with the data and theory un-
til saturation is reached (Robson 2011, Mills et al. 2010). A sample of the final coding
structure developed by this method is included in Appendix A.
Content analysis was also applied to the interview study data. This consists of structured
searches to count the number of times particular works for phrases are used (Mills et al.
2010). Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest the frequency of data can provide verification
and guard against anecdotalism (or a “main informant” (Robson 2011)) but Braun and
Clarke (2011) warn more instances of a theme does not equate to significance. In Chapter
6 the number of respondents who spoke about each theme is used as a form of quantitative
validation. This prevents participants who spoke extensively on one topic skewing the
results (as coding by word count, percentage coverage, or number of references can) yet
provides another dimension to the analysis — demonstrating the dominance of certain
themes.
5.4 Findings
5.4.1 Safety leadership
Participants were asked to describe the traits and behaviours they felt a safety-conscious
leader should display— drawing on examples of best-practice from workers and colleagues
and their views of an idealised safety leader. In response to both questions on traits and
behaviours, participants provided a mixture of both traits and behaviours illustrating the
breadth of skills needed for leadership and the weak distinction between what participants
perceived as traits or behaviours. This difficulty extracting behaviours from the traits that
underpin them, and vice-versa, also supports criticisms of trait-based leadership theory
which ignores the social-process and situational context of leadership as discussed in Chap-
ter 3.
There was widespread recognition that safety leadership should not be limited to those
in a leadership role; however, if this was unclear prompts were used to widen the investi-
gation beyond safety managers’ best-practice.
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You [workers] can all be, and I want you to all be safety leaders, to lead each
other and help each other.
(Safety Manager)
Traits
The traits of safety-conscious leaders are shown in Figure 5.1. This figure displays the trait
nodes from the dataset as proportional circles, sized according to the aggregated number
of references, and segmented into subcomponents. Where these could be broken down
further these are shown in an overlapping circle.
Traits of leadership (influencing and interpersonal competence) and traits of safety-
consciousness (experience, qualifications, high-standards, careful working, and proactiv-
ity) were brought up as expected. However, participants gave almost equal weight to dis-
cussing the softer aspects of care and humility — traits which seem out of place in con-
struction’s macho culture.
They actually think of the people, not just as employees but they think of them
as kind of a family unit, so they will go beyond what they have to do to keep
them safe.
(Academic)
Social skill
Many participants’ responses focussed on interpersonal skills: Communication dominated
this theme, including being able to create a rapport as well as listen to and direct others. The
other social traits (personality and reasoning capability) fall into two main themes: being
good-natured — approachable, likeable, patient, polite, and having a sense of humour —
and being charismatic — engaging, enthusiastic, persistent, and persuasive. These two
themes are supported by other traits which have been grouped under Integrity and Agency
respectively.
They have to have good personal qualities and these sort of interpersonal skills,
you know, to listen, articulate … to somehow empathise with the individuals to
make the safety part personal.
(Safety Manager)
Agency
For a minority, success in leadership was about being authoritative; leaders need to be brave
and thick-skinned, but many others saw a softer side to the role: From their perspective this
required support from seniors, and being relatable, respected, and trusted. The success of
safety interventions is “based on the trust, and their openness, and communication” (Aca-
demic) that exists within the leader-follower relationship. Proactivity, or self-motivation to
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Humble (11)
Learning from... (14)
Open to learning (22)
Defer to experience (5)
Grounded (2)
Self-critical (1)
Authoritative (6)
Relateable (7)
Respected (1)
Supported by 
seniors (9)
Trusted (4)
Influential (28)
Adaptable (2)
Conscience (5)
Doesn't blame (4)
Brave (3)
Chronic Unease (5)
Thick skinned (2)
High standards (3)
Trusting (10)
Team player (3)
Of people's opinions (3)
Of people's roles (2)
Of people (4)
Respectful (12)
Approachable (6)
Engaging (9)
Enthusiastic (5)
Likeable (3)
Sense of humour (2)
Personality (22)
Create rapport (5)
Directing (4)
Listening (4)
Communication (18)
Accidents (4)
Colleagues (6)Criticism and 
feedback (2)
Research (2)
Family 
responsibilities (6)
Organised (4)
Professional (2)
Maturity (12)
Consistency (4)
Openness (5)
Honesty (14)
Experienced (19)
Trained and qualified (3)
Credible (23)
Previous accidents (5)
Task specific knowledge (12)
Industry (8)
Working with people (2)
To colleagues (7)
To safety (16)
Committment (19)
Empathy (5)
Encouraging (3)
Genuine care 
(19)
Compassion (1)
Protecting (7)
Caring (25)
Of others'... (13)
Of risks (7)
Of the big picture (14)
Awareness (29)
Activities (2)
Capabilities (4)
Individual 
differences (2)
Morale (4)
Team dynamics (5)
Focused on the task (1)
Mindful (5)
Careful working (6)
Patient (3)
Persistent 
(5)Polite (3)
Persuasive 
(5)
Reasoning (15)
Proactive (18)
Figure 5.1: Traits of safety-conscious leaders
anticipate and resolve problems, was also seen as an important trait and is explored further
under 5.4.1.
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Expertise
Technical competence was a key theme raised by participants: Their credibility is based on
previous experience — including task-specific knowledge and having gained appropriate
qualifications and training as well as experience of the construction industry, accidents, and
working with people. They were said to have high standards and work carefully, finding a
balance between mindfulness and focus on the task.
It’s about believing in what you do and how you then project yourself out to
others that you’re doing it in the correct, mindful, safe, articulate, and proper
manner.
(Safety Manager)
Expertise was also displayed through the level of maturity, organisation, professional-
ism, and commitment to both safety and their colleagues. Six participants spoke of those
with family commitments as being better safety leaders because of their experience of re-
sponsibility.
Openness
An important aspect of safety leadership was a heightened awareness of team dynamics
and morale, and others’ activities, capabilities, and individual differences. Alongside this,
leaders need to be open-minded; learn from colleagues, accidents, research, and criticism
or feedback they receive; and make adaptations accordingly.
It’s about going in with an open-minded approach, that you’re willing to … try
and understand other peoples’ views, people that are more capable than you,
you know, understand their views, appreciate their views.
(Risk Consultant)
This requires safety leaders to remain humble: “Competent to know when they need
support and help, so whether something’s out of their knowledge zone, or their comfort zone”
(Safety Manager) — they remain grounded, self-critical and can seek assistance or exper-
tise.
Integrity
As mentioned, many participants felt being good-natured was an important part of safety
leadership. This should be underpinned by values of genuine care, protection, empathy,
encouragement, and compassion. They put other’s needs before their own (team player)
and worry about the potential for harm (chronic unease). Many participants used analogies
of family ties to describe this trait such as “mother hen”, “brotherhood” and “parent-child
relationship”: Not only does experience of responsibility make people better leaders, but
also their ability to care.
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The people that they’re looking after is almost their immediate family, their
children, almost, but we’ve lost that I feel, and it’s a big issue with me that
we’ve lost this family ethic to how we care for and look after people at work.
(Risk Consultant)
Other traits that showed integrity were honesty, respect, trust, a strong conscience and
not blaming colleagues.
[Workers] feel they can approach you for anything and they’re not going to be
chastised for anything, you know, the open door policy, no blame culture look
at things.
(Safety Manager)
Behaviours
The behaviours which participants felt a safety-conscious leader would exhibit are shown in
Figure 5.2 as proportional hexagons. Sub-nodes are shown by overlapping shapes. These
themes were arranged into a hierarchical framework — from ‘Personal conduct’ to ‘Influ-
encing safety policy’ — based on models of a safety culture continuum from patholog-
ical to generative (Westrum 2004); safety compliance to safety participation (Neal and
Griffin 2006) or citizenship (Hoffman, Morgan and Gerras 2003); or safety leader prac-
tices as “controlling-caring-coaching” (Pilbeam et al. 2017).
Participants tended to focus on one or other end of this spectrum: A minority believed
being safety-conscious was about unquestioning obedience and taking ownership of safety
on an individual basis, whereas most participants saw safety-consciousness as a workforce-
wide activity, focussing on proactivity and collaboration.
Personal conduct
At the bottom of the framework, the foundation of being a safety leader is first to be safety-
conscious on a personal level. This includes not only technical competence in following
rules and best-practice guidance, but also attitude. Workers should be obedient, prioritise
safety and conform to the safety climate. At this level, the leadership element is passive
(i.e. leading by example). However, several participants said that for truly safety conscious
workers, their commitment went beyond the workplace — where safe working is expected
and rewarded — and their exemplary practice continued in their home life. This shows an
intrinsic motivation for safety.
If the walkway is showing that you go from this point to that point, that person
should do that, if it says reverse park you should do that, you know, so it’s
following the same rules, can’t be like one rule for one and one rule for the
other.
(Safety Manager)
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1. Personal conduct (33)
Attitude (27)
Leading by example (20)
Parenting (2)
Outside work (3)
Obedience (9)
Prioritising safety 
(4)
Conforming to the 
safety culture (3)
Technical 
competence (11)
Ensuring work is 
certified (1)
Not taking risks (1)
Properly 
equipped (1)
Lifting 
carefully (2)
Respect for 
equipment (3)
Tidy (5) Slower working (3)
2. Work relationships (20)
Close relationship 
with colleagues (7)
Getting to 
know people 
(11)
Understanding others’ 
motivations (3)
Mediating 
(3)
Not patronising (5)
Creating a welcoming 
atmosphere (2)
3. Heightened awareness (32)
Aware of site 
activities (12) Recognising 
good work (9)
Vigilant (8)
Looking out for 
colleagues (15)
4. Sharing safety knowledge (29)
Emotional 
impact (2)
Explaining rules or 
changes (6)
Mentoring (7)
Normalising safety 
conversations (3)
Pooling safety 
knowledge (6) Supporting 
others (11)
Willing to coach 
(11)
6. Influencing safety policy (35)
Understanding the 
big picture (8)
Encouraging engagement (24)
Encouraging 
ownership (7)
Create a level 
playing field (8)
Beyond enforcing 
procedures (3)
Evidence based 
decisions (1)
Integrating safety 
into production (2)
Investigating 
noncompliance (2)
Collaboration 
(7)
Consultation and 
discussion (7)
Involvement in risk 
management (8)
Follow through and 
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Of risk (5)
Of the project (1)
Of the task (2)
No ‘silo working’ (2)
No hierarchy (7)
5. Proactivity (45)
Anticipating risks (9)
Reporting (2)
Enabling work (13)
Visible on site (15) Not afraid to challenge (16)
Challenging the 
client (4)
Stopping 
work (4)
Seeking feedback 
(11)
From workforce 
(10)
Taking an active 
interest (5)
Asking 
questions (4)
Seeking 
assistance (1)
Resolving safety 
issues (8)
Problem solving (6)
From clients (1)
Figure 5.2: Behaviours of safety-conscious leaders
This is supported by traits listed under Expertise, but also Openness and Integrity as
leaders need to stay grounded and humble, respectful, consistent, and genuinely committed
to their colleagues’ welfare.
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Work relationships
Many interpersonal skills are discussed in the previous section; however, participants also
raised particular behaviours within work relationships which display safety leadership. This
included creating a welcoming atmosphere, and getting to know people as people, what
motivates them, and building close relationships with them.
Does the supervisor know the workers? Do they know how many kids they
have? Do they know what they get up to afterwards? It’s that sort of interest
in somebody outside of work which then you would expect to overflow into a
care and concern of them as individuals.
(Academic)
These work relationships are supported by interpersonal traits but also underpinned by
genuine care, commitment to colleagues and respect for others.
How much does it cost to be respectful? Nothing … I mean I’ve worked on sites
where I think “Boy! Do you realise that that’s actually a human being?”
(Academic)
Interestingly, at this level of the hierarchy the behaviours are neither influencing nor
explicitly safety-conscious, yet participants felt they were important for a safety leader to
exhibit. This confirms their recognition that for safety leadership or interventions to be
successful requires a foundation of good relationships between leaders and followers.
Heightened awareness
Building on these foundations — being committed and knowledgeable about safety, and
having good relationships with colleagues — participants spoke about being vigilant of site
activities, looking out for colleagues, and recognising good work. One participant said the
growth of this approach was something he had noticed over the past five years:
It was never macho to go out on a construction site and say “well done, you’re
doing a grand job there” because you’d be looking round thinking “well, I hope
somebody ain’t seen me” and they saw that as weakness in management.
(Safety Manager)
This requires leaders to be vigilant and observant, but also caring, humble, open and
respectful. As with work relationships, heightened awareness is an important aspect of
safety leadership without specifically relating to safety or leadership.
You mustn’t be lazy, you’ve got to be on your guard all the time and living- living
safety, not just talking about it, living it!
(Safety Manager)
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Sharing safety knowledge
Levels four to six show increasingly aspirational safety leadership behaviours — impacting
others on an individual, workplace, and organisational level. Sharing safety knowledge by
supporting, coaching and mentoring others, and being willing to explain why policies and
procedures are as they are. This requires leaders to have technical knowledge, experience,
and authority, but also the interpersonal skills to influence behaviour without patronising
or embarrassing — patience, empathy, and persuasiveness, underpinned by commitment
and care.
I try and do that [influence behaviour] through talking to people first of all,
giving them the benefit of my experience, trying to show them how it can be
done the right way, and giving them practical solutions as well.
(Safety Manager)
Participants felt the best safety leaders were able make safety conversations a normal
part of everyday work and convey the emotional impact or “horror stories” (Training Man-
ager) of previously experienced accidents.
Proactivity
Being proactive dominated many responses on safety leadership and included proactivity
to prevent unsafe work and enable or encourage safe work. At the baseline, proactivity was
seen as supporting compliance by reporting, stopping or challenging circumstances which
could lead to an accident: This included not only challenging peers about unsafe practices,
but also those more senior.
In addition to preventative interventions, heightened levels of proactivity were shown
by those who went above and beyond enforcing compliance.
It’s better to be prudent and try and prevent an event occurring than acting
after the event has occurred … it’s about being proactive and making sure that
we can possibly foresee what might go wrong and try and put it right before it
does.
(Safety Manager)
These safety leaders actively engaged with site safety, asking questions, and seeking
feedback from the colleagues and the client. The most proactive safety leaders were those
who anticipated risks, planned well, and actively resolved safety issues. Particularly in the
case of figures of authority, safety leadership was demonstrated by their visibility on site
and engaging with workers.
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Actively spending time on the site, prioritising that time, planning, and build-
ing the workers- what the workers need into their plans on an ongoing basis,
making sure that everyone’s got what they need to be doing the next stage.
(Academic)
Proactivity requires leaders to be open and humble, enabling them to know their capa-
bilities and seek assistance, and to learn from criticism and feedback. To challenge unsafe
behaviour they need experience, maturity, tactful communication skills, courage, and a
thick-skin and sense of humour if interventions are scorned. This is the first instance where
influence is a trait underlying the behaviours of a safety-conscious leader.
Influencing Safety Policy
The final level of the framework was reserved for behaviours which saw safety leaders
not only influencing their colleagues or workplace but the wider safety policy or climate.
Primarily, this was through encouraging a collective approach to risk ownership and man-
agement — engaging, consulting, and collaborating with workers. While proactivity is
often a one-way activity, the perceived importance a two-way collaborative relationship
validates the social construction of safety and leadership.
Highly safety-conscious leaders have a deeper understanding of risk and its implica-
tions which is evidenced by going beyond enforcing compliance, fully understand why
procedures are not adhered to, making evidence-based decisions, and integrating safety
into primary operations.
The need for a collaborative approach was supported by many participants who spoke
of breaking down hierarchical or trade-based organisational structures to create a culture
where anyone, junior or senior, can openly discuss risk. This is underlined by many of the
traits found under ‘Integrity’ — trust, respect, honesty — alongside expertise in risk man-
agement, and the interpersonal and communication skills needed to engage and influence
others. Commitment is also a key trait: As well as asking for feedback, it is important to
follow through with suggestions and communicate back the changes that have been made
to build credibility and relationships.
If they’ve got a complaint, deal with it! And actually follow it through! Doesn’t
matter how small it is, deal with it and carry it out because you’ll get the biggest
respect from them.
(Safety Manager)
5.4.2 Construction workers’ attitudes towards risk
Participants felt workers’ attitudes varied significantly both between and within individu-
als depending upon the activities or circumstances, but overall were improving with time.
Brace, Gibb, Pendlebury and Bust (2009, p. 194) categorised attitudes to risks as ‘Sensation
Seekers’, ‘Deniers’, ‘Acceptors’ or ‘Avoiders’. These are expanded upon based on participants’
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descriptions: A distinction was made between sensation deniers who are genuinely obliv-
ious to the risks, and those who are aware yet deny a risk’s potential for harm; a further
distinction between sensation acceptors for whom this acceptance made them either more
tolerant or more mindful of the risks; and the addition of a ‘risk appreciators’ category.
These categories are described in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Risk-tolerance versus risk-awareness of different attitudes
The dominant view of workers attitudes as either oblivious to or denying risk highlights
the importance of training to raise awareness of risks and the pressures workers face to
balance safety and production. Complacency was often blamed, either because of over-
familiarity with dangerous tasks and environments; distancing others’ experiences — “it
would never happen to me”; or the assumption risks had already been dealt with.
They almost rely, rightly or wrongly, on the engineer and project management
that set it up accordingly, and the main contractor, and hope to walk onto a safe
site, which is no bad thing, but can be slightly utopian!
(Risk Consultant)
5.4.3 A healthy attitude to risk
In terms of a healthy attitude to risk, participants discussed how this applied to both how
risks are perceived (Detecting risk) and how they are dealt with (Responding to risk). Some
participants also discussed a healthy attitude to risk as an organisational phenomenon
rather than an individual one — Managing risk. These components of a healthy attitude
are broken down further and presented in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: A healthy attitude to risk in construction
Detecting risk
Worker’s ability to detect risk is dependent on a technical knowledge of construction pro-
cesses, but also an abstract awareness of risk similar to that described by Fruhen et al.
(2013) as chronic unease. According to participants, a healthy attitude to risk is one which
is fully informed of risks and their potential severity; how risks develop, often unexpectedly,
from hazards; and how risks can be controlled. Other participants also said those with a
healthy attitude would be attentive, open to learning about risks, and able to extrapolate
their knowledge to other risks — applying “common sense” rather than needing specific
information on every scenario.
On the other hand, the majority of the responses concerned the less tangible aspect of
risk detection.
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They keep that consciousness level up … make sure that they’re thinking about
the possibilities of what can happen around them.
(Academic)
Participants described a heightened level of engagement, vigilance, respect, and mind-
fulness of risks as an important aspect of a healthy attitude. Key to this was avoiding com-
placency — never taking any situation for granted and continuously checking for hazards
in a changing environment.
Unlike technical knowledge which is developed through training and experience, this
mindfulness is more likely to have developed from previous experience of poorly managed
risks and their consequences. One risk consultant described the stark difference between
those who had had such “an epiphany” (Academic) and those who had not.
You can always tell straight away … they have more morals than most. They’ve
been either prosecuted or investigated or they’ve had something happen to
them, or on their site, because they tend to ask for a more questions, and the
right ones.
(Risk Consultant)
Responding to risk
This awareness of risk reflects the concepts of chronic unease and organisational mindful-
ness which feature in Adaptive safety — in particular in high reliability organising (HRO).
However, in contrast, there were also some participants who felt a healthy attitude to risk
was one of unquestioning obedience and rigid adherence to procedures. This view was
mostly held by those working in high-risk construction environments (such as off-shore or
tunnelling) but shows a traditional model of safety-by-compliance is still prevalent.
Responses on a healthy manner to respond to risk were similarly divided between those
who felt this was to follow procedures as instructed, and those who saw the value of flexi-
bility, intelligence, and judgment. Aligning with an Adaptive model of safety, some partic-
ipants highlighted the need for risk response to be sensitive to the context.
A healthy attitude to risk is to be not just reliant on procedural knowledge … a
healthy acknowledgement that plans can be improvised upon.
(Academic)
In responding to risks, most participants agreed a healthy attitude was one that em-
braced risks — ensuring they are safe but not allowing risk aversion to compromise perfor-
mance. Excessive risk aversion is not only expensive but takes the enjoyment out of work
and degrades the relationship with the workforce. Participants stressed the importance
of risk as an opportunity: A degree of risk keeps workers focussed, and overcoming haz-
ards stimulates innovation; improves processes; impresses clients; builds teams; and gives
workers a sense of pride and job satisfaction.
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Managing risk
Although most participants discussed a healthy attitude to risk as a personal value, many
also discussed the concept as an organisational strategy. This reflects the shift towards
a systemic view of accidents — rather than seeing individuals as responsible — and the
social construction of safety. These participants saw managing risk is a collective process,
stressing a healthy attitude as one where responsibility is shared between designers, clients,
and the supply chain.
A healthy attitude to managing risk is primarily the belief that risk should be minimised
and mitigated as far as possible; proactively challenging processes and “seeking to innovate
our way out of risk” (Academic). However, opinions were divided between traditional and
Adaptive approaches. Some felt the best way to manage risk was through thorough plan-
ning: Carefully scheduling work to consider the impact on other trades and the public,
prioritising high-risk activities, and responding proportionately to events. On the other
hand, others saw risk management as dynamic and interpersonal — engaging workers in
“a real active discussion around risk” (Risk Consultant).
Finding a “sweet spot” or balance was recurring theme in responses to this question. Just
as Lekka et al.’s (2012) and Fruhen et al.’s (2014a) frameworks show safety leadership re-
quires interpersonal leadership skill alongside technical knowledge of risk management, a
healthy attitude to risk includes the technical and social competence to manage it appro-
priately. Overall, a healthy attitude to risk was described as a desire to reducing risk, while
sharing responsibility; balancing autonomy and control (which is still seen as important in
construction); and not compromising production.
5.4.4 Resilience
Althoughmany participants were not familiar with Adaptive safety or resilience engineering
(RE), responses to the question “What would a ‘resilient workforce’ look like?” provided
valuable insights — promoting discussion around their interpretation of this term and its
applicability to construction. Figure 5.5 illustrates participants’ perceptions of ‘resilience
behaviours’ ordered from least to most aligned with the literature from left to right. As
with previous figures the shapes are proportionally sized to the number of participants
speaking on this theme.
This diagram shows their differing views and divided opinions: For some, resilience
was synonymous with compliance and discussions revolved around traditional aspects of
safety — for example, a workforce which is stable, healthy, competent, experienced, well-
briefed, and projects exhibiting good planning and housekeeping. There was also a ten-
dency to discuss resilience as an individual or psychological construct rather than from an
organisational perspective. Workers themselves are determined to “stand up to adversity”
(Risk Consultant), but this ‘resilience’ actually causes them to put themselves at risk.
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Figure 5.5: Behaviours of a resilient workforce
A construction workforce is resilient in terms of being macho and tough, and
they will work in whatever weather and things like that.
(Safety Manager)
At the other end of the spectrum, participants discussed aspects of resilience such as
flexibility, responsiveness, and strengthening through adversity. Interestingly, the risk con-
sultant quoted below felt construction had become less resilient over time, with larger
projects tending to take a ’one-person-one-job’ approach rather than multiskilling.
So they could bend and twist and be flexible to accommodate the business needs
… I think [in the past] we had a resilient workforce that could be flexible and
take on several tasks, within their comfort zone.
(Risk Consultant)
Other participants recognised the regulator’s drive towards a more resilient approach,
“trimming back on all the legislative plethora of documents … to make it more workable and
understandable” (Safety Manager).
I think there has been that shift- I mean if you think about construction legis-
lation, there is very very few rules which say ‘you absolutely have to do this’ or
‘have to do that’. The point is that you a have to judge for yourself what the
harm is and the hazard is.
(Safety Manager)
Several responses did see resilience as a team-based capacity. Many spoke about the
value of worker engagement, an active dialogue around risk, mutually asking questions,
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problem solving collaboratively, and providing feedback. Their answers showed parallels
with an interdependent safety culture, the resilience capacities to learn and respond, and
deference to expertise — focussing on a team’s ability to learn and self-organise based on
its members’ strengths and expertise.
Ultimately sort of a climate of interdependency so workers have the ability to
work on their own without having to be overly supervised, companies with a
workforce that trains itself and self-regulates itself as well.
(Safety Manager)
They’d have this ability to manage without process, they didn’t need the writ-
ten word, they didn’t need rules, they have a natural process going on where
capability and competency was coming to the fore, in terms of how those teams
were managing the delivery of that project.
(Safety Manager)
These managers described how a resilient organisation would deal with the unexpected
without rigid processes or management, instead drawing on capabilities and experience
within the team. This organic vision (whereby resilience is a bottom-up capacity driven by
the workforce) was only described by a small number of participants. Most saw resilience
as a result of good leadership and organisation — top-down rather than emergent.
Although some saw the potential for resilience, particularly on smaller projects, almost
all the participants were sceptical about applying it to construction: Reasons given for this
were its legal implications; construction’s orthodox approach to occupational safety and
health (OSH); the challenge of getting buy-in from senior management and the workforce;
the macho culture; and the untrustworthy and untrained workforce. The idea of giving
construction workers more autonomy and ownership of risk was difficult to accept. This is
discussed further in the following section.
5.4.5 Freedom
In line with Safety Differently’s philosophy of ‘people are the solution’, the idea of giving
construction workers more freedom over how safety is managed was discussed with par-
ticipants. Many participants had a negative initial reaction — non-compliance is a major
cause of accidents; however, after elaboration 17 were in favour of freedom provided this
was within certain parameters. In general, participants spoke of a restrained level of free-
dom: Rather than “let them loose on the site” (Academic), they discussed freedoms in terms
of engaging workers’ expertise in planning work and managing risks. Even the participants
who strongly disagreed with the notion were in favour a collaborative approach to risk
management. Only a small minority took the concept to the extreme of using a ‘common
sense’ approach or choose their own personal protective equipment (PPE).
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We have this compromise or this balance of giving them sufficient freedom to
feel that they’re in control of their own work and that they are contributing and
that they’re overcoming individual problems, but we also want to shield them
from making bad decisions and putting themselves and others at risk.
(Safety Manager)
For increased freedom
The majority of participants spoke of at least one potential benefit of giving workers more
freedom: Primarily, this was because they felt workers’ should be “respected and recognised
for the talent that they bring to the project, and their diversity as well” (Safety Manager);
their expertise should be appreciated as a valuable asset and integrated as early as possible
in the design phase.
I think the freedomwe should give them is upfront, sitting down thinking about
planning the job, and we can really draw on and use their experience to the
utmost at that stage.
(Safety Manager)
From an operational perspective, participants recognised that freedom could help the
workforce to respond to problems and cope with change, and had the potential to improve
productivity (albeit at the expense of safety) by harnessing workers’ creativity and problem-
solving skills. It is also a more efficient way of managing people on projects without the
resources to “micromanage” (Safety Manager) and in situations where plans must remain
flexible.
We’re relying upon the decision making on an hourly basis of the people who
work for us, in order to get the work done.
(Safety Manager)
Furthermore, participants felt workers appreciated freedom because it enhanced feel-
ings of empowerment, respect, responsibility, commitment, and self-expression, and pro-
moted communication and cooperation.
The beauty of that as well is that if the workers have been involved in that
they’re much more likely to buy into it because they’ve helped design it.
(Academic)
Against increased freedom
Although the majority of participants agreed workers should be given more freedom, all
of them specified caveats. It should be implemented carefully, on a case-by-case basis —
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depending on size, type of project, sector, cost, and level of safety integration at the design
phase — and consider boundaries set by corporate policy, work standards, and clients’
expectations. It is also only suited to situations where workers are competent, supervised,
aware of the risks and working within a good safety culture.
Arguments against increased freedom focused on the practicalities of implementing
such a policy within an industry which is project-based and resistant to change. Construc-
tion relies on the standardisation of processes and the skills of specialised trades: In large
multi-organisational projects these need to be meticulously coordinated. The risks change
quickly making them difficult to manage, and construction often takes place within haz-
ardous domains (such as live process plants) where not only construction risks need to be
controlled but those of the host environment. From a management perspective, partici-
pants felt safety-by-compliance would be easier to manage and defend in court should an
accident occur. The influence of the litigious culture of construction was clear as partici-
pants found the idea of a laissez faire approach to safety challenging.
What happens if there’s an accident and we haven’t put all of these things in
place? … People are scared of [change] because you don’t know what’s going
to happen. So I think it’s around this- there’s fear around the unknown.
(Academic)
Participants also cited problems of giving freedom to workers whom they felt did not
have the competence or risk perception to cope with increased freedom. Four participants
felt workers could not be trusted; they would push the boundaries of safe operation, fail to
wear appropriate PPE, and cause accidents through non-compliance.
In contrast to those who felt workers appreciated the empowerment and self-expression
that came with increased freedom, three participants said workers who chose a career in
construction did so “because they don’t have to answer questions, they don’t have to stand up
in front of people, they don’t have to make suggestions, they just have to do what they’re asked
to do that day and get on and get it done” (Construction Manager). Increased uncertainty
and responsibility, and a requirement to think, engage and communicate with others would
not be welcomed by the construction workforce.
Finally, one participant felt workers already had a great deal of freedom in the sense
that they were about choose their employment and the projects they worked on because of
the flexibility of the industry. They have freedom to engage in risk management but don’t
take up this offer.
5.5 Discussion
The findings of this research provide an insight into the work of safety managers, ex-
ploring how they perceive and influence workers’ attitudes to safety. For some, safety-
consciousness was unquestioning compliance, but others showed an appetite for a less
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forceful rigid approach. In line with Adaptive safety, most interviewees felt that workers
would benefit from greater autonomy but tempered this with a firm caveat about compe-
tence and experience. Trust and ownership are important factors in risk management but,
given the unique nature of construction and its challenges, a traditional approach to safety
is still seen as valuable. Despite this, participants suggested more could be done to reduce
the reliance on paper-based safety; integrate safety into primary processes (as opposed
to seeing it as a separate activity or department); cross-skilling of trades to increase risk
awareness; and engaging frontline workers in risk management activities.
Discussing the traits and behaviours of safety-conscious leaders with experts in con-
struction allows the different aspects of successful safety leadership to be conceptualised.
Safety Leaders need both power and safety expertise to build relationships and influence
culture, but other factors such as trust, respect, authenticity and humility have also been
proposed as significant. Interviews found leaders in construction should possess expertise,
integrity, authority, open-mindedness, and interpersonal skills — empathy, charisma, com-
munication, and likeability. These traits underlie the behaviours shown at the top of Figure
5.2 which contribute to safety-by-resilience rather than safety-by-compliance. This model
is simplified in Figure 5.6 which illustrates the continuum of safety behaviours becoming
increasingly engaged and collaborative with improved worker engagement and safety cul-
ture (Westrum 2004, Neal and Griffin 2006, Hoffman et al. 2003, Pilbeam et al. 2017).
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climate
Collaboration
Challenging and 
making changes
Coaching
Sharing knowledge
Caring
Awareness and 
empathy for colleagues
Compliance
Setting a good 
example
GenerativeProactiveCalculativeReactivePathological
Culture
W
orker engagem
ent
Figure 5.6: Safety leadership and culture maturity model
The levels show safety behaviours shifting from prevention to promotion and then in-
fluence an increasingly wide sphere— from coaching others, to collaborating on processes,
104 Chapter 5. Safety Leadership for Resilience
to changing organisational and industry-wide policies. Showing safety leadership as a con-
tinuum in this way illustrates that it is not a fixed trait; different styles of leadership are re-
quired in different situations and types of work. Furthermore, safety leadership is not only
a product of safety knowledge and authority: While these support the lowest (Compliance)
and highest (Citizenship) levels, other degrees of safety leadership are also underpinned
by empathy, integrity, and openness to new ideas.
They need to ask us what we need, not tell us what to do. Ultimately, to under-
stand how work actually gets done, they need an open mind and a big heart.
(Dekker, 2018)
While research in safety leadership has been dominated by its ‘leadership’, rather than
‘safety’ component, this conceptualisation highlights other aspects of safety leadership be-
sides these. It also emphasises safety leadership is not limited to those in a position of
authority as influence is only one aspect of this phenomenon.
A key theme from the interviews which marks the transition from preventative to gen-
erative safety is proactivity. Interest in proactivity has grown in recent years, paralleling
interest in resilience: Beyond occupational safety, modern work is increasing in uncer-
tainty and interdependence — requiring an agile and innovative workforce (Parker and
Bindl 2017, Curcuruto and Griffin 2017). Proactivity is defined as “taking control and mak-
ing things happen rather than watching things happen. It involves aspiring and striving to
bring about change in the environment and/or oneself to achieve a different future” (Parker,
Bindl and Strauss 2010, p. 828). Therefore, to be described as proactive actions must be
change-orientated and self-starting: This could be to either bringing about change within
an organisation itself; strategic changes to improve the organisation’s performance in its
environment; or individual changes to ‘craft’ (Slemp, Kern and Vella-Brodrick 2015) a role
(Parker and Collins 2010).
Early research in the 1990s explored proactivity as a personality trait (Crant, Hu and
Jiang 2017), but contemporary perspectives see the concept as a pattern of behaviour in in-
dividuals, teams, organisations or societies (Parker and Bindl 2017). Curcuruto and Griffin
(2017) define the prerequisites for proactive behaviour as both ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’: The
proximal component includes an individual’s capability and commitment — also described
as “can do” and “reason to” (Parker et al. 2010) — which is supported by distal aspects of
their role (knowledge, competence, skills, expectations, and definitions) and the organisa-
tion (values, climate, routines, social exchanges, leadership, job design, supervision, and
team design) (Curcuruto and Griffin 2017).
Likewise, the findings of this study have highlighted the importance of considering
Adaptive safety as a product of distal and proximal antecedents: Neither safety leadership
nor proactivity can be considered as individual traits, so focussing on individuals as a means
to cultivate organisational resilience neglects its organisational prerequisites. Engaging
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and empowering workers is not only a consequence of good leadership, but enabled by the
culture, resources, and structures to support it.
5.6 Conclusion
An engaged workforce is an important aspect of Adaptive safety. This work sheds light on
the role of leaders to support worker engagement: In terms of safety leadership as a tool
for fostering resilience, participants advocated individualised relationships, trust, coach-
ing, and collaborating with workers — paralleling best-practice in leadership generally.
These leadership behaviours are recognised as exemplary by construction professionals,
yet construction is not safe or resilient. Questions therefore remain about why this type of
leadership is difficult to implement in construction, and other factors which play a part in
organisational resilience. The role of systemic factors or ‘distal antecedents’ which support
resilience are explored in Chapter 6.
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6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 explored safety leadership in construction and the aspects of this which align
with an Adaptive approach. Many of the participants interviewed recognised the impor-
tance of authenticity and trust, engaging with workers, building relationships and encour-
aging proactivity. Furthermore, most agreed there was scope to give workers more freedom
to manage their own tasks and safety. Contrary to this, many participants felt obedience,
control, and compliance were still key to safe operations in this sector. This chapter uses
soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland 2001) to describe the complex, systemic chal-
lenges of construction with a view to explaining why these barriers make it more difficult
to take an Adaptive approach (Objective 2 — “Understand the challenges of construction as
a system”).
This work has been published as a journal article in Applied Ergonomics (Harvey, Wa-
terson and Dainty 2018a) and as a conference paper (Harvey, Waterson and Dainty 2018b)
which was presented at the Congress of the International Ergonomics Association (IEA) in
Florence.
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6.1.1 Systems thinking in construction
There have been calls for construction to move away from a ‘root cause’ mentality towards
accidents since the turn of the millennium (Gibb, Hide, Haslam, Hastings, Abdelhamid
and Everett 2001). Many studies looking into the factors affecting performance on con-
struction sites emphasise managing safety at every level of the system (Sawacha, Naoum
and Fong 1999); In particular, the contributing factors in construction accidents (ConCA)
model promotes a holistic view of incidents (Haslam et al. 2005). The impact of the ConCA
model has been widespread in academia, industry, and government. 13 years after its orig-
inal publication the article continues to attract more attention year-on-year, confirming its
position as a seminal paper in construction safety.
Haslam et al.’s model shows the importance of considering relationships between the
immediate circumstances causing an accident, and the factors which shape and originate
it — following in the footsteps of Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ metaphor (Reason 2000) (Figure
6.1). The research highlighted the contribution of political originating influences — such
as education and economic climate — and as such went on to inform a government inquiry
which said:
The HSE1 cannot succeed in eliminating fatalities without the support of the
population as a whole and the Government. This is a social issue and is too
important to be confined to the narrower focus of health and safety.
(Donaghy, 2009)
Donaghy’s report not only recognised the need for change to be driven from outside the
industry, but also the breadth of causal factors. It includes an extensive list of recommenda-
tions — from equipment and working conditions to unions and directors’ responsibilities.
ConCA demonstrated the need for a collaborative effort to own and manage risk from
the client team, concept designers, project management, preconstruction planners and
the industry as a whole, and to ensure risk management robust, integrated and participa-
tory (Gibb, Haslam, Gyi, Hide and Duff 2006). An integrated approach has been shown
to support project success (Franz, Leicht, Molenaar and Messner 2017), organisational
learning (Behm and Schneller 2013), the relationship between designers and construc-
tors, (Atkinson and Westall 2010), teamwork between trades (Baiden and Price 2011)
and safety leadership, by developing trust and communication throughout the system
(Donovan, Salmon and Lenné 2016). Systems thinking has been applied to demonstrate
the emergence of events, such as why safety outcomes are often inconsistent with inspec-
tion results (Saurin 2016) or supposed leading indicators (Lingard, Hallowell, Salas and
Pirzadeh 2017). However, a need for further research into systems thinking in construction
has been recognised (Love, Ding and Luo 2016); While in other sectors systems models
have progressed and developed, ConCA remains the best fit for construction.
1Health and Safety Executive
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Figure 6.1: The ConCA model (Haslam et al. 2005)
The existing literature on systems dynamics modelling in construction often takes a
‘hard’ (Scholz and Tietje 2002, p. 120) or objective approach to modelling the complexity
of construction organisations and performance, based on data mining of accident reports
(Chi and Han 2013), existing literature (Shin, Lee, Park, Moon and Han 2014), or simula-
tions (Goh and Askar Ali 2016). Conversely, literature on risk management and risk-taking
focuses on the range of proximal and distal factors which predispose workers to these
behaviours (Choudhry and Fang 2008, Oswald, Sherratt and Smith 2014) but rarely ex-
plore the relationships between these and where they originate from (Asilian-Mahabadi
et al. 2014).
6.1.2 The organisation of this chapter
The aim of this study was to review the credibility of the ConCA model with a panel of
expert interviewees. Their perception of the system, the pressures they face, and the factors
which shape their decision-making and leadership style were discussed and mapped onto
the original framework. This included the intrinsic hazards of the building process, the
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workforce, and the wider system. These data were used to crystallise relationships between
these factors and substantiate the systemic nature of accident causation.
The findings are presented as two sections. First looking bottom-up at the nature of
work and the workforce, then looking top-down at the organisational and industrial chal-
lenges. The discussion brings these together drawing out five key themes, or common per-
ceptions of workers, and exploring their systemic origins. Finally, a developed and updated
version of the ConCA model is proposed which gives a fuller picture of accident causation.
6.2 Method
The participants and data collection for this study were the same as in Chapter 5, see Sec-
tion 5.2 and for details. In addition to thematic and content analysis described in Section
7.4, this study used SSM: This approach enabled relationships between the wider industry
and its workers’ traits to be explored and provided evidence to support why leaders’ traits
and behaviours are successful or unsuccessful in the context of construction.
6.3 Data analysis
This latter part of the interview study uses SSM (Checkland 2001) to explore construction
as a complex system, managers’ priorities, and the challenges of risk management with a
view to explaining why an Adaptive approach to safety would be difficult in this sector. The
‘Rich Picture’ method facilitates visual communication and holistic thinking about messy
problems, situated in the context of complex systems within which they exist. Checkland’s
(2001) method advocates exploring the structures, processes, climate, people, issues and
conflicts, and the relationships between these.
Having already analysed the data thematically for the previous Chapter, rich pictures
or conceptual models were developed from the data in accordance with the principles of
SSM (Figures 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7). These are not ‘hard’ quantitative models, but de-
scribe construction as a complex system— revealing the relationships between factors that
contribute to construction’s problems, with a view to understanding and resolving them.
6.4 Findings
6.4.1 Hazards in construction
The initial questions sought to extract the problems and pressures of the construction in-
dustry which make risk difficult to manage. Participants’ responses to these two questions
often provided overlapping content, demonstrating the interwoven nature of hazards and
validating the use of sociotechnical system (STS) analysis to understand this complex sys-
tem. The interaction between the intrinsic hazards of construction and the risks caused or
exacerbated by poor management was most clearly demonstrated by the participants who
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questioned whether describing construction as hazardous was correct and instead felt poor
management (of risks and the project as a whole) was at fault.
I don’t think construction is dangerous, I think what’s dangerous about con-
struction is not truly understanding the hazards that construction presents, and
therefore not evaluating the risks associated with those hazards, not properly
designing out hazards.
(Safety Manager)
Intrinsic hazards of construction work
17 themes were extracted which relate to the intrinsic hazards of the construction process,
as opposed to management issues which interact with these or introduce their own risks.
These are illustrated as a tree diagram in Figure 6.2. The number in brackets following each
subject in the figures show the number of responses including that theme. These numbers
are aggregated into high-level themes, where the same participant is only counted once,
but which also include responses from other participants about the overall topic that could
not be subcategorised.
Nature of work (17)
Changing Environment (25)
Building the 
workplace (8)
Unexpected hazards (9)
Movement (7)
New 
technology (3)
The weather (11)
Locations (10)
Tools (6)
Materials (2)
Physical work 
(3)
Interacting with 
services (2)
Working at a height 
(8)
Historic 
buildings (3)
Oversailing (2)
Proximity to other 
features (2)
Underground (2)
Figure 6.2: Tree diagram of the intrinsic hazards of construction processes
Features of construction process such as dangerous materials, tools and the physical
nature of work were identified, as well as the hazards of building within a context of phys-
ical geography and existing infrastructure. Working at a height was also a recurring theme
which reflects its importance as one of the major causes of fatalities (HSE 2014b). Never-
theless, these physical hazards were overshadowed by the changing nature of construction
projects, the effects of which were universally recognised. This included both external
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changes, such as weather and unanticipated hazards of the site, and internal changes as
the workplace grows and materials are transported.
The biggest thing about construction is that it’s permanently temporary until
the day we finish, and everything changes all the time, even the things you’ve
done the same are different.
(Safety Manager)
Walls go up and so all of a sudden our fire escape routes need to change, or
we’ve dug a trench across the- the ground and now we have to change our
whole traffic management system.
(Risk Consultant)
As well as physical hazards within a changing environment, many participants chose
to discuss the way these hazards are exacerbated, and other risks introduced, by industry
and workplace factors. These are explored in 6.4.2.
The construction workforce
The intrinsic hazards of the construction process would not have such potential for harm if
not for the proximity of the workforce within these activities.
You’ve got machinery and humans together which as we know is a terrible mix
… in a factory hopefully either the machinery’s moving and the people are
stood still or vice versa, we’ve got both happening at the same time!
(Construction Manager)
Undoubtedly, people play a role in creating risk in construction; it is human nature
to be variable, unpredictable, prone to error, and to struggle with change, but there are
many factors which make those attracted to work in construction — typically young, agile,
men — particularly susceptible to unsafe acts. Table 6.1 is a matrix which compares demo-
graphics of the construction workforce with common traits that were seen to increase their
propensity to take risks. The shading shows where participants drew links between the
characteristics of the workforce and these demographics — dark for a strong association,
and light for possible. As with Figure 6.2, the numbers in brackets represent the number
of respondents who spoke about each characteristic.
The requirements for education and language skills are low, and the short-term con-
tracts provided by project-based work are appreciated by workers who are young and free
from responsibilities, and therefore able to work long hours and travel. Construction work-
ers are known for being tough and physically capable, but this can cause workers to push
themselves beyond safe (and healthy) limits because they believe they are fit, strong, flex-
ible, and have good balance and stamina enabling them to cope with the tasks.
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Table 6.1: Demographics of the construction workforce seen to exacerbate risk-taking
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Competence
Lack of interest in safety (12)
Not academically interested (8)
Language barriers (6)
Lack of qualifications (4)
Attributes
Physically capable (12)
High need to achieve (7)
Loyalty to colleagues (7)
Resourceful (4)
No family commitments (2)
Background Others’ low expectations of them (8)Challenging histories (5)
Behaviours
Lack of discipline (7)
Laziness (6)
Lacking common sense (3)
Aggressiveness (1)
Attitude
Low expectations of themselves (6)
Closed-minded (5)
Fear of being different (4)
Seeking excitement (4)
Fear of speaking publicly (2)
Many of the factors in Table 6.1 lead workers to engage in risk denial: The male-
dominance of the industry pushes workers to show they are able to cope with its risks;
economic disadvantage means workers act to cut-corners and save money; age can mean
workers are complacent based on their physical capability (young) or experience (older);
and workers with low academic attainment are less likely to fully understanding the risks.
The diversity of nationalities working in construction is also a demographic of the work-
force which exacerbates risk-taking behaviours, although rather than the denial of risk, this
can be attributed to misunderstandings due to language barriers, different expectations of
occupational safety and health (OSH), and a lack of standardised international qualifica-
tions.
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Unfortunately, the type of work attracts workers with traits which, while desirable from
a production perspective, mean they can be unpredictable, complacent and prone to risk-
taking. Positive attributes such as being hardworking, innovative, and free from commit-
ments can have a negative impact on judgement.
One worker actually said to me: “If I die, my parents are the only ones that are
going to miss me.”
(Academic)
This recklessness suggests workers lack an appreciation of their worth and their impact
on those around them. The desire to be seen as a hard worker can be partially attributed to
the importance of reputation for securing work in the industry, but can also be interpreted
as a product of workers’ backgrounds — low academic attainment and economic disadvan-
tage. The low expectations held by others and of themselves fuel a strong need to achieve
and be seen as helpful and resourceful.
In [area] we tend to be a bit poorer and we think a bit more creatively …
because they’re trying to savemoney and we’ve got to tell them that their safety-
well we do tell them that their safety is much more important than any amount
of money in the world.
(Safety Manager)
Another reason why construction is risky is some people are very keen- which
is an admirable trait- very keen to help others, and almost jump in when they
can’t- when they haven’t got the competence to do that particular task, to try
and help out.
(Training Coordinator)
Another trait mentioned by participants was a fear of speaking in public — a skill which
is not important for constructionwork—but which, alongside peer pressure, can contribute
to an unwillingness to report unsafe incidents. This lack of confidence combined with the
low expectations, low sense of personal value, and a strong need to achieve suggest one
factor contributing to construction workers’ cavalier attitude to risk is a desire to prove they
are capable.
Factors shaping the acceptability of risk
The significant numbers who felt that construction workers were oblivious to risk, and
many more who said they had a high tolerance or poor understanding of risk, prompted
an in-depth analysis of the factors participants felt influenced this.
Complacency was a prominent theme, said to be caused by either experience or previ-
ous positive outcomes; familiarity with such situations; or distancing — an ‘it would never
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happen to me’ mindset. Other significant negative effects were attributed to a lack of com-
petence or training about risk, and a poor or macho safety culture. Conversely, participants
felt workers perceived the risks as less acceptable if they had experience of previous acci-
dents, had commitments to family or friends and colleagues, management were committed
to enforcing safety, and the location of work felt dangerous (e.g. underground or at sea).
They’ve all sort of seen something they’d prefer not to … they turn round and
think “Well hang on, the ambulance isn’t going to come toddling up the road, there
isn’t one” you know? So whatever happens you’ve got to survive it for at least-
well if you’re off shore at least an hour.
(Risk Consultant)
There were several factors which have potential to have either a positive or negative
effect, such as peer pressure and previous experience of the construction industry, national
culture, and age. Participants were evenly split as to whether older workers became more
or less tolerant to risk with experience, and similarly participants felt younger workers were
either aware of their lack of experience or thought they were invincible. Variability can also
be seen within the international demographics of the construction industry: Workers who
have been exposed to poor safety attitudes in other countries may have no concept of formal
safety management systems, making them difficult to control, whilst other cultures take a
rigid approach to rules meaning their obedience is advantageous for safety.
When the magnitude or consequence of a risk is perceived as high and uncontrollable,
workers were said to be more cautious; however, this could also have a negative influence
as serious risks such as high voltage current or working at a height can overshadow smaller
risks making these seem more acceptable. Workers were thought less likely to perceive a
risk if it was relevant to their trade, and they had therefore become complacent about it, or
it was not relevant to their trade, and they did not understand it. This also meant workers
were likely to only take ownership of risks relevant to their trade and compartmentalise
their management.
Communication about risk management meant workers were more vigilant, but 4 par-
ticipants said risk management measures had the potential to encourage tolerance because,
in accordance with risk homeostasis theory (Adams 1995, Wilde 1982), workers feel the
risks have been adequately controlled. Finally, if workers felt valued by management, that
their skill was valuable, had recent training, or were trained in multiple trades they were
less tolerant to risk. As seen in the previous section, attitudes to risk in construction are
highly varied and subject to the complex interaction of many factors.
Factors leading to unsafe acts
Factors such as experience, training and culture, influence the acceptability of risk; how-
ever, participants also spoke of the pressures and distractions that could cause workers to
behave unsafely, regardless of whether they felt the level of risk was acceptable.
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Whether or not a worker chooses to accept a risk depends upon its perceived benefits
whether these are worth the risk (Adams 1995, HSE 2004). Figure 6.3 shows that partic-
ipants felt workers were often motivated to take risks by money, peer pressure, time pres-
sure, and concern for their reputation. As well as these trade-offs, some participants men-
tioned dissatisfaction as a motivation for unsafe acts, particularly where they felt restricted
or patronised by safety measures, and a few said they would act unsafely if distracted by a
mobile phone or personal issues.
Pressures (39)
Dissatisfaction (8)
Distractions (4)
Comfort (6)
Easier options (3)
Human nature (2) 
Laziness (4)
Looking good (2)
Money (20)Penalties (1)
Progress or 
promotion (1)
Reputation (11) 
Rewards (3)
Satisfaction (3)
Time pressure (12)
Mobile phones (2)
Personal issues (2)
Hard worker (7)
Problem solver (4)
Peer pressure (17)
Showing off (6)
Fear of ridicule (6)
Afraid to challenge 
unsafe issues (2)
Fitting in (2)
Groupthink (7)
Finishing early (10)
Self-generated (5)
Peer pressure (1)
Figure 6.3: Tree diagram of factors which can cause workers to trade-off safety
The trouble is the workers will latch onto this [inappropriate safety measures]
and see this as an inability of the management to be flexible, in what they’re
doing, and then they sort of rebel against that, and there is resentment and a
negative attitude.
(Academic)
Workers took unsafe actions because they were not aware of the risks themselves or
their impact on others. In particular, workers were more likely to behave unsafely if they
were not aware of the consequences of the risk and lacked knowledge or experience around
it. More complex risks, where the hazard develops from combination of causes, and those
outside a worker’s trade were also likely to be missed.
Attitudes towards risks are an important consideration, but one of many factors which
contribute to the decision-making process of weighing up knowledge and awareness of
risk against pressures, priorities, and distractions. So far, unsafe acts have been discussed
from an individual perspective – the factors that affect the acceptability of risk and decision-
making – however, these should be seen in the context of the system: Participants also spoke
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about many team, workplace and organisational influences which can affect someone’s
propensity to act unsafely and show the importance of not placing blame at the frontline.
To some extent the conflicting factors in Figure 6.3 can be seen as products of both
the workforce and the industry: Time pressure may stem from a desire to finish early but
also the client or poor planning; reputation is important to secure work in a competitive
industry; poorly designed personal protective equipment (PPE) is bulky, uncomfortable,
and interferes with operations; showing off shows a desire to be accepted into a transient
community; and being motivated by money is not only an individual trait but one which
reflects the sector as a whole and companies’ desire to stay in business. It is clear that sac-
rificing safety is not an individual’s choice but a complex decision based on many pressures
and issues.
6.4.2 The wider challenges of managing risk
Thus far, the intrinsic hazards of construction have been extracted, and aspects of the con-
struction workforce which participants felt increased workers’ propensity for risk-taking
behaviours. The remaining data related to other issues which made managing risk difficult
in construction. These codes were grouped into a tree structure, ordered into a hierarchy
of distance from the frontline based on ConCA (‘Originating Influences’, ‘Shaping Factors’,
and ‘Immediate Circumstances’) and ranked according to prevalence (Table 6.2). The rela-
tionships between these factors, and the site and workforce challenges already identified,
are discussed in the following section.
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Table
6.2:O
riginating,shaping,and
im
m
ediate
factors
w
hich
m
ake
m
anaging
risk
difficult
Originating Influences (75)
Client (41)
Conflict of interest (32)
Cost (22)
Speed (19)
Reputation (4)
Supply chain (2)
Underinform
ed (12)
About 
construction (8)
About safety (5)
Lack of buy in (9)
Ownership of risk 
(6)Com
pared with 
other sectors (4)
Intim
idation (1)
Varied (1)
Subcontracted 
structure (35)
Transient workforce (24)
Lack of loyalty to 
tier-1 (8)
Varied levels of 
experience (5)
Disposable (4)
Unstable culture 
(4)Loss of local 
knowledge (2)
Difficult to 
im
plem
ent safety 
strategy (1)
Standardisation (10)
M
istrust (6)
Coordination (5)
Com
m
unication (5)
Variability 
between projects 
(19)
Size(12)
Lack of transferability (8)
Knowledge 
transfer between 
projects (2)
Pushing 
boundaries (3)
Dom
ain (2)
Type of construction (2)
Unregulated (11)
Lack of standardisation 
(5)No need for form
al 
qualifications (4)
Com
panies (3)
Financial risk (2)
Shaping Factors (74)
Accountability 
(32)
Shirking safety 
responsibilities (15)
To the health and 
safety team
 (8)
To the sub-
contractors (7)
To the client (2)
Com
partm
entalisation 
(12)
Silo working (7)
Separating safety 
from
 prim
ary 
activities (5)
Fear of litigation (10)
Blam
e culture (4)
Blurred chains of 
responsibility (2)
Poorly designed 
policies (32)
Unsuitable rules (25)
Lack of sensitivity 
to the task (17)
Not done by an 
expert in the task 
(9)
Lack of review (4)
Reactive (3)
Disproportionate (2)
M
easurable (2)
Not evidence based (1)
Planning (26)
Not integrating safety at 
the design phase (13)
Coordinating a com
plex 
project (8)
Unpredictable (6)
Undesignable workplace 
(6)
Unlike a factory 
(5)
Attitude towards 
risk (20)
Acceptance of risk (7)
Lack of new ideas (5)
Awareness (3)
M
inim
um
 com
pliance (5)
Cost and tim
e for change 
(4)Conservative (2)
Focus on safety not 
health (1)
Immediate Circumstances (59) 
W
orker buy in 
(35)
Lack of interest (19)
Cynical about safety (7)
Intim
idated by 
professionals and 
paperwork (5)
Lack of loyalty or 
responsibility (4)
Dem
onising health and 
safety staff (3)
Resolving issues at the 
frontline (2)
Patronised (2)
Lack of training 
(20)
Not inform
ed about risk (8)
Lack of cross-trade skills (1)
Poor integration 
of m
anagem
ent 
staff (17)
Lack of consultation (10)
Lack of trust in workers (3)
Not engaging (1)
Com
m
unication 
(16)
Lack of live discussion (7)
Difficult to enforce safety 
(4)Changing attitudes (3)
Failure to stop and revise 
plans (3)
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6.5 Discussion
The findings show the range of challenges that influencing decision making: Construction
work is high-hazard in combination with constant change making risks difficult to con-
trol; the demographics of the workforce (young, male, international, and with low levels
of education and economic privilege) are associated with characteristics that exacerbate
risk-taking behaviours; and the project-based, client-driven structure of the sector is com-
petitive, unregulated and litigious.
Primarily, workers were seen as oblivious to the risks or tolerant and willing to deny
the risk in the face of other priorities. However, a holistic or systems thinking approach
to analysis helps to reveal the complex relationships between this and other immediate,
shaping and originating causes of accidents — challenging the tendency to blame workers
and look for a “root cause”. The systemic origins of five worker attributes that were seen to
cause accidents — low engagement with safety, ‘silo working’, lack of competence, ‘cutting
corners’, and a high risk-tolerance — are explored in the following section. The industry-
wide factors which cause, attract, and exacerbate these behaviours demonstrate the value
of systems thinking to address construction risks.
6.5.1 Worker traits and their systemic origins
Low engagement with safety
On the surface workers are seen to lack interest in safety and therefore fail to engage in
risk management. However, this is a relationship which goes both ways: not only do work-
ers fail to engage with management, but management fail to engage with the workforce.
Although the workers are the experts in the task, it is presumed they are risk-takers who
need to be controlled and this limits collaboration; thus, because their expertise is not val-
ued, they disengage from the project. Many of the participants recognised the need for
enhanced collaboration, but the project-based nature of the industry makes this difficult:
Learning is disrupted in temporary organisations and there is limited time built into the
schedule to gather input from the workforce during the design phase.
This lack of engagement means safety becomes an afterthought and policies are ill-
suited to the context, making sweeping generalisations about the nature of construction
work. Poorly designed procedures and equipment cause workers to become cynical and,
again, disengaged because they feel they have little influence or value. They become dis-
obedient (either as a pragmatic reality of getting work done or as an act of animosity),
resentful of their employers, and demonise OSH — perpetuating the disconnect between
workers and safety which is perceived as their lack of interest. This emphasises the impor-
tance of integrating safety into primary work activities so they suit the context and support,
rather than hinder, efficient work. These relationships are summarised in Figure 6.4.
It is clear some effort is needed to break the vicious cycle of managements’ mistrust and
rigid rules leading to workers’ disengagement and disobedience. Although workers appear
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uninterested in safety, this could be because they are not given timely opportunities to en-
gage, do not expect to be engaged with, or have become cynical about safety because their
input is not valued. Rather than blaming workers’ lack of interest, it is important to recog-
nise the impact of this as well as peer pressure, fear of school-like situations, intimidation
from professionals, cynicism, and a misperception of OSH staff as enforcers. Acknowledg-
ing these reasons for low engagement shows where interpersonal skills and guidance for
engaging with workers could be developed and improved in light of this.
‘Silo’ working
Similarly, as a result of low engagement between workers and management, workers are
seen to work in silos — compartmentalising their role and the risks associated with it.
When they’re just treated as a part in a much bigger picture- jigsaw, and your
part isn’t that important- or that’s how they perceive it perhaps, then their in-
terest in that project and that organisation, and risk, is diminished.
(Academic)
Workers contracted to do a specific task for a specified price rarely appreciate the signif-
icance of their role in relation to the project. Accidents can happen because they fail to see
the ‘big picture’; how their workmight interact with other trades on site or the wider impact
the risks they take could have. On one hand this could be seen as a lack of competence, but
it is also indicative of problems within the project-based nature of construction: Projects
need specific skills for certain periods of time and work to a tight schedule. Brief temporary
contracts allow little time or incentive to invest in training, and workers are under pressure
to finish their tasks and move on. The system is not set up to allow relationships between
trades to develop and instead they become inward-looking, defensive, and isolated, which
narrows their perception of risk. These relationships are summarised in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Factors contributing to construction workers’ lack of communication
Several participants felt that workers’ perception of risk was higher if their trade was
valued, particularly if their work was visible in the finished building, and they had an
awareness they were contributing to something they could be proud of. Projects are more
likely to be safe and successful if workers understand their role as part of a larger project,
particularly if the project is high-profile (Bolt et al. 2012). Some participants also felt
training workers in skills other than their own would help them to identify the hazards of
other trades. However, although autonomy and job rotation have been shown to improve
job satisfaction (Parker and Bindl 2017, Waterson et al. 2015), it would be difficult to
justify and implement this in a transient environment where the skills required are highly
specialised.
Lack of competence
Under the broad term of competence, participants referred to not only a lack of technical
competence in one’s own trade, but an awareness of safe practice, the work of other trades,
and the interactions between site activities. This highlights the breadth of skills and traits
needed to manage risk successfully and the tendency of managers to oversimplify and dis-
miss an incident as a ‘lack of competence’. To improve workers’ competence there is a need
for further training; however, the lack of investment in workers due to specialised trades,
project schedules, and temporary contracts has already been discussed. There is also a lack
of regulation of construction companies which fails to prevent a lack of competence leading
to incidents.
You could set up a construction business tomorrow … it’s a low level of entry
into the market, and that exposes people to risks and hazards that they’re not
capable of controlling.
(Safety Manager)
122 Chapter 6. Construction as a Complex System
This is exacerbated by a lack of resources and low profit margins. The role of the con-
struction sector, as a provider of engineering solutions within other domains, means profit
must be reaped from the supply chain and building processes. By engaging the cheap-
est workers construction firms can reduce their outgoings, but these are often those with
the lowest competence levels. Several participants spoke about the difficulties of resisting
pressure from clients who were determined to keep costs down at the expense of engaging,
competent, qualified and safe personnel.
A more general lack of competence (for example, academic and social attainment) can
also lead to risk-taking behaviours. Participants said workers chose construction because
“they’re well down the food chain when it comes to where they’re going in life” (Safety Man-
ager) andwere incapable of doing anything else. From a systems perspective, it is important
to understand why construction work attracts these workers: Although some trades are
highly-skilled, the requirements for general labouring are quickly learnt; physical agility
is prized over mental; and good social and language skills are rarely necessary. These
relationships are summarised in Figure 6.6.
Low 
competence 
levels
IndividualWorkplaceIndustry
Project-based 
Pressure from client
Physical work
Expendable workforce
Lack of investment
Male
Disadvantaged 
socioeconomic 
background
Low profit margins
Tight schedule
Lack of training
Young
Physical strength 
rewarded
Not academically minded
Loosely regulated
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Construction suits workers with these traits, but this introduces management problems
for those in charge. Again, these issues are embedded within the nature of construction
work and the project-based industry, but to improve safety it is important to understand
why construction workers lack the necessary competence so training and regulation can
focus on addressing these.
Taking shortcuts
Cutting corners to save time and money were often seen as driven by laziness, but also
symptomatic of a culture among construction workers to solve problems and prove them-
selves to be resourceful, capable, and productive.
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What we want people to do is stop and reflect, what they tend to do is to go
in to automatic problem solving … you know, “What would I get congratulated
for, would I be congratulated for stopping work? Or would I be congratulated if I
solve the problem?”
(Safety Manager)
Participants felt workers had been conditioned by the customary lack of resources to
rush and improvise, and there was a widespread expectation that prioritising cost and
schedule over safety would be rewarded. Even in cases where projects were well-managed
and safety budgeted for, it was difficult to change the attitudes of workers who were not
used to work being open for discussion, projects being planned well, and companies being
committed to workers’ well-being.
Pressure from clients — who were said to be more concerned with cost, schedule, and
reputation than safe operation — was seen as the source of this: Participants provided
examples of clients who appointed the cheapest firms, imposed penalties for contractors
who took longer than planned, and sacked those involved in accidents to the dismay of the
safety managers who could no longer learn from and improve upon the situation. These
actions show a limited appreciation of construction processes, especially safety, and an
unwillingness to take ownership of risk or invest in anything other than the end product.
The subcontracted structure also creates opportunities for clients to pass the blame down
to subcontractors, who in turn look to blame the primary contractor or client.
Low profit margins, compounded by a fear of litigation, can be seen to underpin corner
cutting at all levels of the industry. Risk management is based on meeting the minimum
standards for compliance: Safety policies were said to be reactive, disproportionate, not
evidence based, rarely reviewed, and taking a broad-brush approach to cope with constant
change. The extensive use of PPE, signage, and site rules to keep workers safe shows a
reliance on the “the last line of defence” (Risk Consultant) rather than good planning and
design. This profit-driven, and hence corner cutting, culture is inevitable in a competitive
sector, and the most fundamental of the systemic issues it faces.
High risk-tolerance
Most participants agreed construction workers had either an accepting or denying attitude
towards risk, and some said they enjoyed the thrills and challenges of the work. In part,
this is due to the potential for varied, physical, outdoor, and exciting work which attracts
individuals with a risk tolerant personality. Often, these are young men who are flexible,
hardworking, and problem solvers, and, although these traits are desirable for production,
they tend to coincide with unpredictability, complacency and risk-taking. As discussed in
the previous sections, the construction workforce is also known for its low levels of academic
attainment, social skill, and economic privilege: Their low expectations can be seen to drive
a need to achieve — cutting corners and saving money.
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This is another clear example of the connection between risk-tolerance and risk-taking
at the frontline and the nature of construction as a distributed system which attracts un-
skilled and uncommitted workers who are difficult to manage. Risk-tolerance is not a
fixed trait but dependent upon pressures and incentives such as time, comfort, money, and
reputation. These factors motivate workers to sacrifice safety and appear to have a high
tolerance for risk, but in fact, these are initiated by systemic issues: Poor planning, tight
schedules, poorly designed equipment and insensitive procedures; fear of litigation, and
an expendable view of the workforce are all brought on by a lack of resources and stability.
A high tolerance for risk can also be attributed to a lack of awareness, due to insufficient
training, or disobedience, due to dissatisfaction, as already mentioned. These relationships
are summarised in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Factors contributing to construction workers’ high risk-tolerance
An improved understanding of the type of worker attracted to construction, and the
pressures they face, can support safety managers’ strategy to tackle unsafe acts. Greater
empathy and autonomy could combat dissatisfaction, a balanced safety policy to maintain
elements of construction which inspire workers and provide job satisfaction, and training to
enhance risk awareness could all help lower workers’ risk-tolerance. However, more difficult
to tackle are the organisational pressures which influence the culture of the organisation.
Proving the roots of these problems identified here would provide evidence to challenge
the view that workers are rebellious, negligent and complacent, and instead show they are
scapegoats in a flawed system.
6.5.2 Summary of findings
The findings provide an insight into the work of construction safety managers. It is clear
they face not only the intrinsic hazards of a physical, dynamic work in challenging locations,
but also managing a difficult demographic of workers, and competing with the pressures
of an unstable and financially squeezed industry.
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Construction is just a big game of risk, companies go under all the time, because
tender decisions are taking a risk- it’s what we’re kind of used to.
(Academic)
All three facets of the problem were explored - the work itself, the workforce, and
its management. Construction is unstable, not only in terms of the workplace they are
building, but its finances, workforce, and the systems in place to manage these. Its dynamic
nature prevents the transfer of knowledge between projects and the implementation of
consistent and well-designed safety measures (policies, training, culture, quality standards
etc.). Lines of accountability become unclear in temporary organisations, leading to the
shirking of safety responsibilities — by both the client and subcontractors — and a culture
of blame and litigation. By exploring the wider organisational or industry-wide challenges
it is possible to see the shaping influence these factors have on the structure and workforce
of construction and the difficulties influencing safe behaviour.
6.5.3 Systemic causes of risk in construction
There is a clear need to tackle the roots of unsafe acts embedded within the construction
industry; however, it is difficult to know how to approach change and who to hold respon-
sible.
By using an STS lens on construction, the relationships between the issues which safety
managers expressed have been explored to disentangle hazards from poor management,
and poor worker attitudes from the industry-wide factors which attract and exacerbate
these. This analysis provides evidence to challenge blame at the frontline: Many of the
complaints about workers’ poor attitude (such as silo working, cutting corners, high risk-
tolerance and a lack of ownership, competence and engagement) can all be traced to
systemic issues around the nature of construction work and pressures from the wider so-
ciotechnical system. In light of this, the ConCAmodel (Gibb et al. 2006, Haslam et al. 2005)
has been redrawn (Figure 6.8) to show how the site, technology and worker factors which
combine to form accidents are framed within managerial and industrial originating and
shaping influences.
Quantitatively, when asked about the causes of risk in construction, participants were
more inclined to discuss the difficulties of managing a complex project — dealing with
clients, subcontracting, and accountability — and worker attributes — a macho and com-
placent workforce. When the data is displayed as a tree diagram based on ConCA frame-
work (Figure 6.9) the number of nodes and references demonstrates this. This contrasts
with the original ConCA model (Figure 6.1) which elaborated more on the site and tech-
nology. Unlike accident reports which are reductionist and can be vulnerable to hindsight
bias (Dekker 2002) (and which the original ConCA was based on), this study shows many
managers are aware of the influence of a wide range of distal factors in the causation of
accidents.
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Figure 6.8: ConCA+
Taking a systems approach to interview analysis also provided an opportunity to ex-
plore the relationships between poor attitudes at the frontline and the industry-wide factors
which attract and exacerbate these. While workers are often blamed for causing accidents
because they lack interest in safety, work in silos, lack competence, cut corners, and have a
high tolerance for risk, these traits can be traced to interrelated aspects of organisations and
the industry. This approach generates new avenues for improvement which are explored
under Section 6.5.4.
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6.5.4 Recommendations and future work
The following research agenda summarises the opportunities highlighted by taking a sys-
tems thinking approach, going beyond increasing regulation, qualification, training, re-
sources and length of contract which are often called for but difficult to realise effectively.
It provides guidance for implementing and shaping some establishing safety methods and
refocussing the way forward.
• Job enrichment research has shown that enlargement and rotation of roles can im-
prove performance (Parker and Bindl 2017). Diversifying roles in construction could
increase empathy, awareness, community, and the ‘big picture’ perspective, thus em-
phasising the value of each workers’ roles in the project as a whole and inspiring
pride in their work. Cross-trade training could provide increased competence at min-
imal expense to the company; however, it could reduce quality as skills are highly
specialised and may be unpopular as workers are unlikely to want more information
and responsibilities.
• “Learning legacy” programmes should be developed to improve transfer of knowledge
between projects and awareness of innovation. These exist in high profile public
sector projects in the UK, but there is a lack of support for smaller projects. Therefore,
the programme should be extended to include a wide variety of projects; information
must be brief and accessible; and manpower (particularly from architects, designers
and engineers) allocated to seeking out and applying relevant innovation.
• Empowering and valuing workers is an underestimated aspect of risk management.
Engaging with workers on risk management and respecting their expertise is partic-
ularly important in light of their low expectations and lack of loyalty. Collaboration
would build vertical relationships, communication, trust, and protect against peer
pressure.
• Risk management should involve workers on the frontline and be integrated into op-
erations. Effort is required to change the perceptions of health and safety executive
(HSE) staff as an enforcer of rules to a facilitator of ideas. Collaboration can help to
combat dissatisfaction with insensitive procedures and equipment, but must be ini-
tiated in a way informed by the traits of workers — e.g. not academically minded,
intimidated by professionals, not inclined to speak publicly, limited fluency and com-
prehension of local language, and influenced by peer pressure.
• Peer pressure could potentially be a powerful force for good given the need to build
relationships quickly in a transient environment. Cultural programmes need persis-
tence and repetition to account for constant change and counteract the pressures to
prove their reputation or show-off to fit in.
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• Adaptive safety has so far been touted as a solution for intractable industries; how-
ever, although the successes of well-managed projects prove construction is tractable
(Bolt et al. 2012) it is not the most efficient to manage safety in a squeezed industry.
Although the hazards are manageable the rate of change and unpredictability is not;
thus, an adaptive approach could benefit an environment which— for reasons of time
pressure, language barriers, low literacy levels, context on site, unstable processes,
and change — does not cope well with paperwork.
6.6 Conclusion
The hazards of construction are embedded within building a physical output, both in terms
of the practical processes needed to accomplish this and the temporary, undesignable na-
ture of the workplace. This constant change makes managing risk difficult, not only within
a project, but across the industry: The nature of the work — providing infrastructure for
other businesses — means designs are unique, profit margins are extremely low, and work
is suited to a dynamic network of specialist organisations contracted to specific aspects of
the build. It is inevitable therefore that the physical nature of work and style of contract at-
tracts workers who are uncommitted, physically capable, unafraid of hard work and seeking
a career with plenty of variety. Unfortunately, these traits coincide with risk-taking. Build-
ing for a client also means profit must be squeezed from the supply chain and building
processes, leaving construction firms with little resource to invest in technologies which
could improve processes, no time for change or learning, and no inclination to change be-
cause of the widespread acceptance that construction is risky. These top-down pressures
from the client and bottom-up challenges from the workforce show why it is important to
take a holistic approach to the system when managing safety.
Construction workers are perceived as having a high risk-tolerance: This has been un-
packed by exploring how and why attitudes vary within and between workers. Risk-taking
behaviours depend firstly upon whether they are aware of the risk, secondly whether they
perceive that risk as tolerable, and thirdly whether they feel the rewards are worth taking
said risk. Many factors contribute to these, including the traits of the workforce; influences
on their decision-making; and the pressures of the industry. In terms of supporting the
managers this study shows a disparity between those who saw workers as negligent and
disobedient and those with more enlightened views about distal or originating influences.
A systems thinking analysis of managers’ perceptions lends support to the view that
many of construction’s problems are rooted within distal factors such as its transient work-
force, financial constraints, and temporary organisations — products of a structure which
is vital to providing unique outputs for a range of clients. Although this would be diffi-
cult to challenge, this paper provides advice for training and risk management which takes
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account of workers’ traits and the pressures they face from the system. It also provides sup-
porting evidence for emerging concepts in safety management: Collaborating with work-
ers to show they are valued; integrating risk management in operations; increasing transfer
of knowledge though ‘learning legacy’ programmes; cross-trade training to improve their
‘big-picture perspective; and looking to Adaptive safety to reduce paperwork and increase
empowerment.
Chapters 5 and 6 have explored the phenomenon of Adaptive safety leadership; how this
compares with leadership styles in construction; and the systemic barriers which underlie
construction’s leaning towards a more traditional compliance-based approach to safety —
limiting the adoption of an Adaptive approach. So far this research has only studied this
concept based on individuals’ experiences rather than organisationally: Further research is
needed to understand the practice and reality of becoming an Adaptive organisation and
the role leaders play in this.
In spite of the barriers discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, some construction companies
are pushing forward with implementing the Adaptive paradigm. The successes and short-
comings of this venture are explored in a case study of two infrastructure megaprojects in
Chapters 7 and 8.
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7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the systemic challenges of construction that conflict with Adaptive
safety have been identified and discussed. Despite these concerns, Adaptive safety has
attracted attention from construction and has recently been introduced to the sector by
pioneering companies. The question remains whether Adaptive safety can be successfully
translated into this new and different context. These pioneers provide a unique insight into
this theory of safety and an opportunity to improve our understanding of its mechanisms
and prerequisites.
Laing O’Rourke’s (LOR’s) ‘Next Gear’ safety programme is the first in UK construction to
publicly incorporate Adaptive age principles — namely Dekker’s ‘Safety Differently’. The
transition to Next Gear began in LOR’s Australian business, two years ahead of the UK.
Following this, in 2015 two sites (Tottenham Court Road and Liverpool Street stations —
both Crossrail) became pilots for Next Gear based on having a supportive client; being sole-
ventures; the high-risk activities involved; and the timeline of the build. The programme
was officially launched across all UK sites and business areas in Summer 2017.
The aim of the final study in this thesis is to document LOR’s transition to Next Gear
with a view to explaining its successes and challenges. Two infrastructure projects are
compared: Crossrail, which was the pilot for the scheme, provides the most mature version
of Next Gear, and the Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) where Next Gear has more recently
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been implemented as part of a joint-venture with Ferrovial Agroman. Chapter 7 explains
how LOR interpreted, adapted, and implemented Safety Differently, and Chapter 8 dis-
cusses its impact on stakeholders and vice versa - addressing Objective 3 — “Observe Safety
Differently in practice in construction”.
7.1.1 The organisation of this chapter
The following sections describe how the Next Gear programme was designed and rolled-
out by LOR. It discusses the rationale behind their decision to pursue Safety Differently;
the development and implementation of the programme; the uptake of the changes; and
its impact on the business.
The next chapter (Chapter 8) explores its reception by stakeholders (frontline workers,
safety leadership, clients, and the wider industry) and evaluates their influence on the ef-
fectiveness of the programme. Chapter 9 concludes by discussing Next Gear’s fidelity to
the concepts of the Adaptive safety movement, and whether this truly is a more ethical and
safer way to manage risk.
7.2 The projects
Similarities between the TTT and Crossrail projects make them well-suited for comparison.
Both are tunnels which traverse central London meaning both have multiple sites dispersed
across a crowded city. Both also face similar challenges as they update the capital’s Victo-
rian infrastructure to cope with a growing population: The first London Underground line
opened in 1863, and the London Sewer System was completed between 1859 and 1865.
However, unlike the Underground which has been constantly expanded and modernised
since the 1800s, a sewerage project on the scale of TTT is unprecedented. TTT is larger
in diameter (7.2 m, compared to Crossrail’s 6.2 m) and the longer of the two — 25 km of
continuous tunnel compared to Crossrail’s five twin tunnelled sections totalling 8.3 km of
the 22 km Elizabeth Line. Despite this, TTT is estimated to cost £4.2 billion compared to
Crossrail’s £14.8 billion.
The major difference between these projects is their delivery organisations. ‘Cross-
rail Ltd’ is part of London Underground, known as an experienced and domineering client,
while TTT’s client (ThamesWater) has commissioned a consortium of four investors (Bazal-
gette Tunnel Ltd, commonly known as “Tideway”) as the infrastructure providers. As such,
Crossrail is publicly funded through the government’s Department for Transport but TTT is
a private venture funded by Thames Water’s customers. Public-private partnerships (PPPs)
such as Crossrail — where risk is retained by the public sector — have been criticised as
poor value for money, inflexible, and lacking transparency (HM Treasury 2012); the finan-
cial and environmental costs are underestimated and benefits for the local area exaggerated
(Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 2003). On the other hand, private ventures (like
TTT) are known to be more agile and innovative, but face greater pressure to maximise
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profit (Robinson, Carrillo, Anumba and Patel 2010). Despite these challenges, megapro-
jects (in excess of £1 billion) continue to grow in popularity (Flyvbjerg 2014).
Typically, PPPs contract out smaller work packages while private investors give their
contractors a larger jurisdiction and greater autonomy in its delivery. Delivery of Crossrail
involves 17 organisations with LOR fitting out of three of 41 stations but not involved in
tunnelling. Only eight principle contractors are involved in TTT forming 3 joint-venture
partnerships: Ferrovial Agroman and Laing O’Rourke (FLO) will deliver one third of the
tunnel and eight out of 17 combined sewer overflows (CSOs) — where the new tunnel
connects with the existing sewer. Information about the two projects is from their respective
project websites (Crossrail 2018, Tideway 2018).
Construction in London is a “thriving megaproject ecology”— a dense and multi-layered
network of project-based organisations and their supply chains (Davies 2017, p. 124).
Project ecologies serve as the memory for these organisations (Grabher and Thiel 2015,
Schwab and Miner 2008) where ‘project capabilities’ (Brady and Davies 2004) develop,
hence it is important to consider these projects in context. LOR is one of several ma-
jor construction firms which have cultivated relationships and capabilities that support
them in winning large government infrastructure contracts. Having been involved with
Heathrow Terminal 5 and London 2012 Olympics, these firms were the natural choice for
Crossrail and Tideway — their chief executive officers (CEOs) becoming ‘project nomads’
(Davies 2017) moving from project to project transferring their knowledge and staff along
with them.
7.3 The case study
The case study is a cross-sectional multiple case design with three embedded units of anal-
ysis: two at TTT — the Central tunnelling shaft site and Blackfriars Bridge Foreshore (a
CSO), and one at Crossrail — Tottenham Court Road Station. The scope of the case study
is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
These two London tunnels allow Adaptive safety to be studied in practice in con-
struction. Many 21st century management innovations — lean, quality management, six
sigma— have been less successful in projects (Davies 2017); however, the capabilities LOR
has developed from past megaprojects combined with the freedom of a private venture
should mean TTT is fertile ground to test this new concept. Furthermore, by comparing
the two projects, Crossrail provides an opportunity to compare and explore the influence
of joint-venture partners, public verses private clients, and cultures from different sectors.
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Tottenham Court 
Road Station
Blackfriars Bridge 
Foreshore CSO
Central Tunnelling 
Shaft Site
River Thames
Tideway Tunnel
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Crossrail (underground)
Underground station
Crossrail (overground)
Overground station
Figure 7.1: The cases and units of analysis in relation to the River Thames
7.3.1 Data collection
Data were collected at eight locations between July 2017 and February 2018 in the form of
interviews, focus groups, documents, and observations which were thematically analysed.
21 interviews and three focus groups were conducted, the roles the interview and focus
group participants held are illustrated in Figure 7.2.
The mean construction experience of participants was 18.4 years with a standard de-
viation of 15.2. Mean number of years with their current company was 6.8 years with a
standard deviation of 7.7. Most were employed directly by LOR and subsidiaries, but others
by the client, Ferrovial Agroman, sub-contractors, and themselves. As discussed previously,
of the participants working on TTT almost all had worked on Crossrail previously.
Interviews and focus groups were triangulated with core policy documents outlining
how Next Gear would be implemented; observations of risk management processes — in-
ductions, briefings, and workforce engagement; and observations of other events to provide
a complete picture of how Safety Differently is communicated by an external risk consultant
to LOR’s management and then to site. These documents and observations are detailed in
Figure 4.1.
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Figure 7.2: The roles of case study participants
7.4 Data analysis
Case study researchers need to be adaptive — making the most of the available data —
meaning the importance of rigorous and intelligent analysis is even more significant (Yin
2009). As with the interview study (Chapters 5 and 6), thematic analysis was used to iden-
tify themes and the relationships between these within the data. This process is described
in Section .
Observations and documents cannot provide a complete picture because participants
are the expert in their own reality (Lewis-Beck et al. 2004); instead they need to be com-
bined with other methods as it is difficult for an investigator not to overlay their own values
when interpreting observed behaviours. Comparing multiple sources and methods (obser-
vations, documents, interviews and focus groups) validates the findings and helps to build
a robust theory of Next Gear’s operationalisation.
7.5 Findings and discussion
To structure this section, key relationships found in the case study are illustrated in Figure
7.3 with the relevant section numbers where these are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The
arrows show how Next Gear has influenced stakeholders, and where they have shaped this
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organisational change. Some factors which have helped and hindered its implementation
are also shown.
Organisational 
safety strategy
Company (7.4)
Industry (8.5) Clients (8.4)
Safety Team (8.3)Engineers
Frontline work 
(8.2)
+ Induction +
+ Safety tools +
+ Collaboration +
+ Co-location+
Project 
management
Joint-venture 
partner
+ Support +
- Mixed messages -
+ Support +
+ Challenging regulations +
- Project-based -
- High turnover -
+ Flat structure +
+ Open minded +
+ Project capabilities +
+ ‘Blank slate’ +
+Reputation +
+ Knowledge sharing +
+ Collaboration +
- Conflicted interests -
+ Support +
+ Collaboration + + Influential +
Figure 7.3: A conceptual framework illustrating how safety strategy influences stakehold-
ers
7.5.1 Why ‘Safety Differently’?
Consistent with the research which gave rise to Safety Differently, one factor which
prompted LOR to find an alternative to ‘Behavioural Safety’ was plateauing safety metrics.
Alongside this, the move was triggered by three unprecedented fatalities over 18 months
on sites with an exemplary safety record. Existing safety systems and their foundations
were called into question as high-consequence accidents had become more frequent and
more difficult to predict. Safety Differently was described as a “Road to Damascus1” (Senior
Safety Management) moment which explained their experience and offered a welcome
“breath of fresh air” (Construction Manager). Past methods — “dogmas of [Bird’s and Hein-
rich’s] triangles and [Swiss] cheese models” (Senior Safety Management) — were stifling
progress and no longer fit for today’s industry.
But when you look at an AFR2 graph it doesn’t include any of the potentials, it
doesn’t include any of the things that actually have the potential to kill people
1A conversion or religious experience
2Accident Frequency Rate
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…We’re looking at the wrong indicators, we’re looking at the wrong picture of
what good looks like.
(Senior Safety Management)
As well as its underlying philosophy, Safety Differently appealed to this pragmatic sector
as an opportunity to address some of the other challenges of construction safety: Ethical
responsibility (Dekker 2017b, Long 2012), bureaucracy (Bieder and Bourrier 2013, Dekker
and Nyce 2014), and relationships that exist within the workforce characterised by conflict,
confrontation, and blame (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005).
Industrialisation in Western society promoted science, rational planning, and quantifi-
cation as the key to progress (Dekker 2018); however, some believe this “trust in numbers”
is misplaced (Porter 1995). Porter challenges the pseudo-scientific utilisation of numbers
in social, and specifically risk, research. Quantifying safety creates a burden of compli-
ance (Bieder and Bourrier 2013) which does not equate to reducing risk (Manuele 2013)
and places legal defensibility above rationality and morality (Rae, Provan, Weber and
Dekker 2018). The need to ‘prove’ the safety of an organisation has been recognised as
an industry-wide obsession by academics (Amalberti 2013, Dekker and Pitzer 2016) and
LOR’s managers— feeding complacency, suppressing reporting, tempting fraud, and draw-
ing focus from potential high-consequence events
There’s just a whole industry hiding the reality of what’s happening on sites
and it’s all built around the pressure that we’ve racked up.
(Senior Safety Management)
The pressure to do this does not come from any legal requirement but is driven by
competition to win contracts; misinterpretation of the law; and fear of litigation. One
safety manager described how construction companies have become “choked with these
initiatives and programmes” (Senior Safety Management) over the past 15 years because of
the attention health and safety has received from the government, clients, and keeping up
with competitors. Research has shown the “irony of tremendous efforts that are being devoted
to safety” which foster a false sense of security (Amalberti 2013, p. 114); unpreparedness
for situations that do not fit the rules (Dekker 2018); and increased liability as companies
run the risk of failing to comply with their own high standards (Hale and Borys 2013).
Provan et al. (2018) describe how the professionalisation of safety means practitioners
need to validate their own existence by creating safety-specific activities outside primary
operations: There is a contagion of new ideas; lack of validation; and dogmatic imple-
mentation. This professionalisation and subsequent segregation of disciplines involved in
construction has been increasing since the 1700s, and is not unique to safety — a similar
trend has been seen in architecture, engineering and the building trades (Davies 2017).
Rather than replacing existing measures, these activities contribute to a growing paper-
work burden which fulfils an anxious need to look busy, even when these activities have
“no direct line of site to the risk” (Senior Safety Management).
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Safety clutter is defined as “the accumulation of safety procedures, documents, roles and
activities that are performed in the name of safety, but do not contribute to the safety of opera-
tional work” (Rae et al. 2018). Rae et al. warn subcontracted organisations (where multiple
contractors’ processes overlap) are particularly vulnerable to clutter, resulting in cynicism
and ‘surface compliance’; hindering innovation; perpetuating harmful beliefs about safety;
and undermining trust and adaptability.
As part of the move towards Next Gear, safety managers recognised this clutter was not
intended or supported by regulators and began to challenge it, streamlining processes to
those which add “real risk management, not liability management and paperwork” (Senior
Safety Management).
Collectively we’ve all given up on aligning the method statements, the task
sheets, the way we said we’re going to do the work, with how it’s actually done,
and that just creates a whole world of problems because it creates a culture
where actually management’s completely divorced from reality.
(Senior Safety Management)
Paperwork has tied management to their desks, fuelling operatives’ view that they are
uncaring, ignorant about construction work, and afraid to be on site. Instead, Next Gear
responds to risk on site, accepts adaptation, and aligns policy with practice. This has the
potential to improve productivity both directly, though innovation, and indirectly through
improving the relationship with the workforce. This approach also appealed to health and
safety professionals who had become disillusioned with their role and its reputation.
I’ve always known from when I started in health and safety, in tunnelling, that
the best way to get something out of somebody is to engage and listen and
involve people.
(Safety Manager)
This ‘Compelling Case’ for Next Gear was put forward to senior management: Safety
Differently offered an explanation and hope in light of troubling trends and on a practical
level, it was an opportunity put safety back in touch with reality — reducing bureaucracy,
increasing productivity, and improving worker satisfaction.
7.5.2 The ‘Next Gear’ vision
Next Gear is headlined by three principles based on Safety Differently: “People are the
solution, not the problem”, “safety is the presence of positives, not the absence of negatives”, and
“safety is an ethical responsibility, not a bureaucratic activity” (Policy Documents). Alongside
these, Next Gear renews LOR’s commitment to Just Culture (Dekker 2007, Reason 1997)
and challenges the norm with its focus on high-potential over minor risks, and lack of ‘Zero
Accident Vision’ (Zwetsloot et al. 2017).
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To support this, changes have been made throughout the risk management process:
The safety programme has been rebranded from ‘Mission Zero’ to ‘Next Gear’; all safety
processes are implemented at the discretion of each project, in collaboration with the
workforce; and procedures have been redesigned to prioritise worker involvement, high-
potential risks, and positive events. These three key areas are expanded on in the following
sections.
The rebranding
The most apparent change to the identity of LOR’s safety strategy is the removal of ‘zero’
from its brand name. However, the more significant changes have been in the way this
identity is communicated to the workforce: Recognising that heavily brand-orientated pro-
grammes can be a hindrance for frontline operatives, their approach avoids using the Next
Gear name, logo, slogans, and jargon on site.
When you go to the project, you might not see Next Gear logos anywhere. It’s
not about the posters and the spin, but it’s about the ethos and the values …
it’s business as usual as opposed to it being some kind of campaign thing.
(Senior Safety Management)
This “softer approach” (Senior Safety Management) emphasises and aligns with Next
Gear’s ethos that safety should be led by the workforce, not imposed top-down by man-
agement. The brand is also less rigidly enforced than its predecessors; for example, at
Tideway, Next Gear’s principles have been incorporated into the joint-venture’s ‘Integrated
Engagement Programme’ — but neither this term nor ‘Next Gear’ are used on site.
This new identity (or lack of identity) signifies efforts to distance Next Gear from past
Behavioural Safety where strong brands overshadowed and undermined progress. Rhetoric
is a powerful tool for influencing safety mindsets (Waterson 2017): A safety campaign
which trivialised risk and dehumanised victims as ‘dumb’ lead to an increase in fatalities
(Long 2014); the word ‘zero’ is laden with connotations of reductionism and minimalism,
not learning (Long 2012); and ‘behavioural’ emphasises human behaviour as the cause of
accidents, encouraging blame (Long 2017). Instead, Next Gear’s aim is to communicate
its philosophy and culture to the workforce “subconsciously” (Safety Manager) through the
inclusive processes used on site conducted in natural, familiar language.
You’ve got to be careful how far down the chain you want this [brand] com-
municated … [Labour suppliers’] senior leadership won’t have to know much
about Next Gear because their people will be involved in all the tools we have,
they’ll be absorbed into the project culture.
(Safety Manager)
In line with this, when asked if they had heard the name ‘Next Gear’ most engineers
were familiar with the term, but only a minority of supervisors and no frontline operatives
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were aware of its existence. Contemporary perspectives on safety leadership see it as a
relational and participatory process (Pilbeam et al. 2017, Simmons et al. 2017). Fairhurst
argues language is key to identity, relationships, power, and hence leadership: Leadership
is not a trait but a process, socially constructed in context through interactions (Fairhurst
2011). Discourse analysts believe words and symbols communicate values which shape
the attitudes and culture of an organisation (Long 2017). Their power to frame and prime
responses has been carefully considered in renaming the programme as a whole and the
tools. These tools are discussed later in this section under Developing the toolset.
Suppressing safety as a ‘brand’ helps to integrate it with primary operations and increase
engagement on site. However, there is still an expectation for principle contractors to have
a strong safety brand as part of their business and tenders. Rather than being demanded by
government, bureaucratic accountability for occupational safety and health (OSH) has be-
come part of business-to-business relationships, and accepted as the norm (Dekker 2018).
As such, Next Gear was viewed as needing a new brand, but this is applied selectively above
the frontline.
Safety’s become commodified in a way that we need to have a brand … I can’t
just say “We’re just going to do safety in a more simple, straightforward way with
greater honesty and integrity and have a proper relationship with our workforce”
it doesn’t sell, you know, it doesn’t win work.
(Senior Safety Management)
Another downside to Next Gear’s low-key branding is that without an obvious new
identity many workers have not noticed the changes, so their scepticism towards safety
remains.
Every construction company has their own- so I used to work for BAM3 they
have ‘Beyond Zero’, every company has it, it’s just with a different badge and a
slightly different slogan.
(Engineer)
This is especially true at Crossrail where Next Gear competes with ‘Target Zero’ (the
client’s safety brand) which dominates the visual identity of the site, and LOR’s ‘Mission
Zero’ persists on logoed personal protective equipment (PPE). Without the symbolic com-
mitment of site-wide rebranding, Next Gear’s impact is somewhat lost. Conversely, by
avoiding creating yet another more prominent safety programme, LOR hope to combat
many damaging effects of Behavioural Safety discussed in Chapter 1 (Innovation fatigue;
safety’s divorce from operations; suppressed reporting). Next Gear is primarily communi-
cated through personal encounters within “business as usual”; although this means cynical
attitudes and past expectations will be slower to change, the change will be meaningful.
3Royal BAM Group
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Adjustment to fit sectors and projects
As Safety Differently emerges, consultants promoting this to industry emphasise the need
to tailor the concept to each context, experimenting and cultivating practice to be shared
with a network of like-minded organisations. The need to manage organisations in a way
which accounts for context or environmental factors has been recognised by contingency
theorists since the 1960s. This school counters Taylor’s ‘Scientific Management’ and its
mechanistic view of organisations: Rather than ‘one best way’ to manage, ‘Contingency
Theory’ sees organisation as open systems which need to adapt and respond to threats
(Burns and Stalker 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). In the same vein, Turner’s (1978)
seminal book, which paved the way for a sociotechnical approach to risk, was inspired by
Burns and Stalker’s work (Weick 1998). While traditional safety takes a mechanistic or
reductionist approach to finding the ‘best way’ to minimise risk, Adaptive safety — having
branched out of sociotechnical system (STS) — recognises the need to adapt and construct
safety in context.
Unlike previous Behavioural Safety programmes, which were described as “an off-the-
shelf solution” (Senior Safety Management), Next Gear was introduced gradually as a small-
scale pilot — allowing time to test the new tool set and refine it with input from the work-
force. LOR were able to develop their own version of Safety Differently, sensitive to the
needs of the sector and its history with safety. As part of this, LOR took a bold step to make
all safety policies discretionary for each project — including the ‘5-point PPE rule’ although
this was controversial and only adopted on half their sites: For traditional thinkers PPE epit-
omises safety, and not enforcing its use was likened to heresy. Sites which did experiment
with a ‘carry-and-use’ PPE policy found this to be a breakthrough with the workforce. It
sets forth LOR’s ambition to fundamentally challenge safety in construction and clearly
demonstrated their commitment to “people as the solution”.
Where previously conversations about risk had been dominated by complaints about
poor-quality ill-fitting equipment, making these optional paved the way for authentic and
constructive dialogue. One construction manager described how optional PPE raised work-
ers’ awareness of the risks and urged them to take responsibility for their own safety.
Participant: You might never have to wear a hard hat again … if you thought
that you could manage your health and safety on site that was the freedom we
were going to give you, and people said “This is great, we’re not going to wear
helmets-” and then they took a step back and thought about it, and said “Actually
I do need to wear a helmet, I’m being a fool here!”
Interviewer: Sort of realising it for themselves?
Participant: Yeah, we’re giving you- the ball’s in your court to look after your-
self, we’re not going to tell you what to do, you’ve got to look after yourself,
and it came through that way.
(Interview with a Construction Manager)
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Increased flexibility supports a response to risk on site which is proportionate, as op-
posed to blanket bans and rules. As another example of this in practice, one participant
explained previously contraband short trousers and radios have been allowed on some sites
for activities where these do not expose workers to increased risk. Safety can be customised
to the reality of risk on site: Discussion is encouraged, and workers are invited to challenge
rules and paperwork, collaborating on more efficient and evidence-based procedures.
We’re happy to manage our risk on a day-to-day, like person-to-person, on the
role-that-they-do basis, rather than, you know, being unnecessary, do you know
what I mean? Being over- OTT, over the top
(Safety Team)
Different versions of Next Gear have developed on different projects and different sites.
At Tideway, the Integrated Engagement Programme combines Ferrovial Agroman’s and
LOR’s safety policies with the client’s requirements and input from the workforce, but also
allows for these guidelines to be refined in context. As such, each of the CSO sites is unique;
keen to share good practice with each other, but equally willing to dismiss something that
does not work — acknowledging the individuality of each site’s culture. One CSO site was
praised for its family dynamic which would be impossible to recreate through any top-down
initiative.
Expressions of Next Gear also vary throughout the business because of the services
they provide and industrial sectors they are involved with. LOR owns many subsidiary
businesses, some of which are used to “more of a command and control type approach”
(Senior Safety Management); nevertheless, they have drawn upon Next Gear to create
their own “blend” of Safety Differently. Similarly, both Crossrail and Tideway’s versions of
Next Gear have been blended with requirements from their exacting clients.
We [infrastructure] have clients sometimes who restrict us being this free … in
construction they have developers who don’t really care.
(Senior Safety Management)
Finally, as a global business, safety strategy needs to adapt to suit national cultures:
In Australia, Next Gear began with a grand public launch, but in the UK low-profile “drip-
feeding” (Senior Safety Management) was favoured for many of the reasons in the previous
section . According to Hofstede’s ‘Cultural Dimensions’ theory Australia has a lower ‘Power
Distance’ score than the UK, meaning hierarchy and the establishment are held in low
regard. This aligns with Next Gear: Their culture of decision-making in business is col-
laborative with management expected to consult the expertise of their employees (Today
Translations 2018); modesty, brotherhood, and equality are valued; and communication
is ubiquitous, informal, direct and participative (Hofstede Insights 2018). Australians are
also open to new ideas (Today Translations 2018) and the nation is recognised as a world
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leader in the safety research community; thus, they have been more readily accepting of
the changes. By comparison with the UK — where great care has been taken to intro-
duce change gradually — these traits have allowed the Australian branch of LOR to rapidly
embrace Next Gear.
Increased flexibility “gives projects the ability to come up with local solutions, to local chal-
lenges and local risks” (Senior Safety Managers), empowering them to respond to hazards
and innovate. Participants have seen relationships with the workforce improve, particularly
with sub-contractors who become frustrated with overly restrictive principle contractors.
A happy workforce is an efficient workforce, right? And that’s the most impor-
tant thing, so if you can do that safely it doesn’t create a problem and it keeps
their morale happy for what they do, it’s better for all the project, that’s what I
like about it.
(Safety Team)
Through their efforts not to “brainwash everybody” (Senior Safety Management) — al-
lowing Next Gear to colonise and evolve naturally — has meant some of LOR’s subsidiary
businesses have developed quite differently compared to the core: For example, the organ-
isational structure of sub-businesses is leaner and involves less supervisors and managers,
so people are busier and workers’ attitudes more “gung-ho” (Safety Manager). The dis-
cretionary approach to safety policies means some projects have not been as proactive in
implementing Next Gear as others; sites have become more varied and some feel safer than
others. Concerns were raised that this lack of consistency could cause problems for those
managing multiple sites or for staff transferring between projects.
Developing the toolset
Compliance-based processes have been replaced with a new suite of tools reflecting the
ambition for a more positive, people-focused, and less bureaucratic approach. The changes
to the Planning, Monitoring, and Reviewing phases of risk management are outlined below.
It should be noted that, as discussed in the previous section, the tool set is only a guideline;
everything is optional and can be adapted according to each project’s needs. The following
describes how these have been implemented at TTT and Crossrail. Other LOR sites may
use their own variants of these processes.
Planning
Fatal and severe risk (FSR) reviews are the Next Gear equivalent of a ‘Deep Dive Audit’ or
Hazop4 (Kletz 2001). Although some participants were flippant about this rebadging, they
also understood its significance: The new name emphasises the gravitas of ‘fatal’ hazards
and severs the punitive and bureaucratic connotations of audits. Furthermore, at TTT the
4Hazard and operability analysis
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FSRs are known as ‘workshops’ which invites collaboration more than its generic title —
‘review’.
Particularly from my team, they love the fatal and severe risk workshops, and-
they like it that- that everybody gets involved in those, the workforce as well.
(Safety Manager)
The new identity has made a positive difference to how safety audits are perceived
alongside changes to the way these are conducted: The FSR review is high-level — “your
top risks that could kill or severely hurt someone, so work at a height or lifting operations,
if they go wrong someone’s going to get badly hurt” (Safety Manager) — not task specific,
but detailed enough for client approval. The workforce is also involved in the process,
and positive language gives emphasis to what is “missing and needed” to support the task,
rather than what could go wrong. Another difference is that the output is to brief the
workforce not to protect against litigation: ‘Visual Task Sheets’ are favoured over impen-
etrable ‘Risk Assessment Method Statements’, because ensuring information is accessible
and the workforce well informed is seen as an ethical responsibility. Both these changes
reduce time spent on paperwork. Lastly, these procedures are open to change and can be
updated throughout the build through ‘Operational FSRs’ and other processes outlined in
the following section.
Monitoring
While safety audits and inspections only view non-compliance in a negative light, Next
Gear’s planned versus actual (PvA) sees divergence from process in a unbiassed way. The
‘actual’ method may reveal adaptations which can be incorporated into improved plans.
Where workers’ adaptations could potentially introduce risk, the PvA is used as an oppor-
tunity to clarify the process and learn, not punish.
This underlines “people as the solution” by honouring their ideas, incorporating their
expertise, and developing processes together. It also upholds their ethical stance on safety:
For example, unmarked services at Blackfriars led to costly delays of three weeks5 while
procedures were revised to mitigate the risk of cable strikes. By listening to workers’ con-
cerns and responding to the reality on site, the expected attitude of “we’re doing everything
we should be in the procedure so … that’s alright, just crack on” (Safety Manager) has been
challenged.
These reviews are far less formal than their traditional counterparts — described as a
simple, humble, open-minded conversation, conducted on site to review the task in situ.
Their approach draws on ‘Humble Inquiry’ — “The fine art of drawing someone out, of asking
questions to which you do not know the answer, of building a relationship based on curiosity
and interest in the other person.” (Schein 2013, p. 2) — and ‘Radical Candor’ — balancing
criticism and empathy in leadership (Scott 2017).
5At the time of data collection
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Those conversations are very open and very trusting, and they’re done at the
workface.
(Safety Manager)
To maintain this open and trusting dialogue, PvAs are not intended to be led exclu-
sively by health and safety staff (although at present most are until the process becomes
embedded); paperwork is updated off site; changes are communicated visually; and the
new process replaces intimidating ‘Method Statement Assurance Checks’ — at supervisor
level and below PvAs are not known by anything other than a ‘chat’. Most participants
were positive about these changes to the assurance process, they have been welcomed by
the frontline and are considered the “biggest success” (Senior Safety Management) of Next
Gear.
Participants also praised the ‘Collective Insights’ tool. These are “a brainstorming ses-
sion” (Senior Safety Management) led by a site engineer with everyone relevant to the task.
They are more structured than PvAs and conducted off site, but in the same way their aim
is to collectively update the procedures, either as an interactive briefing before a task or
in response to concerns raised by workers. Acknowledging workers’ expertise in problem
solving has been a key part of participatory management’s ‘quality circles’ (Ishikawa 1985)
and participatory ergonomics since the 1980s (Gyi, Shalloe andWilson 2015), but this style
of management is rare in construction.
The guys on site found that [Collective Insight] really valuable because it’s not
just me telling them what they’re doing, they also know what’s expected of
everyone else, and where everyone else needed to be at the time.
(Engineer)
The method statements are simplified, broken down into daily or weekly packages, and
discussed step-by-step allowingworkers to ask questions, clarify their own and others’ roles,
and contribute lessons from their experience. Participants found this method improved buy-
in and communication — especially with sub-contractors — and helped to integrate safety
and quality into operations. They are a powerful problem-solving tool, but critics warned
against these becoming a substitute for proper planning.
For me the striking thing- and I think the guys round the table felt the same-
within half an hour of all the relevant people being round there, there’s your
solution… I just wish we’d spent the half hour prior to putting people out there,
then we wouldn’t have had all the drama that went along with it.
(Safety Manager)
This open-minded approach is reinforced by the metrics used to monitor safety.
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It’s all about the narrative. Tell us the story of your project, how active are you
in the space of Next Gear? How many positives have you got?
(Senior Safety Management)
Conventional safety metrics and their associated punitive measures have been removed.
Instead, positives are measured such as engagement tours, training, and use of the new
risk management processes mentioned above. Hollnagel argues efforts to measure Safety
II are futile: Quantification introduces certainty and complacency to a construct where
uncertainty and responsiveness are essential (Hollnagel 2018). Avoiding this temptation
has been a challenge for construction but, although many of the traditional performance
metrics are still recorded to satisfy the client, these are kept internal to the health and
safety team and no longer seen as targets they are under pressure to meet.
Reviewing
The introduction of ‘Positive’ or ‘Appreciative Investigations’ is a significant step in an in-
dustry for which, in the past, tight schedules have limited opportunities for learning.
Why don’t we [debrief] in construction? Well, because it’s onto the next task.
But not only do we not get to practice before we start, we also don’t get to
debrief. There’s not enough time, we’ve got to get on and pour the next wall.
(Senior Safety Management)
Appreciative inquiry (AI) was first proposed as an alternative to problem solving: Rather
than focussing on the negatives or problems, AI aims to encourage social innovation by eval-
uating the ‘positive potential’ of a situation and how this can be developed and prioritised
(Cooperrider and Srivastava 1987). Optimism and positive emotions support individual
and organisational resilience; promote creativity; and strengthen the relationships needed
to sustain change (Bushe 2012). AI has not only been adopted as part of Safety Differ-
ently’s toolset, but been expanded to underpin its trademarked ‘Appreciative Safety®’ (Art
of Work 2018) — acknowledging the role of people as the solution in creating safety.
In accordance with Safety Differently, “it is easier to study how things go right than to
study things that have gone wrong” (Positive Investigation Report); therefore, LOR aims to
prioritise understanding “all of those activities that happen every single day, on every single
site, where we actually do do what we said we were going to do” (Senior Safety Management),
investing as much time in this as investigating reportable incidents. The positive aspect of
their investigations is two-fold: Firstly, it focuses on successful tasks, and secondly it looks
for good practice and innovation. The review process is led by a member of the health and
safety team who collects feedback from all parties involved in the task. This is summarised
into a short, visual, report to share this knowledge and improve this process, and others,
in the future.
Achieving positivity in construction is a challenging prospect; workers are quick to crit-
icise, and, despite being a positive investigation, much of the analysed report focused on
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difficulties and frustrations. Changing this negative culture will take time, but these in-
vestigations are a tool to accelerate progress: They fulfil a need to acknowledge not only
workers’ ideas and good practice, but their efforts to fill the ‘gap’ — overcoming challenges
to bring about a successful outcome in spite of these.
Although some participants alleged the new tools were simply a renaming of old pro-
cesses, they recognised the significance of changing the way these are conducted. Many
safety requirements are still dictated by the client and regulators, restricting what can be
changed; however, in contrast with their predecessors, these new tools involve frontline
staff and take place on site where appropriate — integrating safety as part of primary op-
erations. As Next Gear matures and reaches its ‘critical mass’ (Rogers 1995), more of these
processes will be initiated and led by people at the sharp end.
The way these things are designed, it’s all about- it’s about people getting in-
volved, it’s not about safety-people doing safety, it’s about a project leader, and
his team, and the project, they’re doing safety.
(Senior Safety Management)
Changing the rhetoric of safety has been significant step in Next Gear: Using a positive
and familiar vocabulary, rather than accusatory and corporate, has made safety accessible
to the workforce. The names of the tools have been changed to align with this, and inves-
tigations ask ‘what’ rather than ‘who’ to deter blaming individuals. The safety team were
observed on multiple occasions speaking calmly and candidly about risk on site, sharing
stories of incidents at both TTT and Crossrail and how they have been managed. They
avoided speaking in a way which would blame or ridicule the victim; raised awareness of
risks through empathy rather than fear; and welcomed discussion.
7.5.3 Impact on the business
Two years in, LOR’s leadership and staff driving the change remain enthusiastic about Next
Gear’s collective and people-centric approach. Its principles can be adapted to any issue,
project, or country and participants were keen to see these extended beyond safety to other
areas of the business such as procurement and recruitment.
Several participants provided examples of times when Next Gear’s processes improved
productivity — either directly through changes to the procedures, or through improved
coordination and engagement of the workforce. Where previously safety and productivity
had been incompatible, an openminded attitude towards ‘workarounds’ deploys workers’
creativity for the benefit of the business.
Why didn’t you set the walkway up in that way in the first place? If that’s the
most efficient way to do it. We’re all about efficiency and improving productiv-
ity. Why penalise him because he hasn’t stuck to the walkway?
(Senior Safety Management)
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Rather than competing, safety, quality, and productivity are addressed simultaneously
through collective processes that bring together expertise and voice concerns from all as-
pects of the build. Subsequently, in the face of deadlines, safety was less likely to be sacri-
ficed: “If you’re working safely … then that’s going to be the quickest and most efficient way to
do it” (Safety Team). Next Gear’s streamlined methods also meant there was more time to
invest in designing out risk, preventing “hideously dangerous” (Site Engineer) rework and
its associated costs.
Cutting down the bureaucracy allows me to focus more on the engineering is-
sues which is my speciality, which in turn prevents safety issues.
(Engineer)
Although Next Gear’s approach sees safety integrated into primary operations, priori-
tising it is still difficult — especially in light of recent “major commercial challenges … when
it becomes matter of survival for a business … the focus [on safety] drops” (Senior Safety
Management).
If it’s not feasible in terms of business and we’re going to lose money, then we
won’t do it.
(Safety Manager)
Unfortunately, like everything it comes down to “how much does it cost?” at the
end of the day, which is alright when times are good, but of course then it’s a
race to the bottom when money’s tight.
(Engineer)
Next Gear’s streamlined, integrated processes should reduce expenditure on safety in
the longer term, but some investment is required initially to support the new tools, sub-
stantiate the philosophy, and demonstrate their commitment through fair wages and qual-
ity equipment. Contrary to this, many operatives complained about budget PPE and low
wages; the safety department was understaffed for what was required; and the several
engineers provided examples of times when where a more expensive version of a product
could have prevented an incident or additional work which put workers at risk. Privately
and publicly funded projects face financial pressure to maximise profits and provide value
for money for taxpayers respectively (Robinson et al. 2010), competing with the neces-
sary increase in safety spending to initiate this change. Procurement departments were
demonised as a barrier to Next Gear — prioritising targets to reduce spending and diluting
Next Gear’s message. To reinforce to the workforce the value of engagement it is crucial
to listen and respond, but delays in responding to workers concerns because of cost have
weakened this feedback loop.
Operatives had noticed the projects’ and LOR’s efforts to make health and safety visible
and accessible.
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You see a lot more of the health and safety [team] out and about on the job
actually- like they’re asking you if everything’s- if everything’s working sort of
how it should be and if people are working safely and things like that. On my
last job they’d just let you get on with it, but- yeah. It is- they are on top of their
game here.
(Operative)
This visibility is helping to normalise health and safety as part of everyday work; in-
creasing workers’ positive interactions with it; helping Next Gear to spread ‘virally’; and
changing the reputation of OSH. This process is supported by feedback to the workforce
which demonstrates their input is making an impact — incentivising further engagement.
7.5.4 Enabling factors
As a business LOR have been well-positioned to make this change — known for being
progressive and innovative. In the 1990s several major tunnelling projects (Jubilee Line,
Heathrow Express, and Channel Tunnel) suffered significant delays and cost overruns lead-
ing to an investigation concluding “British clients and contractors were incapable of managing
large-scale infrastructure projects” (Davies 2017, p. 104). Following this, the construction
of Heathrow Terminal 5 introduced a new agile contract with greater collaboration, client
accountability, and co-located integrated project teams leading to its success (Brady and
Davies 2010). Involvement in this project meant LOR acquired ‘project capabilities’ which
have continued to develop at London 2012, Crossrail, and TTT strengthening their world-
leading position. Their respect within the industry which has helped to gain support from
regulators and sub-contractors.
We’ve got quite a lot of prominence in the industry, so when someone like Laing
O’Rourke does something a bit differently, then the industry kind of looks at
that.
(Safety Manager)
Once the support of senior management was gained, the flat management structures
of this family-owned company have enabled rapid change.
It’s a family run business with very- very senior leadership … a very direct ap-
proach to leadership, it’s a very flat management structure … the benefit of
the way our business is if [the CEO] says- just says one sentence it all happens
immediately.
(Senior Safety Management)
There were also benefits to the project-based structure of construction: the streamlined
processes suit sub-contractors; changing project partners compels review and continuous
improvement of policies; and the complexity of projects prevents complacency because “the
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slower pace of work drives the safety up … being forced to have more time to think about it
does drive out good solutions.” (Site Engineer)
Here [Crossrail] almost every single pour requires an entirely separate method
statement, whatever … because of the very nature of the job you have to stop
and plan, otherwise you can’t physically do anything, which requires the safety
to be revisited each time.
(Engineer)
Characteristics of the innovation itself and the way it has been implemented have also
enabled its success. Research shows innovations are more likely to be adopted if they offer
a significant relative advantage or ‘utility’ — particularly if it makes life easier; have the po-
tential to be developed and customised; a shallow learning curve; and are compatible with
existing systems (May and Finch 2009, Rogers 1995). In line with this, frustrations with
the previous systems meant Next Gear’s advantages provided motivation for change, and
its non-prescriptive approach to co-creating safety processes also supported its adoption.
It is seen as radical by many, but when you think about it, it makes sense. It
does make sense, and I think everybody gets that- everybody gets that it makes
sense.
(Senior Safety Management)
Previous iterations of Behavioural Safety programmes and the progress seen with each
has reduced the learning curve. Participants agreed the transition would have been more
difficult without these stepping stones— “standing on the shoulders of giants” (Senior Safety
Management).
Finally, Next Gear has also been surprisingly compatible with other aspects of the indus-
try. It does not compromise their ability to meet the client and regulators’ requirements or
protect against legal action; instead, it addresses legislation in its intended form, and chal-
lenges misconceptions which have built up through fear and market-pressure. Moreover,
the programme has won awards from major safety regulatory bodies as the construction
industry is becoming convinced this is the way forward.
People were really worried about these [auditors], because they thought, “Are
they going to be asking for all these pieces of paper we’ve shredded?” And we got
an ‘excellent’ and several ‘noteworthy efforts’ for the kind of things we’re doing,
so we must be doing something okay.
(Senior Safety Management)
In terms of communicating the philosophy, participants said it was important to go
through the right authority when engaging with sub-contractors. Until Next Gear realises
a constant open dialogue on risk between trades, sub-contractors respond best to their own
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management, rather than the project’s. This is consistent with researchwhich show internal
factors, such as communication and social networks, are more important in the diffusion of
safety innovations in construction than external drivers, such as regulators (Esmaeili and
Hallowell 2012). LOR have been able to use this to their advantage; relying on word-of-
mouth to spread Next Gear through frontline-led interactions reduces the disparity between
individuals, enabling them to share knowledge more effectively (Rogers 1995). Anecdotes
and stories of successes are powerful and Next Gear is creating a buzz which attracts talent
to the company.
7.6 Conclusion
LOR are changing the culture of construction through relational encounters which empower
workers to create safety at the frontline. Next Gear has been a shift towards making safety
relevant and accessible to the workforce and away from litigation management. As well
as increased collaboration, the processes are more streamlined, simplified, and flexible,
and the language of risk has been refreshed to emphasise positivity, participation, and the
human (not legal) cost. Safety is communicated informally and integrated into everyday
activities.
The effect is to break down barriers with the workforce, increasing communication,
trust, buy-in, and morale, and for the business greater coordination between trades, effi-
ciency, and productivity. Their progress has been supported by LOR’s previous experience
of London-based infrastructure megaprojects, agile project management, and past safety
innovations; clear motivation for change; and the sympathetic way the programme has
been designed and implemented. However, the journey has not been without difficulties.
The next chapter discusses how Next Gear has been received by stakeholders: The barriers
which have diluted its impact, and the factors which strengthen the case for operationalis-
ing Adaptive safety in construction.
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8.1 Introduction
Chapter 7 discussed Laing O’Rourke’s (LOR’s) rationale behind introducing Adaptive safety
in construction and the benefits they have seen as a business. While most have embraced
the Next Gear philosophy, undertaking any organisational change is known for its chal-
lenges and its reception has been mixed. Rogers’ ‘Diffusion of Innovation’ describes how
the adoption of new technology or ideas varies throughout a population, with some ‘Early
Adopters’, followed by the majority, and some ‘Laggards’ (Rogers 1995).
Some people have an epiphany moment and think “You know what, I’m going
to change” … Some people it’s ‘Oh I’ve been doing that- this is the way I’ve been
all the time anyway’, and some people are ‘What a load of bollocks, I’m not going
to buy into it’.”
(Safety Manager)
Some of the quickest to embrace Next Gear have been project leadership — because of
its efficiency emphasis on production — and engineers — because they value the increased
buy-in from the workforce. Next Gear has made significant progress with cynics in the past
few years: Some took time to be persuaded of its advantages “slowly but surely” (Safety
Manager), but the Early Adopters have pushed forward aggressively putting themselves in
a “risky situation” (Senior Safety Management) as they rush into uncharted territory.
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8.1.1 The organisation of this chapter
This chapter describes how Next Gear has been received by different stakeholders, its im-
pact on them, and the factors which have challenged and facilitated the transition at each
level of the system. Aspects of the workforce (both operatives and health and safety pro-
fessionals), the projects’ clients, and the industry (regulators, structure, and culture), have
all influenced the change. These are evaluated in the following sections with a view to
determining Adaptive safety’s compatibility with construction.
8.2 Frontline operatives
When asked about the differences they had noticed between Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT)
and their previous project, operatives primarily commented on the enthusiasm for, and
visibility of, health and safety. Many also praised the good organisation which meant it felt
unrushed — “no roaring and shouting” (Operative) — and the inclusive atmosphere.
There’s no friction, there’s no bitchiness, we all know what we have to do, and
that’s it basically.
(Operative)
This visibility is helping to normalise health and safety as part of everyday work, in-
creasing workers’ positive interactions with it and spreading Next Gear “virally”. Those
who had been involved with Next Gear’s processes quickly saw the value of these new
methods that aligned with the reality of their work and had potential to address many of
their concerns — excessive paperwork, inappropriate procedures, and poor communica-
tion. At Crossrail, where Next Gear has been running for more than two years, operatives
and engineers were increasingly taking the initiative to lead safety processes themselves.
Unfortunately, not all workers had noticed a difference between this site compared with
previous ones. They complained it was just as litigious, bureaucratic and pressured as any
other site. This view was mainly held by operatives from sub-contractors so may have been
influenced by their brief time on site and limited interactions with Next Gear: Its low-
profile dissemination means workers have no reason to expect this project to be different,
and instead assume these long-standing issues remain.
The extent to which Next Gear is achieving its goals to increase communication, collab-
oration and trust within the workforce are explored below.
8.2.1 Communication
The effects of a more collective approach to risk had been noticed at all levels of the organi-
sation: For example, senior safety management found workers who in the past would have
avoided them were now less fearful and even proactive about speaking to them; a safety
manager observed workers were less inclined to blame engineers for failure of a task; an
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engineer said he nowmade a conscious effort to speak up “and most of the time people listen,
which- which is quite nice actually” (Site Engineer); one supervisor had been pleasantly sur-
prised to be asked his opinion on “everything”, even tasks outside his sphere; and operatives
felt able to give feedback to others which in the past they would have avoided because of
the potential for argument.
I think the operatives are a lot more vocal now … I think probably before they
were kind of “Oh, if I’m seen to be causing a fuss then, you know- then I’ll cause
a problem”
(Engineer)
Although this shows Next Gear has increased communication on site, operatives needed
reassurance of support, with some saying they would prefer to speak to management than
confront another worker directly — past arguments and bullying taking time to be forgot-
ten. Some were reluctant to challenge others as they wanted to avoid being a nuisance or
causing confrontation. Several workers liked the anonymous observation cards as they saw
them as an alternative to challenging directly — misinterpreting the purpose described in
the induction to firstly to speak to those involved (“Sort it”), and then to “Report it” as a
final action. These cards are one of TTT’s initiatives which blur the message of Next Gear
as many frontline workers were not aware they would be encouraged and supported to
challenge directly.
Other operatives did feel able to challenge, but felt the need to be defensive and, on
occasion, hostile. There were also practical difficulties engaging the workforce in the new
processes: Some were shy and needed encouragement to get involved in discussions and
maintaining the attention of workers in a meeting room of a busy site — even for a thirty-
minute Collective Insight — was a challenge.
Next Gear has been supported by factors which promoted dialogue throughout the
workforce. At TTT’s smaller combined sewer overflow (CSO) site (Blackfriars Bridge Fore-
shore), health and safety management found — compared to the Central tunnelling shaft
site — teams developed better working relationships with each other and the client.
Working on this [CSO] site, it’s an entirely different beast, because here I’ve
found there isn’t really the us and them mentality … it’s a smaller team and we
are all over a couple of floors, we see each other when we’re in here making tea
and coffee et cetera.
(Safety Manager)
Co-location of teams has been shown to have a significant impact on cooperation, trust,
and communication (Allen 1984) hence some safety managers at TTT chose to sit with the
engineers to facilitate Next Gear. Other participants confirmed the importance of building
these relationships: An engineer found workers more willing to engage with her when
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part of a smaller team or working on the smaller CSO, and a supervisor found teams that
had moved from Crossrail to TTT (bringing their experience and existing relationships with
them) were easier to work with. Having moved from another tunnelling megaproject, these
teams benefited from a reduced learning curve at TTT — already being familiar with the
high-expectations and organisational processes associated with this type of site.
8.2.2 Collaboration
Many had noticed the positive effects of empowering workers, drawing on their experi-
ence and listening to their concerns. The emphasis on respect, recognition, praise, and
engagement is improving workers’ job satisfaction and overall well-being.
The lads feel more involved, that they’re actually building what they’ve planned,
not building what we’ve planned.
(Construction Manager)
Even today, I’m still learning stuff … it’s good, because then they feel a bit
motivated, “Oh, look! He’s asked me what I’m going to do!”
(General Foreman)
Workers also fed back about benefits of Next Gear’s processes for sharing workload and
integrating new workers — particularly in engaging a multicultural workforce — and sub-
contractors who appreciate the autonomy, improving their relationship with LOR’s man-
agers. Those who had been involved in collaborative problem-solving found this built trust
and lasting relationships which teams would draw on in the future to share knowledge.
They’d understood their problems, and they worked together, and that team
now are very close … they’ll come back and talk to some of our team, if there
are problems with any job because they learn from each other.
(Construction Manager)
Next Gear’s processes have also resulted in productivity gains and quality enhance-
ments:
I’m not stupid, the boys out there have been doing what they’re doing a hell of
a lot longer and have got far more experience in what I’m asking them to do
than I have … they’ll tell you exactly how you can get round [a problem].
(Engineer)
Not everyone at the frontline had seen the benefits of Next Gear, particularly at TTT
where the Next Gear way of life is less established. Many workers were cynical about safety;
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bored of “the next new drive’ (Supervisor); and uninterested in the changes — “I’ve done like
loads of them, they’re all similar” (Supervisor). Some were confused by the subtle branding
which had appeared on bulletins and emails without a formal launch, and why ‘Mission
Zero’ (for the few who had noticed its absence) had been removed without any explanation
of whether or why they had failed to achieve zero accidents. The workforce has become
weary of constantly changing safety interventions: Initiative or Change Fatigue reduces
energy, productivity and commitment; can leave a workforce overwhelmed and fearful of
instability; and breed pessimism and cynicism towards management (Shapiro 2017). In
line with Shapiro’s recommendations safety leaders recognised the need for persistence —
explaining messages, involving workers, and incentivising the new processes. However,
he also recommends ‘recovery-time’ to allow workers to buy into change, but LOR’s safety
leaders felt the names and branding would need to be changed again in the future to keep
them “fresh”. Complacency is a threat which worries many safety managers in construction,
hence their search for novelty (Shapiro 1996) and dogged enforcement of overlapping
interventions (Johansson and Lundberg 2010, Rae et al. 2018, Swuste et al. 2012).
Workers were disdainful of management’s legal “arse-covering” (Supervisor), lack of
experience, sympathy, and humility, and several used the interview as an opportunity to
implore management to listen to them.
I’m not saying all of them, but there is a lot of them who’ve never actually
physically worked on the ground with the likes of us ... you can’t really talk to
them because they think they know best.
(Operative)
Although participants from Crossrail said the new tools helped to integrate sub-
contractors, only some at TTT felt part of the project; instead feeling the need to compart-
mentalise their responsibilities.
We’re in charge of our little world, and obviously a lot of management like to
think they’re in charge of everything, but when it boils down to it, it’s only me,
because if it all goes wrong it’s me who goes to prison.
(Supervisor)
Many workers were fervently risk-averse, clearly aware of their responsibility for their
peers; they did not trust the organisation to keep them safe and did not feel, or want to be,
integrated into the wider project — “I look after my little area.” (Supervisor). This desire
to protect what Dekker describes as their “discretionary space” is an attempt to retain some
pride and meaning in their work (Dekker 2018, Dekker 2007).
8.2.3 Trust
Some frontline workers who had encountered Next Gear were disappointed that it had not
lived up to expectations and grown sceptical.
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Participant A:Wewere told that with this Next Gear that they was empowering
people and, you know, wouldn’t shove- all this health and safety wasn’t shoved
down your throat … they were going to say “Well, OK, we can relax our- our rule
on [PPE]” but it’s not panned out yet, it’s just words.
Participant B: And I don’t- personally I don’t think it ever will.
Participant C: I don’t see how that would really work, if they say that “Well
some tasks don’t need safety glasses, some do-”
Participant B: There’d be too much confliction wouldn’t there?
Participant C: There’d be too much room to abuse it to be honest.
(Crossrail supervisors’ focus group)
Despite efforts to engage with the workforce, their distrust for management was still
evident. Several argued it was not their attitude that needed to change but that of man-
agement — rarely had they noticed that it had. Moreover, some had misinterpreted Next
Gear’s methods: Asking open questions — intended to involve and listen to the work-
force — enforced the perception “they don’t know what we’re doing” (Operative), and using
photographs was seen as “spying” (Operative).
It’s a lot of us and them … [management] come and they stand at the top of
the shaft looking down at you- wouldn’t look at you or say hello or nothing,
they’d just look at you and walk away … They’re not confident enough to ask
questions. They don’t know anything about shovelling.
(Operative)
Engaging with workers has been complicated by safety’s negative reputation. Workers
were on their guard around management, wary of the new processes — “they’re here to
catch us out” (Senior Safety Management), and they feared losing their jobs so would bow
to pressure to “just get it done” (Supervisor). The expectations not to challenge or be
consulted have become so ingrained in the industry workers no longer speak out.
Participant: These days I don’t even bother arguing now, it’s pointless because
they just go “Do it!”, so you just think “Fine, I will do it.”
Interviewer: So that’s come from 20 years of experience?
Participant: Yeah, and I don’t mind doing anything, but there’s got to be a
reason why you’re doing it … they can’t give me reasons, it’s just because that’s
what’s written down in their book, and that’s what we’ve got to do. And they
won’t listen to- like I said, 20 years’ experience of doing a job-
Interviewer: So even if it were to be different here you probably wouldn’t try
and challenge it?
Participant: No, no.
(Interview with a Supervisor)
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Management interpreted workers’ compliance as a fear of thinking for themselves or,
at worst, incompetence; but in fact, having worked under the authoritarian rule of safety
for many years, they have become demoralised and apathetic. These characteristics —
submission, resignation and cynicism—have also been seen in people kept under totalising
regimes (Arendt 1967 cited in Dekker 2018). Next Gear recognises the industry’s role in
workers’ oppression and challenges it, but their trust in the system will take time to rebuild.
8.3 Safety leadership
Traditional mindsets at every level of the organisation — focussed on accidents, trends,
targets and certainty — have been difficult to convert, especially among safety profession-
als and engineers. Accepting safety based on trust, well-being and anecdotes has been a
struggle, and it is a constant fight not to slip back into old habits.
People struggle if there’s nothing to measure … if we haven’t got a chart that
says there’s this many happening, then nothing’s happening, andmyworry with
Next Gear is we’re starting to slide into that.
(Safety Manager)
The scheme needed an identity “to get any traction with senior management” (Senior
Safety Management), reflecting how safety has become commodified, quantifiable, and
normalised as part of business relationships (Dekker 2018). Some were sceptical of the
abstract concept of ‘Safety Differently’ as initially presented, without any proof or tangible
plan and tools to implement it. Concerns were also raised about how occupational safety
and health (OSH) professionals — with their strong preferences for detail, order, and con-
trol — would cope with such a significant change to their role. They would be fearful
the legal implications and concerned that (should Next Gear be successful) they would
ultimately make themselves redundant.
[They feel] that unless there’s a massive turnover of activity, inspections, ob-
servations, meetings, briefings, inductions about actually- somehow they’re-
they’re deficient.
(Senior Safety Management)
As well as those whose pro-bureaucracy tendencies meant they struggled with Next
Gear, there were also critics who reacted defensively to the plans — assuming any new
safety intervention would mean increased paperwork and refusing to engage.
Trying to get people’s mindset around the bureaucracy, although we’re intro-
ducing new tools which on the surface appear to be more bureaucracy…we are
introducing these new tools to move us in a different direction, and therefore
we can remove some of the other tools.
(Senior Safety Management)
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Some could not see past the short-term increase in paperwork to long-term plans for
its reduction. The cluttered and liability-driven past of safety bureaucracy has scarred the
sector, stifling innovation.
Contrary to this, most OSH professionals have embraced Next Gear. Participants were
positive about the changes; genuinely committed to its principles; and increasingly con-
vinced by its philosophy as it proved itself on site. Not only has it been effective in identi-
fying safety issues but has changed their role for the better — improving job-satisfaction
and relationships with the workforce.
Next Gear has seen the role of health and safety shift “away from being a policeman and
more into being the conscious of the organisation.” (Safety Manager)
We’re enablers, we’re not restrictors … [leaders] who ask better questions, who
facilitate the environment so that the team can succeed.
(Senior Safety Management)
In the past, many safety managers had found themselves bored and disillusioned with
their role — unpopular, office-based bureaucrats — which did not match their reasons
for joining the profession. Rather than traditional stereotypes of policeman, bureaucrat,
or priest, OSH professionals regard themselves as “upholders of justice, making sure the
capitalist objectives of the modern corporation don’t come at the expense of the safety of those
on the frontline” (Provan et al. 2018, p. 31). Some participants had even joined LOR because
of Next Gear’s promise of a role which better fit these values.
You don’t need any skills for it, it’s a mindset, that’s what it is … if you don’t
think that way then you’re not going to be- you won’t have any skills in it, do
you know what I mean? It’s not a- it’s not something to learn, it’s something to
believe.
(Safety Manager)
There was a widespread view among safety managers that Next Gear’s ideas were
“preaching to the converted” (Safety Manager). They had recognised through their own
past experience the value of an inclusive, relational approach, but this was now validated
and supported explicitly with “additional tools to help push it along … it does help having
the same message because on a big job I guess it allows everyone to be aligned and moving in
the same direction.” (Safety Manager)
I’ve always enjoyed the engagement side of it, so I’ve always enjoyed engaging
people and empowering people. It gives me a lot of satisfaction if you’ve got a
good site with feedback coming from the workforce.
(Safety Manager)
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Most had enjoyed the challenge and opportunities it had brought to gain new soft-skills
and experience in other areas.
It is an interesting challenge because it’s a very counter-intuitive place to be as
a health and safety expert, to be telling people to do less to get more! And I’ve
enjoyed that.
(Senior Safety Management)
Focusing on collaboration has reduced the dependence on safety managers to provide
the answers. There is less expectation for them to understand the technical aspects of
construction (although it does help) and instead they support and empower workers to
solve problems themselves. This was especially reassuring for newer members of the team
who found the collective processes enhanced their own learning, as well as the operatives’.
You don’t need to be an expert just to ask questions, you could learn some-
thing new. And you might just be right, you might spot something they’ve over-
looked.
(Site Induction)
Practically, only some said they had seen a reduction in paperwork; however, they had
noticed they spent more time on site, were better informed, and had better relationships
with the workforce. Next Gear’s goals to focus on high-consequence risks, reduce bureau-
cracy, and involve the workforce frees up time for safety staff and engineers to spend on
activities that add value, and should continue to do so as more safety responsibilities be-
come part of frontline work. Although not under any less pressure, safety managers felt
liberated from pointless and punitive work that had hampered them previously.
I don’t get that feeling the world’s fallen apart because somebody’s cut their
finger from our business, which is great really, because it used to be an absolute
nightmare.
(Senior Safety Management)
As well as confidence in its philosophy, Next Gear leaders were outgoing, curious, open-
minded, enjoyed problem solving, embraced challenge, and were proactive — taking the
initiative to create opportunities for conversations and lead the new processes. Leaders
were supported by from interpersonal and leadership skills — such as accommodating dif-
ferent personalities — as well as a technical knowledge of construction processes which
gained the respect of the workforce and increased engagement. Respect and trust were
key to the relationship between leadership and operatives. Finally, an individual’s health
and wellbeing support effective decision-making, including judgement around risk. Many
of these traits align with the interpersonal aspects of leadership discussed in Chapter 5.
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I’m quite a confident person, I’m not intimidated or phased by new people or
different situations, I think that’s why it’s good that I’m in the role I am.
(Safety Team)
Initially, the responsibility for leading Next Gear has fallen to health and safety man-
agement, but this is shifting towards operations — hence these characteristics apply to
anyone wanting to drive the Next Gear agenda. However, changing the negative reputa-
tion of safety and the view that safety is the responsibility of the safety department are
both ongoing struggles.
I think it’s still very much seen as it’s a safety function, and we go and do it to
people, and I think we need to- for it to work really really well and really embed
it, it needs to be the construction teams, and the management teams.
(Safety Manager)
8.4 The client
Balancing Safety Differently with the client’s requirements has been one of the greatest
challenges. Both Crossrail and Tideway are supportive of Next Gear, but need the reassur-
ance of more traditional safety measures alongside it, resulting in confusion and conflict.
Despite the drive to the reduce paperwork, the safety team found themselves duplicating
processes — running a parallel “ghost system” (Senior Safety Management) to satisfy the
client. For instance, the Crossrail and LOR’s Next Gear inductions are presented back-to-
back at Tottenham Court Road station (TCR); workers at TCR received safety alerts and
initiatives from other non-LOR Crossrail sites; and at TTT a multitude of contradictory
safety interventions send mixed messages to the workforce — diluting the impact of Next
Gear.
Participant: If you think about it you could have, in essence, three health and
safety systems. You have Ferrovial and Laing O’Rourke and the joint-venture.
Interviewer: And Tideway’s?
Participant: Yeah. Which in essence are all going to say exactly the same thing,
right?
(Interview with a Safety Manager)
The intentions of these four safety systems may be the same, but the ways they try to
achieve this outcome are incompatible. Both clients were inclined to pay more attention to
minor injuries than the potentially fatal incidents which are the focus of Next Gear.
One of the things about Crossrail is that they sometimes look for easy wins,
picking up on [minor hazards], but when it comes to “Oh we want you to do
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this lining a wall, this big form work, this big complex lift, whatever- just do it!”
Show us the method statement and as long as it looks sound it’s fine.
(Engineer)
Both clients required key performance indicators (KPIs) to be reported, going against
the move away from metrics; both reacted to incidents by restricting freedom and carry-
ing out conventional investigations, making it difficult to prioritise Next Gear initiatives
such as investigating positives or engaging with the workforce; and both enforced manda-
tory personal protective equipment (PPE) so there has not been an opportunity to trial a
discretionary policy.
Tideway’s ‘transformational’ ambition has seen many positive initiatives such as its out-
standing welfare facilities, immersive induction course, and emphasis on long-term holistic
physical and mental health. Being privately funded, TTT is not as tightly regulated as pub-
licly funded projects allowing greater scope for innovation (Robinson et al. 2010). However,
safety managers condemned some of these initiatives as “unnecessary” (Safety Manager):
They felt workers were inundated with interventions, some of which were perceived as trite
or superficial (e.g. giving out gift cards at Christmas) and hindered Next Gear’s attempts
to depose the transactional management of ‘Behavioural Safety’. Some of the safety team
admitted to paying lip service to the client’s initiatives which did not align with Next Gear.
Safety managers also criticised Tideway’s ‘Leadership Tours’, which on one hand could
provide perfect opportunities to engage with the workforce, but instead were used by the
client as inspections — reinforcing the “us and them” culture which many operatives felt
was present despite LOR’s efforts to open up communication between workers and man-
agement. The client’s interference and hypocrisy led to additional work and frustration,
degrading their relationship with the contractor.
I was going to say strangled, but that’s not the right word, by Crossrail … we’re
man-marked by Crossrail so they’re not like our previous jobs that I’ve worked
on … We had a lot more freedom.
(Site Engineer)
The problemwith being a client is you get to know less than half of what actually
goes on … we have a client here based on the job integrated with us but there’s
still that clear divide.
(Safety Manager)
The success of creating an integrated project team of client and contractors has been
limited, and clients were often seen to be obstructing health and safety; unfortunately, their
blue sky ambitions and promises made at the induction created expectations which could
not be met on site, resulting in resentment among the workforce.
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We talk a good fight but we don’t necessarily deliver … and you do get people
saying “Well, what- I heard this on EPIC1, I heard that on EPIC, and I’m still stuck
here with all this”. So I think on some- on some issues, we’re over stretching
the reach.
(Safety Manager)
This was compounded by cost-cutting measures on the project which complicated re-
cruitment and retention.
All the labour out there is agency, it’s ridiculous because there’s no commitment
from them, you know, there’s no commitment from them, “Oh you’ve finished
up, oh alright off you go.”
(Supervisor)
The quoted supervisor had seen a 300% turnover in his team in less than two years
on the project, and was among several operatives who complained that pay at TTT was
below the market level. It was hypothesised that LOR’s high proportion of directly em-
ployed workers would aid the transition; however, this factor was not raised by any par-
ticipants. Instead, its effect was overridden by pressure to maximise profits on this private
venture, driving the use of agency labour. This high turnover will be costly long-term and
compromise safety: Agency workers lack commitment, skills, and — as discussed in the
previous section — the transient workforce makes it more difficult to communicate Next
Gear through personal encounters.
Despite this, those who were able to compare the two clients said Tideway were more
supportive than Crossrail. Rail clients, including London Underground are known to be
ultra-conservative, quick to blame, and have a knee-jerk reaction to incidents. Described
as “confrontational” and “stuck in the dark ages”, several participants felt fighting uncom-
promising clients would hold Next Gear back.
[Clients are] absolutely obsessed with AFRs2, Lost Time Injuries, and they al-
ways will be, they won’t change that principle … there’s a lot of bonus attached
to that, in- in their world.
(Senior Safety Management)
Although in their own ways both Tideway and Crossrail have been challenging clients,
they have also been supportive of the scheme. Ideally, a client needs to be either fully
aligned with Next Gear, or happy to give the principle contractor complete freedom — as
seen more often in construction as opposed to infrastructure. Tideway has been influenced
by Safety Differently, including “people are the solution” as part of their mission statement,
which explains why many of their initiatives align with Next Gear. They have ambitions to
1Tideway’s immersive and experiential induction course
2Accident Frequency Rates
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“raise the bar” for the industry, experimenting with new ideas and concentrating on health
and well-being which demonstrates their commitment to people.
We’ve got kind of a client that just wants to be different, they’ll embrace, you
know, anything new, the innovation side of it is- is very well supported, and
yeah in a sense they’re a breath of fresh air themselves.
(Safety Management)
Next Gear has been supported by Tideway initiatives which emphasise the ‘big-picture’
(for example, an induction video about the tunnel, a viewing platform over site, and pho-
tographs of the build throughout the offices). A goal-driven approach motivates perfor-
mance and encourages innovation (Dekker 2018): By showing workers their contribution
is a valuable part of the project these initiatives stimulate ideas and discussion. Engagement
has also been encouraged through interactive and scenario-based elements throughout the
induction process and technology (BIM3 and VR4) which is used to support training and
discussions on risk.
Having an opportunity to influence safety from the outset of the project has been bene-
ficial for LOR at TTT. This is consistent with research which shows a project is more likely
to be successful if the client is involved at the front end to define goals, understand risks
and opportunities, and engage with stakeholders (Morris 2013). In contrast, Crossrail is
seen as the more difficult of the two clients, but Next Gear was introduced four years in to
a seven-year project so difficulty changing their established safety practices was to be ex-
pected. Having proved its value over the past two-year pilot, as they reach the final phases
of the project Crossrail are becoming more amenable.
But what’s happening now is Crossrail is, now it’s drawing to a close they’re not
as forceful as they used to be- we still have to comply, but they’re not- they’re
not as forceful.
(Senior Safety Management)
8.5 Industry
8.5.1 Regulators
Initially, convincing an industry which so staunchly advocates traditional or Safety I values
was a battle. The Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT) launched
a scathing attack, accusing LOR of slipping standards and neglect which would “erode the
very foundations of the UK’s health and safety culture” (UCATT, 2016).
3Building Information Modelling
4Virtual Reality
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We needed to counter this myth that floats around that we’ve stopped doing
safety.
(Senior Safety Management)
LOR was criticised in the media yet risked their reputation to pursue the scheme. Safety
management showed determined faith in the theory, defending themselves against unions
and regulators who had taken it “out of context” (Safety Manager), and ultimately, their
risk has been rewarded as they lead the industry into this new era.
Construction has struggled to relinquish its “endless bureaucracies” (Senior Safety Man-
agement): As discussed in 7.5.1, companies have set progressively ambitious targets and
tighter controls to impress clients and regulators, creating pressure for themselves and
competitors. Turning against this prompted uncertainty and criticism.
The traditional perception would be that if you’re not focusing on traditional
health and safety anymore, then you’re not doing very well in the eyes of the
regulators, and you’re not doing very well in the eyes of the assurance compa-
nies.
(Senior Safety Management)
Some felt the move would need a supportive change in government legislation to be
successful. Qualifications enforced by the regulators (National Examination Board in Occu-
pational Health (NEBOSH) and Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS)) conflict
with the Next Gear philosophy meaning from the start of their careers both safety pro-
fessionals and workers and not trained for a Safety Differently organisation. For example,
Next Gear aims to break down barriers and support a ubiquitous discussion of risk, whereas
the CSCS reinforces the correct procedures for challenging another worker — via your su-
pervisor unless the situation is safety-critical. On the other hand, misrepresentation of the
law has led many to believe it is more restrictive than it is. Rather than rigid compliance
and bureaucratic processes, regulators advocate “sharing and learning”, “active participa-
tion” (BSI 2018) and “strengthening leadership and worker engagement” (HSE 2018) — key
components of Next Gear.
8.5.2 Structure
As a network of project-based temporary multiple organisations (TMOs), the influence of
the wider project ecology on TTT and Crossrail needs to be considered. Growing numbers
of infrastructure megaprojects (Flyvbjerg 2014) has created competition for workers and
TTT has struggled to recruit and retain qualified workers, jeopardising the project.
Now we shouldn’t just be going out to anybody to do any sort of job, we should
be getting the best … but the trouble is the best guys are either still on Crossrail
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or they’ve been taken to HS25, or they’re going down to Hinkley Point, Northern
Line Extension.”
(Supervisor)
Research is ongoing into the ‘trickle across’ effect in construction meaning project ca-
pabilities are transferred to subsequent megaprojects; however, this supervisor raises con-
cerns TTT may be left out of this ‘cascade’ because of its timing and its poor reputation
which deters workers. On the other hand, TTT’s leadership has created a knowledge shar-
ing partnership to pass on learning from Crossrail. The infrastructure industry innovation
platform (i3P) aims to foster industry-wide collaboration, accelerating and directing inno-
vation towards key challenges (I3P 2018, Kemp 2017). Learning or capability development
is key to Adaptive safety but project-based industries struggle with a “doing versus learning
dilemma” (Davies 2017, p. 109) — whereby work is focussed, rapid, and seemingly unique
which restricts the transfer of knowledge. Systems like i3P build relationships and trust
between organisations to share explicit knowledge, but the tacit knowledge workers have
gained may be lost.
Infrastructure megaprojects are often led by a partnership of principle contractors. Ini-
tially, implementing Next Gear in a joint-venture was expected to be a challenge — hence
Crossrail, a sole-venture, was chosen for the pilot — however, TTT strengthens the case for
its suitability to any context. Ferrovial Agroman and LOR both brought ideas to a “blank
canvas” (Safety Manager), forcing them to review their processes, combine their expertise,
and decide a way forward together based on the needs of the project. Designing this joint
strategy was initially painful, but compared to other joint-ventures the tension between the
partners was said to have been minimal: Ferrovial Agroman were soon convinced of Next
Gear’s potential and committed to this experiment. Partners on subsequent projects have
also been quickly converted and more willing align their policies than expected.
However, at the frontline supervisors did feel there was tension between LOR and Fer-
rovial Agroman, and the complex organisational structure was a hinderance.
Crossrail to me was an easier project and not as frustrating, here is very very
frustrating…we’re waiting 6weeks to get plastic zip-ties, we’re waiting 6weeks
to get lifting tackle- you know.
(Supervisor)
Compared to Crossrail (the sole-venture), TTT’s layers of management and lengthy pro-
cesses resulted in delays in procurement and allocating permits. While Next Gear tries to
encourage engagement by showing workers they are valued and listened to, these delays
and frustrations mute its effectiveness. The structure of the organisation is further compli-
cated as work is sub-contracted; trades compartmentalise their work, limiting communi-
cation, trust, and engagement. These sub-contractors are also only on site temporarily —
5High Speed 2
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perhaps as one of several projects they are working on — making it harder to reinforce
Next Gear’s message.
If you were in a manufacturing company or- oil company probably it’s easier
because you’re going to have the same staff … but during those 7 years [of this
project’s duration] it’s amazing the number of people we have on site so that’s
very- it makes it very challenging just making this philosophy more effective.
(Safety Manager)
The temporary workforce and organisations in construction also mean the sector strug-
gles to allow interventions to reach maturity. Shapiro critiques the tendency for organi-
sations to ‘fad-surf’ between panaceas which are “applied blindly across a business, with-
out attention to where they might be useful, why, with what other techniques they are be-
ing combined, and how, if at all, they should be modified to meet the needs of the company”
(Shapiro 1996, p. xiv). This trend is seen in construction with safety culture and behaviour-
based safety programmes, each promised breakthrough but was soon replaced by the next
fad.
In such a dynamic and pragmatic industry waiting for long-term results is challenging.
Some saw Next Gear as one of many fads that had come and gone and were worried it too
would not come to fruition.
I think as a sector we’re quite good I think at sharing and communicating, so
what tends to happen is, the latest- someone has a success with something, or
it gathers some positive publicity, and then the next company wants to do that
because they want to be on that bandwagon.
(Senior Safety Management)
You see in construction, especially in this project, it’s very difficult to- for us to
have these kind of strategies because we have people everyday coming to sell
you new stuff, new practice, agencies, so it’s very difficult to create a strong
culture about it here.
(Safety Manager)
Having a strong ‘safety brand’ has become an important part of the tendering process.
Clients’ requirements for contractors are based around traditional safety metrics, putting
LOR at a disadvantage beside competitors who spoke the language of the industry. This
included Tideway whose works information for the project originally specified a contractor
with a zero-based safety programme. To counter this, extra time and effort was needed to
convince potential clients of the benefits of Next Gear, persuading them to take a risk and
let LOR experiment.
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It’s a slight risk because some clients are still measuring us like for like with
other competitors, and they might be saying “AFR6 this, and AFR that” and we’re
saying “Next Gear, engagement, trust.”
(Senior Safety Management)
8.5.3 Culture
Finally, LOR faces a challenge changing the culture of construction which is dominated by
negativity and blame. Past safety policies have been built around controlling a minority
of apparent risk-seeking, undisciplined, and incompetent workers. Senior Safety Man-
agement explained the key to Next Gear is not to let this minority limit the respect and
autonomy the workforce deserves, instead fostering sympathy with the workforce — un-
derstanding their actions in order to learn and improve. However, there was a widespread
acceptance that occasionally there would be “idiots” and “mavericks” on site that caused
accidents.
Wework in an industry where [accidents are] just inevitable, we can do as much
as we can, but we can’t- you can’t teach out stupidity.
(Engineer)
According to Safety Differently, accidents are impossible to predict, and people are the
strength in the system, yet even participants who were fervently committed to and engaged
in Next Gear were inclined to see accidents as someone’s fault. There were examples of
instances where Next Gear’s privileges had been openly abused.
We’ve had some guys on construction sites saying: “Where’s your permit?”, “We
don’t need a permit, we’re ‘Safety Differently’!” and you can see how it can start
to be abused.
(Senior Safety Management)
This limits how true Next Gear can be to the Safety Differently philosophy: While there
is still a perception that these “malicious people” indulge in “rogue behaviours” there will be
pressure to balance Safety Differently with traditional discipline and rules.
Negative attitudes also compromised the Next Gear tools; collective insights could be
dominated by questions about accountability and appropriate permits, and worker engage-
ment often unleashed a barrage of complaints.
It’s trying to get people- people will very readily complain, but they won’t very
readily praise, you know? Everybody’s happy when they’re moaning … unfor-
tunately it’s a construction site and if you’re too nice, people will just take you
for a ride.
(Engineer)
6Accident Frequency Rate
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8.6 Conclusion
There have been many challenges which threaten Next Gear’s ambition at every level of this
complex system: The industry is reliant on compliance-based safety; clients dictate safety
processes; projects are constantly changing; and the workforce has learned not to engage.
These discourage collaboration — reinforcing the culture of cynicism, blame, fear, and the
divorce of management and the frontline. Any organisational change is challenging, and
construction’s persistent culture means workers’ trust in management, and subsequently
willingness to engage, will take time to rebuild.
The case study also identified aspects of construction which mean Next Gear is well-
suited, and factors which have facilitate the transition. By comparing the two projects,
the importance of a supportive client; alignment with the Safety Differently philosophy
from the outset of the project; and time to allow the ideas to embed and relationships
to mature were discovered. Construction’s dynamic organisational structures can also be
advantageous as changes can be made quickly, processes reviewed, and iterations trialled.
Chapter 9 draws together the factors which have supported and hindered Adaptive
safety at LOR. These findings, together with those from previous chapters, are discussed
to determine its compatibility in construction.
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9.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the findings of the case study presented in Chapters 7 and 8 and
reflects back on the theory behind the Adaptive safety movement to evaluate this attempt
to apply its ideas in construction. Its compatibility (or incompatibility) with construction
is discussed, questioning whether resilience is suited to a dynamic network; if empowering
workers addresses construction’s blame culture; and the degree to which a more traditional
version of safety— procedures, competence, experience, and compliance— is better suited
to this sector.
The chapter concludes by proposing a model of systemic antecedents which underpin
organisational resilience and a continuum between traditional and Adaptive safety.
9.2 Challenges and facilitators of Safety Differently
The findings of Chapter 8 indicate that — based on the early stages of Next Gear’s devel-
opment and implementation — construction can incorporate Adaptive safety, and benefits
from its ideas. To summarise these factors which have affected Laing O’Rourke’s (LOR’s)
transition to Next Gear they have been presented in a modified decision matrix. Table 9.1
shows how the ‘SWOT-TOWS’ decision matrix has been modified for this purpose.
This framework is typically used to explore the Strengths and Weaknesses of an or-
ganisation, and Opportunities and Threats of the external environment in a future venture
(hence ‘SWOT’); however, here it is utilised to assemble the strengths and weaknesses of
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Next Gear and the factors which have challenged and facilitated its application in these in-
frastructure megaprojects. Instead of making a strategic decision, the SWOT-TOWS anal-
ysis has been applied on reflection to evaluate the mechanisms that support and hinder
Safety Differently. The inverse ‘TOWS’ element uses four quadrants to identify where the
strengths of Next Gear are supported by aspects of construction (lower left) and where the
weaknesses of Next Gear are exacerbated by construction’s flaws (upper right). The upper
left and lower right quadrants show where features of Next Gear can overcome the chal-
lenges of construction and features of construction which can overcome the weaknesses of
Next Gear respectively. These quadrants have been subdivided — as the analysis is retro-
spective— to also include areas where the construction’s challenges undermine the benefits
of Next Gear and where the weaknesses of Next Gear mean it fails to take advantage of
construction’s strengths. The findings are presented in Table 9.2.
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Table 9.1: The modified SWOT-TOWS pro forma
Weaknesses of Next Gear Strengths of Next Gear
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(and vice versa)
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construction which
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strengths of Next 
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vice versa)
ORGANISATION
PROJECT
SAFETY 
LEADERSHIP
WORKFORCE
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Table 9.2: The strengths and challenges of Next Gear at LOR
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SECTOR - Litigious, traditional safety mindsets, 
existing qualifications, low-profit margins, blame 
culture, market-pressure and competition
Difficulty convincing the sector and its clients to overcome their fear of 
litigation. Requires investment to make changes. Changing the culture of 
the industry is difficult and slow. Risky to go against industry expectations.
ORGANISATION - Unionised, constant 
change, compartmentalisation of trades, low 
wages
Public reputation is crucial in a competitive market. Change makes 
communicating Next Gear’s message more difficult.
PROJECT - Demanding clients, interfering 
project management, joint-venture partners, 
cumbersome processes
Clients dilute Next Gear and confuse the message with contradictory 
initiatives. Reliant on traditional metrics. Difficult to bring all stakeholders 
on board.
SAFETY LEADERSHIP - Pragmatic, fearful of 
litigation, negative reputation, separated from 
primary operations, preference for control and 
busyness, significant change to their role
Difficulty understanding Safety Differently as a concept. Struggle to let go 
of a traditional model of safety. Difficulty moving between projects because 
of inconsistency.
WORKFORCE - Transient, cynical, fear of 
confrontation, apathetic, distrustful of 
management, low calibre of workers, defensive, 
initiative fatigue, fear of losing their job, shyness, 
stubbornness, short attention span
Broken promises reinforce cynicism. Some only briefly encounter Next Gear 
and have not noticed the changes. Not open to change. Worries about 
‘idiots’ who need to be controlled by conventional safety measures. 
Expectation to be told what to do.
Overcoming (Positives over 
weakness)
Undermining (Weakness over 
Positives)
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SECTOR - Open to change, communication 
between companies, dynamic
Construction has become cynical 
about traditional safety. Constant 
change stimulates review and 
improvement.
Change prevents initiatives reaching 
maturity. Change means versions of 
Next Gear diverge.
ORGANISATION - Flat management 
structure, progressive, influential within the 
industry, previous behavioural safety programmes, 
supportive leadership, project capabilities
Willing to invest in innovation. Most 
are familiar with Behavioural Safety 
and its flaws.
PROJECT - Well-organised, aligned or laissez-
faire clients, influenced decisions from the outset, 
joint-venture partners, smaller sites or teams, 'big-
picture' perspective, pace and complexity of the 
project
Some partners may be less on-
board than others. Pace and change 
mean some lack time to understand 
the philosophy.
SAFETY LEADERSHIP - Aligns with 
experience, outgoing, open-minded, proactive, 
embrace challenges and problem-solving, 
technical knowledge of construction, health and 
wellbeing, authority, leadership skills, visibility
Relies on knowledge of safe 
construction processes to set 
boundaries. Workers expect formal 
risk processes led by safety leaders. 
Some safety leaders lack skills or 
mindset for engagement.
WORKFORCE - Resourceful, experienced, risk-
averse, experience of megaprojects, existing team 
relationships, open-minded, appreciate autonomy, 
trusted
Many still feel restricted and have 
become sceptical about whether 
Next Gear will deliver. Some workers 
misunderstand or abuse the new 
policies.
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Overcoming (Strengths over challenges) Undermining (Challenges over strengths)
Challenges unethical litigation management. Challenges 
insensitive, unworkable policies and bureaucracy. Language is 
accessible and not accusatory. Aligns productivity, safety, and 
quality. Improves efficiency. Supports a just culture.
Existing training discourages engagement and communication 
between trades.
Greater empowerment and job satisfaction for workers. 
Encourages inter-trade collaboration and coordination.
Sceptical of changes. Change reduces the effectiveness of 
knowledge transfer. Relational approach relies on open 
communication. Undermines value of the workforce.
Brand is overshadowed by the clients’. Undermines value of the 
workforce’s input. Limits knowledge transfer.
Improved wellbeing. Improves safety’s reputation. Safety is 
created by the workforce for the workforce. Embracing a more 
collaborative approach to safety.
Poor relationship with the workforce compromises engagement.
Significant change challenges long-standing expectations. 
Increases engagement. Supports open communication 
throughout the site. Informality makes safety accessible. Opens 
communication. Improves relationships between ‘us and them’
Difficulty changing attitudes of those only briefly involved. The 
workforce has learnt not to expect to be consulted. Attitudes 
and expectations are ingrained.
Complementing
Able to adopt radical ideas quickly. Flexibility suits diversity of the sector. Successes and challenges are easily shared. 
Communication is enhanced by the involvement of the workforce. Supports learning and innovation.
Direct involvement of management to support change. Open to new ideas. Demonstrates the workforce is valued and supported 
from the top.
Provides time for consultation and collaboration. Reduces pressure. Supportive of new initiatives, particularly reducing bureaucracy 
and monitoring. Develops a safety policy which meets the needs of the project. Builds relationships which support communication. 
Stimulates ideas and learning. Time to reflect and share ideas.
Enjoy engaging with the workforce. Facilitate collaboration, communication, and relationships. Welcome innovation. Changing the 
reputation of safety. Increasing involvement on site. Respected by the workforce. Not judgemental. Normalising safety as part of 
everyday work.
Empowered. Embraces their creativity. Draws on their experience. Supports engagement with other teams and the project 
organisation. Eager to improve productivity, safety, and working conditions. Increased job satisfaction. Improves relationships with 
management.
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9.3 The role of safety leadership
Safety leaders have been integral to the shift towards Adaptive safety in construction. Fig-
ure 9.1 shows how negative attitudes to workers— ‘people are the problem’— perpetuate a
vicious cycle (Zimmermann, Raab and Zanotelli 2013) driving the division between work-
ers and management. Strong leadership skills are needed to break these cycles, changing
attitudes to workers and encouraging engagement.
“People are the 
solution”
Positivity
“People are the 
problem”
Blame 
Trust
Integration
Engagement
Distrust
Communication
Disenfranchising
Isolation
Defensiveness
Figure 9.1: Vicious and virtuous cycles in management and worker attitudes
While safety leadership is key to worker engagement, this research has shown there are
many other factors that contribute to organisational resilience. Change at LOR has been
driven top-down, first changing the organisational strategy, in order to facilitate the emer-
gence of resilience from the bottom-up. Many of the challenges they have faced confirm
the industry-wide factors that conflict with Adaptive safety — lack of investment, lack of
stability, and lack of communication.
In addition to its incompatibility with construction, these explorations have revealed po-
tential flaws in the philosophy of Adaptive safety which need to be addressed: Namely, the
ethics of experimenting with safety; its overemphasis of worker engagement; leaving the
frontline vulnerable to blame; and its reliance on traditional safety to provide boundaries.
These are discussed in Sections 9.4 and 9.6.
9.4 Challenges
9.4.1 The ethical concerns
Key academics in the field of resilience engineering (RE) have been clear there is no one best
way to engineer resilience, but a multitude of methods which depend on an organisation’s
context and progress (McDonald 2006). Instead, an approach is advocated focusing on
the factors unique to each sector which “facilitate the emergence of resilience” (Hollnagel
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and Sundström 2006) and conducting ‘microexperiments’ to test changes in procedures
(Dekker 2017a, Dekker 2018).
‘Safety Anarchism’ proposes an ecological model of learning by “self-correcting feedback
loops”(Dekker 2018); however, with so little known about the mechanisms and antecedents
of resilience, the ethics of such a trial-and-error approach are questionable. In many sec-
tors changes to safety management are unthinkable unless evidenced by a quantifiable
reduction in injury rates.
9.4.2 The substitution of engagement for safety
Similarly, if resilience is cultivated in a unique way depending on context, organisations are
free to pick and choose aspects of this multi-faceted phenomenon. LOR have adapted Safety
Differently to suit the challenges of this unique sector, so the extent to which Next Gear re-
flects the original theory of organisational resilience is debatable. Without an in-depth un-
derstanding of the antecedents or mechanisms underpinning organisational resilience, in
construction this concept has been reduced to ‘maximising worker engagement’. Although
focussing on this has been a significant step forward for construction, a link between en-
gagement and resilience or safety has yet to be proven.
This thesis set out to discuss how the philosophy of Adaptive safety could be modified
to suit construction, focusing one particular aspect — safety leadership. Instead, this work
reveals the need for a thorough and holistic understanding of the construct.
9.4.3 The responsibilisation of workers
Behavioural Safety has been criticised for endorsing worker-blaming, giving rise to the era
of Adaptive safety and vision of ‘people as the solution’. Unfortunately, without a shift
in culture, empowering workers could actually fuel the tendency to blame them. In the
past, workers have been blamed for errors, for a lack of attention, and now for a lack of
engagement, mindfulness, and flexibility.
This contradiction highlights a significant research gap in Adaptive safety: Construction
workers are problem-solvers; they are determined to continue work in spite of adverse con-
ditions; they are dynamic to keep up with constantly changing sites and projects. All these
are key to Adaptive safety, yet here are more likely to cause accidents than prevent them.
Adaptive safety is more than freedom and proactivity at the frontline — without cultural
change, training, resources, and restructuring to provide support at an organisational level
their resilience will not result in safety.
9.5 Antecedents of Adaptive safety
Figure 9.2 proposes a model for the industrial and organisational factors that underpin or-
ganisational resilience. These factors at different levels of the system interplay horizontally
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and vertically, but most importantly they stem from a top-level commitment to facilitate
and support resilient response at the frontline.
Frontline 
response
Culture CollaborationCompetence Communication
Industry
Workplace
Organisation
Figure 9.2: Industrial and organisational factors that support a resilient frontline response
Collaboration
One of high reliability organising’s (HRO’s) defining principles is “sensitivity to operations”
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2007), or in RE examining “work-as-done” (Hollnagel 2014). LOR
have demonstrated the value of this in Next Gear, but this would not have been possible
without top-level support.
Culture
Safety culture has developed a bad reputation due to its oversimplification in manipulative
behavioural programmes (Sileby 2009, Guldenmund 2010) and vague utility (Cox and
Flin 1998). Nevertheless, the collective values of the workforce, organisation, and industry
continue to play a significant role in risk management. Here the term culture is used specif-
ically to mean an organisational commitment to reducing risk — reflecting Chronic Unease
(Fruhen and Flin 2015) and the “preoccupation with failure” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007)
component of Adaptive safety.
Competence
The workforce needs to be equipped, as well as empowered, to respond — Parker et al.
(2010) call this the “can do” and “reason to” of proactivity. Workers need appropriate
training and availability of resources to support “deference to expertise” (Weick and Sutcliffe
2007) and their potential to respond (Hollnagel and Woods 2006). In this way, resilience
is underpinned by a traditional approach to safety.
9.6. The interdependence of traditional and Adaptive safety 179
Communication
Traditional safety processes and systems also underpin communication — an integral as-
pect of risk awareness and the potential to learn. Adaptive safety promotes agile, interdis-
ciplinary teamwork, but the structure of construction (as projects and specialised trades)
limits the flow of knowledge.
9.6 The interdependence of traditional and Adaptive safety
So far, Adaptive safety has primarily been explored in ultra-safe industries wanting to add
resilience as an additional layer of defence. It is not yet understood to what extent Adaptive
safety relies on these sectors’ traditional foundations. Safety II is often promoted as a
replacement for Safety I (Art of Work 2018, Dekker 2018), but its founders argue the
two are complementary (Hollnagel 2014). The danger here is that seeing resilience as a
state of ‘mindfulness’ — a sort of “sixth sense” for risk — emphasises responsiveness over
preparation and prevention. As well as responsibilising workers, it offers construction a
superficial substitute for addressing the problems of the industry at their source.
Gibb et al. (2016) propose a continuum between formal top-down risk control and the
bottom-up social construction of safety knowledge. The appropriate type of risk manage-
ment varies along this scale depending on the individual, task, and environment. This
‘Third Way Continuum’ has been adapted (Figure 9.3) to show how traditional and Adap-
tive safety are not mutually exclusive: Some work can allow a greater degree of freedom
within specified boundaries, but other tasks must be rigidly controlled.
Performance 
variability
Top-down 
control
Bottom-up 
innovation
Figure 9.3: A continuum between traditional and Adaptive safety based on (Gibb et al.
2016, Hollnagel 2009)
At the far left are industries which are best managed with a traditional approach to risk;
the grey areas show the extent to which rules and procedures are needed to set boundaries,
establishing an envelope for performance variability (shown in white). Industries on the
right of the spectrum can allow their workforce to manage risk adaptively with very few
hard rules. Construction sits somewhere between the two extremes of Safety I and Safety
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II: Depending on the nature of the task, some rules are necessary, but there is scope for
adaptation within these guidelines. Further research is needed to understand where dif-
ferent types of construction and other industries would sit within this continuum.
9.7 Conclusion
This research has shown that Adaptive safety in construction depends on organisational,
as well as individual factors. Culture, communication, and competence provide the Safety
I foundations and, within these tangible boundaries, workers can be allowed the freedom
to indulge in Safety II. Thus, there is a need for a context-sensitive balance of new and
old safety paradigms. However, balancing Adaptive safety with more traditional aspects of
safety poses a challenge: Lindland (2018) found encouraging autonomy from the top-down
can send mixed messages, weaken trust, and alienate workers: Too prescriptive a ‘recipe’
compromised employee driven innovation. This paradox suggests autonomy needs to be
initiated from the bottom-up and top-down in collaboration — drawing on both traditional
and new philosophies of safety. Chapter 10 concludes with the impact of these findings
and a way forward.
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10.1 Introduction
This final chapter summarises the findings and contribution of this thesis; critiques its lim-
itations; and puts forward an agenda for future research in the short, medium, and long-
term.
10.2 Summary of thesis findings
10.2.1 Adaptive safety and construction
Initially, Chapter 2 reviewed contemporary literature on emerging concepts in safety (prin-
ciples of high reliability organising (HRO) and resilience engineering (RE) from the Adap-
tive age) and contrast these with construction. Differences between occupational safety
and health (OSH) and systems safety were highlighted in terms of the types of accidents;
understanding of causation; and the way in which accidents are investigated and learnt
from. The type of industry, structure, power dynamics, culture, low investment in safety,
cost constraints, and disposable workforce pose potential barriers, hindering the applica-
tion of this philosophy in construction: This brings to light the sector-specific challenges
and gaps in our knowledge of Adaptive safety.
Instead, it was proposed that focussing on the worker-centred or social aspects of safety
offered the greatest potential for progress in spite of these industrial barriers. Cultivating
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mindfulness and chronic unease could help workers’ better anticipate accidents. Diversi-
fying workers’ skills and improving communication could empower them to respond. In
view of this, the first study examined safety leadership as a means to enhance the Adaptive
capacity of the workforce.
10.2.2 Safety leadership to cultivate resilience
Chapters 3 and 5 examined safety leadership best-practice for engaging and collaborat-
ing with the workforce (proposed as a means to cultivate resilience) in construction and
how these differ from industries like air traffic management (ATM) which have embraced
Adaptive safety.
Fruhen et al.’s (2013) model of Safety Intelligence was developed to suit construction:
Adaptive safety leaders need vision and committent; safety knowledge; social competence;
authority; to trust and empower others; and to solve problems collaboratively. These traits
were explored with an expert panel of interviewees confirming such a leadership style is
favourable, but not always possible, in construction. The findings exemplify what is known
about best-practice safety leadership generally; however, nothing distinguishes this from a
model of Generative (Westrum 2004) or Interdependent (DuPont 2015) safety culture.
The results of this study suggest, while safety leadership may be an important factor in
a resilient response, alone it is not enough to overcome the challenges of construction. This
prompted an in-depth exploration of these barriers to Adaptive safety, as hypothesised in
Chapter 2.
10.2.3 Compatibility with construction
In chapter 6, soft systems methodology (SSM) was applied to the interview data to explore
the challenges of construction with a systems thinking lens. Although some construction
safety managers recognised the value of ownership and autonomy to manage risk, oth-
ers’ views remained rooted in a traditional model of predicting harm, defining rules, and
complying to them.
The dominant perception of workers’ attitudes to risk is as denying or oblivious. Under-
standing the characteristics and pressures of this sector helps to unpack why such attitudes
are drawn towards and instilled by work in construction. The culture of worker-blaming
in construction is challenged: Workers are often seen as rebellious and complacent, when
in reality their propensity for ‘unsafe behaviour’ is shaped by peer pressure, job insecurity,
inadequate schedules and funding, poorly designed and maintained equipment, lack of
training, and low awareness of risk. All these factors can be attributed to cost-cutting in a
competitive and fragmented industry.
These findings cast doubt on the suitability of Adaptive safety to a dynamic net-
work, highlighting the importance of organisational stability to learn and to develop
resilience capacities. Construction does not fit the template of a complex adaptive system
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(Braithwaite, Herkes, Ludlow, Testa and Lamprell 2017): Its risks are predictable and
activities plannable — even if they do not always go to plan.
10.2.4 Implementing Safety Differently and its impact
Chapter 7 and 8 present a case study of Adaptive safety in practice in construction. Laing
O’Rourke’s (LOR’s) safety strategy has been redesigned around ‘people as the solution’.
Their organisational rhetoric is positive and accessible; investigations transparent; and risk
management processes collaborative, streamlined, and flexible.
The response to these changes has been encouraging: Communication, collaboration,
proactivity, and job-satisfaction have shown improvements as the programme is refined
and developed with input from the workforce. Safety leaders have been instrumental in
implementing this change; however, their efforts have been hindered by the persistence of
construction’s culture, interfering clients, and a lack of stability in the workforce— diluting
their message of engagement.
There are questions about whether this success could be replicated on other projects
and in other areas of construction: LOR is a capable, reputable, and progressive principle
contractor, and working at Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) with an enlightened and inno-
vative client may be a one-off winning combination. These megaprojects also provide a
degree of longevity and stability in which to study the emergence of resilience. Elsewhere
in the sector the pace of change may have a greater impact on these organisations’ capacity
to learn.
10.3 Final conclusion
This thesis rethinks traditional construction safety in light of new theories from the nascent
era of Adaptive safety. Adaptive safety takes a less prescriptive approach to risk control,
instead endorsing the view that safe operations emerge from workers’ capability to adapt
and respond. The applicability of this concept in many industries has yet to be explored;
thus, the aim of this research was to identify ways this philosophy could advance safety in
construction.
Giving workers more autonomy proved a challenging concept for managers in this
Safety I dominated sector. They saw its potential in valuing workers’ expertise, promot-
ing communication, building respect and trust in relationships, and fostering responsibility
and commitment; however, construction’s litigation culture, affinity for traditional safety,
project-based network structure, and transient workforce were seen as barriers to this.
These challenges suggest Adaptive safety is not compatible with all contexts, drawing at-
tention to its unknowns and the weak evidence in support of this concept.
In practice, where companies have moved towards Adaptive safety, they have incorpo-
rated engaging workers in shaping practice as part their organisational strategy. Increasing
worker engagement has been a positive step for the industry; improving buy-in, satisfaction,
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ownership, relationships, and challenging its obsession with workers’ ‘unsafe behaviour’ as
the root cause of accidents. However, it does not fully represent RE and HRO’s vision for a
spontaneous self-organising frontline response to safety-critical scenarios.
Organisational resilience is often described as as an emergent property of systems, cul-
tivated from the workforce. This work demonstrates the significance of systemic factors
that underpin a resilient response. Worker engagement and collaboration is undoubtedly
an important aspect, but without competence, communication structures, and a culture
committed to reducing risk it will not necessarily result in safety.
10.3.1 Original contribution
This work sheds light on the applicability of Adaptive safety in construction. Its incompat-
ibility raises questions about the challenges of construction as an industry which prevent
the adoption of new constructs, perpetuating the disconnect between OSH and systems
safety. Exploring these challenges with a systems thinking lens revealed the relationships
between workers’ ‘unsafe behaviours’ and aspects of the industry which compromise com-
petence and communication; attract a workforce with a higher propensity for risk; and put
pressure on workers to trade-off safety. These factors highlight new ways of thinking about
construction safety and new directions for future progress.
These explorations also reveal many research gaps in this field which need to be clar-
ified before Adaptive safety can applied more widely. The mechanisms and methods of
Adaptive safety are poorly understood, raising questions about its prerequisites at all lev-
els of the system; compatibility with different types of work; and suitability to networked
organisations.
On the way to this conclusion, the findings have also contributed to theories of safety
leadership; expanded Brace et al.’s (2009) categorisation of workers’ attitudes to risk; up-
dated Haslam et al.’s (2005) contributing factors in construction accidents (ConCA) model;
and discussed the challenges of methodology in applied sciences. The temptation to rush
into applications — as seen with many constructs in safety science — could deprive organ-
isational resilience of its depth and potential. Section 10.5 proposes an agenda for future
research needed to prove the value of Adaptive safety before taking risks in unknown ter-
ritory.
10.4 Limitations
Interview study
In the first phase of this work, the applicability of findings is limited by the sample and
study design. The data were based on a modest sample of experts, and as such a degree
of caution is required when generalising these to construction as a whole. This type of
exploratory expert panel study alongside sociotechnical system (STS) analysis proved to
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be an effective method in generating new theories and identifying new opportunities to
improve OSH; however, further research is needed to validate the proposed models.
Another limitation of this study is that is focuses on the views of managers and policy-
makers; it does not include the views of workers which would help to validate their per-
ception of risk-taking and evaluate the quality of the decision-making based on these in-
fluences. This is outside the scope of the study and is another area where future work is
needed.
Case study
Research is construction is complicated by project timelines and access to sites. The projects
used for the case study were at the extreme ends of their lifecycles: At TTT tunnelling had
not yet begun and at Crossrail the station was nearing completion. Thus, there was not an
opportunity to evaluate the suitability of ‘Next Gear’ on a project running at full capacity.
Construction is also a varied sector, of which this work has only focussed on infrastruc-
ture megaprojects. The scale and domain of these projects has clearly been a factor in Next
Gear’s dissemination; further research is required to explore its applicability in smaller
companies and other types of project.
10.5 Future work
Qualitative methods have provided valuable insights into this undertheorised concept. Pre-
maturely reducing resilience or Adaptive safety into a measurable construct or frame-
work that can be applied elsewhere should be avoided. This has been the downfall of
many promising concepts in safety such as culture (Guldenmund 2010) and workload
(Sharples 2018). At this early stage, research in this field should focus on observing and
understanding the mystery of how safety is socially constructed (like the original research
in HRO) rather than developing reductionist surveys or methods and toolkits to ‘engineer’
resilience.
Many questions about an Adaptive approach to safety remain, both in construction and
other sectors. Below, a research agenda is proposed to guide future research in the short
and long term.
Short term
• Continuing to study Next Gear at LOR
Having implemented the programme for less than three years, it is too early to draw
definitive conclusions about its success. Neither of the projects case studied provide
a view of Safety Differently at the height of construction: Questions remain about
whether it can cope with this pace of work; the effect of a serious incident; and
proving its long-term impact on accident rates. A longitudinal case study is needed
to follow the progress of this strategy throughout a project.
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• Other types of construction
As mentioned in Section 10.4, this work only studied infrastructure megaprojects.
Further work is required to explore the compatibility of Adaptive safety in other types
of construction — project types, domains, scales, and locations. For instance, the
case study findings suggest Adaptive safety is better suited to construction (rather
than infrastructure) projects where there is less interference from the client, and on
smaller sites where teams are co-located. Both these hypotheses could be tested in
future studies. This work could be used to expand Figure 9.3, comparing where
different types of work fit within the continuum from traditional to Adaptive safety
management.
Medium term
• Applicability to other sectors
Adaptive safety has been studied most extensively in healthcare (Sutcliffe and Weick
2013): Studying it in another context has revealed barriers where its ideas need to
be adapted and many gaps for further research. Similar sectors — such as mining
or agriculture — may confirm these findings or provide insights of their own. There
are many sectors where the potential for Adaptive safety has not been explored. This
could also contribute to the development of Figure 9.3 and look towards a general
model defining the types of work which are best suited to differing degrees of Adap-
tive safety.
Long term
• Organisational change in construction
Studying how Next Gear has been developed and rolled-out across LOR has high-
lighted the challenges of changing culture and diffusing innovations across this dy-
namic sector. This is one reason safety interventions are often ineffective, so research
to understand address this would be valuable.
• Mechanisms of Adaptive safety
This thesis contributes to our understanding of Adaptive safety, but there are still
many questions about how resilience emerges and how to cultivate it. Work is needed
to confirm the model of systemic antecedents proposed in Figure 9.2 of this thesis and
understand how to balance new and traditional methods of risk management.
Positioning the researcher
In social research it is important to consider the work in light of a researcher’s position. My
background as an Ergonomist is an unusual one in this field: Fundamental to Ergonomics
is the principle of understanding and redesigning the system rather than blaming and con-
demning its users. This perspective is a refreshing one in OSH, and even more so in a
litigious sector like construction. Another unusual aspect of my position is as a female re-
searcher in a male-dominated sector — although having previously worked in engineering
and defence this has become familiar.
Following my undergraduate degree in ergonomics, I worked as a Human Factors En-
gineer developing designs for what will become the Dreadnaught Class of ballistic nuclear
submarines. The first of these boats is expected to begin sea trials in 2023 and enter ac-
tive service in 2030 — more than 15 years after my involvement in the project. As a new
graduate, this project provided an ideal opportunity to tackle many ergonomic challenges
from classic anthropometry and HMI to organisational issues of training needs and crew
resource management; however, what fascinated memore than life onboard the submarine
was the lifecycle of this complex megaproject and its social and economic impact on the
local area.
Winning and managing this contract well is critical to sustaining the isolated shipbuild-
ing community of Barrow-in-Furness. Living in this town for a year also challenged my
stereotypes about manual workers and I chose a PhD topic in construction — a sector
passed over by human factors specialists in favour of ‘sexier’ ultra-safe domains, yet one
in need of the most help. Based on this background, my interpretation of the data in this
thesis are unavoidably influenced, but in a way which I hope brings original insight.
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Figure A.1: An example from the coding structure developed during interview analysis
Nodes References
Risk management difficulties 581
Industry 229
Client 99
Conflict of interest 64
Cost 26
Reputation 8
Speed 23
Supply chain 3
Intimidation 4
Lack of buy-in 13
Comparison with other sectors 4
Ownership of risk 9
Underinformed client 17
About construction 8
About Safety 9
Varied clients 1
Financial risk 2
Subcontracted structure 74
Communication 5
Coordination 5
Mistrust 6
Standardisation 18
Company policies 12
Competence 6
Transient workforce 40
Difficult to implement safety strategy 2
Disposable 5
Lack of loyalty to principle contractor 8
Loss of local knowledge 2
Unstable culture 5
Varied levels of experience 5
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Nodes References
Unregulated 20
Companies 7
Lack of standardisation of safety 6
No need for formal qualifications 6
Variation between companies and projects 29
Domain 2
Lack of transferability 8
Lack of knowledge transfer between projects 2
Pushing boundaries 3
Size 17
Type of construction 2
Organisational 211
Accountability 67
Blame culture 7
Blurred chains of responsibility 2
Compartmentalisation 19
Separating safety from primary operations 7
Silo Working 12
Fear of litigation or claims culture 14
Shirking safety responsibility 22
Client 2
Health and safety team 11
Subcontractors 8
Attitude towards risk 33
Acceptance of risk or not challenging risk 8
Conservative 2
Focus on safety not health 1
Lack of new ideas 11
Awareness of innovation 3
Minimum compliance 6
Time and cost of change 5
Planning 57
Coordinating a complex project 10
Not integrating safety at the design phase 16
Undesignable workplace 7
Unlike a factory 5
Unpredictable 10
Poorly designed policies 54
Disproportionate 2
Lack of review 5
Measurable 2
BCase studyparticipants
Table B.1: LOR management participants
ID Crossrail or TTT Years with company Years in construction Role
1 Both 20 20 Senior safety manager
2 Neither 1.5 25 Senior safety manager
3 Crossrail 5 38 Senior safety manager
Table B.2: Crossrail Tottenham Court Road station (TCR) participants
ID Employer Years with company Years in construction Role
4 LOR 30 40 Construction manager
5 LOR 2.5 9 Section engineer
6 LOR 13 13 Section engineer
7 LOR 13 25 HSE manager
8–16 Subcontractors Supervisors
Table B.3: TTT participants
ID Employer Previously on
Crossrail
Years with
company
Years in
construction
Role
17 Ferrovial Yes 4 23 Head of HSE
18 LOR No 0.5 0.5 HSE graduate
19 Ferrovial No 2 2 HSE manager
20 LOR Yes (client) 2 13 HSE manager
21 Subcontractor No 2 20 Crane supervisor
22 Self Yes 11 13 Appointed person
23 LOR Yes 1 5 Section engineer
24 LOR Yes 3.5 3.5 Section engineer
25 LOR (Expanded) Yes 7 10 Crane supervisor
26 LOR Yes 1.5 25 HSE manager
27 Client Yes 7 17 Site manager
28 Subcontractor Yes 7 60 Stores
29 Ferrovial No 5 5 Stores
30–33 Subcontractors Yes Slingers
34–37 Subcontractors Yes Carpenters
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